more bathroom reading material...NEW YORK’S HIGHEST COURT UPHOLD

more bathroom reading material...

www.irenewarshauer.com/LeadPaint.pdf




This is the html version of the file http://www.irenewarshauer.com/LeadPaint.pdf.
Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.
Page 1
1
NEW YORK’S HIGHEST COURT UPHOLDS INSURANCE FOR LEAD-BASED PAINT;
INDOOR AIR QUALITY CLAIMS SHOULD FOLLOW SUIT
BY IRENE C. WARSHAUER1
Building owners are protected from sick building syndrome and lead-based paint claims
by their all risk insurance policies, despite the so-called “absolute” polluter’s exclusion and the
so-called “total” polluter’s exclusion, non-negotiated provisions, drafted by the insurance
industry in the last 20 years and added to the standard-form insurance policies. The exclusions
were drafted to exclude environmental pollution claims and do not expressly mention sick
building syndrome or lead-based paint, indeed, some policies have specific lead exclusions.
Many courts, faced with the task of interpreting these exclusions, have found that liability
from the exposure in a household or commercial setting to products or substances such as
a*****estos insulation, lead-based paint or emissions from everyday products which cause sick
building syndrome, are not excluded. Under the interpretation advocated by insurance
companies, virtually any substance that causes harm is a “toxic chemical,” “waste material,”
“irritant,” “contaminant” or “pollutant,” thus rendering insurance coverage illusory. One
insurance company argued that injuries from carbon monoxide buildup caused by people exhal-
ing were excluded by the polluter’s exclusion.
New York Case
Building owners have won some major coverage victories in the past year. One such
victory is New York’s highest court’s decision that the so-called “absolute” pollution exclusion
did not excuse the insurance company’s defense obligation for the lead poisoning claim of an
infant living in a rental apartment.
1
The primary policy had both a lead paint exclusion and a
pollution exclusion; whereas, the umbrella policy had its own pollution exclusion, but no lead
paint exclusion. The court held that since “the umbrella policy contains specific exclusions for
other types of injuries including alcohol, a*****estos and pollution claims, but not for lead paint”
there was coverage for the lead paint claim.
2
[The insurance company’s] argument, that the pollution exclusion clause of the
umbrella policy excludes coverage for lead paint poisoning, must also be rejected. ‘To
negate coverage by virtue of an exclusion, an insurer must establish that the exclusion is
stated in clear and unmistakable language, is subject to no other reasonable interpretation,
and applies in the particular cases.’[citing Rapid American]. If the language of the policy
is doubtful or uncertain in its meaning, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the
insured and against the insurer. When the exclusionary clause does not include the
particular loss that the insurance company alleges, then the insured is entitled to be
defended and possibly indemnified.
1 Irene C. Warshauer is Of Counsel to Fried & Epstein, LLP where she specializes in representing policyholders in
insurance coverage litigation and alternate dispute resolution.
Page 2
2
Defendant has not met its burden of showing that lead paint comes within the pollution exclusion
of the umbrella policy. First, nothing in the definition of pollutants as defined in provision
VII.K(3) of the umbrella policy indicates that lead paint is included in the term. That section
defines pollutants as “smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, sound, alkalies, chemicals, liquids,
solids, gases, thermal “pollutant,” and all other irritants and “contaminants.” There is no
language that demonstrates the drafter’s intent to incorporate lead paint into the pollution
exclusion clauses. The insurer has not established that lead paint, in “clear and unmistakable
language,” is included in the pollution exclusion. Moreover, both policies contain the general
pollution exclusion while only the underlying policy contains a specific lead paint exclusion.
Unless different meanings are to be ascribed to the pollution exclusion clauses in these policies,
defendant’s position that lead paint injuries are excluded under the pollution exclusion, would
render the specific lead paint exclusion in the underlying policy meaningless, in violation of
settled canons of construction. It is at least ambiguous as to whether lead paint claims are
excluded pursuant to the umbrella policy’s pollution exclusion. That ambiguity must be
construed against the insurer. (citations omitted)
3
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department also decided in favor of insurance coverage.
The policyholder was sued by a person who suffered “injuries resulting from the exposure to
toxic fumes during a construction safety course conducted by [the policyholder].”
4
The injury
occurred when “fumes were released when a roofing membrane was applied with a hot air gun
during a classroom demonstration.”
5
The court found that the so-called “total” pollution
exclusion was ambiguous in these circumstances as,
An ordinary insured in plaintiff’s shoes would not understand that the policy does
not cover a claim for bodily injuries such as those sustained by Rickard. First, an
average insured could reasonably interpret that endorsement as applying to environmental
pollution only. The purpose of the pollution exclusion historically has been to exclude
coverage for environmental pollution. …. Given the history of the pollution exclusion
and the terms used therein, it is entirely reasonable that an ordinary insured would
conclude that the endorsement is applicable only to bodily injuries caused by traditional
environmental pollution and not to bodily injuries arising from the use of a product for its
intended purpose. Second, for the exclusion to apply there must be a “discharge, dispersal
*** release or escape of pollutants” . The fumes that injured Rickard were part of the
normal roofing process and confined to the area where the demonstration was conducted.
Rickard was in the immediate vicinity when he inhaled them. “It strains the plain
meaning, and obvious intent, of the language to suggest that these fumes * * * had
somehow been ‘discharged, dispersed, released or escaped.”
Third, the term “pollutant” is ambiguous because there is virtually no substance or
chemical in existence that is not an “irritant or contaminant.”(citations omitted)
6
The Second Department’s older decision in A-One Oil Inc.,
7
which held that a contractor
was not covered for bodily injuries and property damage for a*****estos injuries resulting from the
replacement of furnace covered with a*****estos containing insulation, is in doubt after Westview.
The Second Circuit, interpreting New York law, held that the exclusion can reasonably
be interpreted to apply only to environmental pollution, and not to all contact with substances
Page 3
3
which may be classified as pollutants. The panel concluded that carbon monoxide poisoning
from a faulty residential heater was not the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the
polluter’s exclusion.
8
Applying New York law, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York refused to apply the polluter’s exclusion to preclude coverage for sick building syn-
drome.
9
The court rejected Public Service Mutual Insurance Company’s attempt to avoid
coverage by relying upon New York Court of Appeals decisions which:
all involved environmental pollution, and thus the issue of whether pollution exclusions
were ambiguous with respect to non-environmental pollutants was neither addressed by,
nor even mentioned in, these cases.
10
The Garfield Slope court held that the exclusion does not bar coverage for injuries from
carpet fumes, stating:
Because the carpet fumes at issue here were released inside, and because they typically
are not the kind of environmental pollution about which state and federal regulators are
concerned, it is at least ambiguous whether they fall within Public Service’s “Absolute
Pollution Exclusion.”
11
The Southern District upheld insurance coverage in a lead-based paint poisoning case.
12
Decisions Across the Country
Courts have ruled both ways in these types of cases, with the majority of recent cases
decided in favor of policyholders. Courts which look at the exclusion as a whole generally
decide that it was intended to exclude traditional environmental pollution and decide for the
policyholder; whereas, those which focus on one word such as “fumes” or “contaminant” tend to
find for the insurance industry. This article will discuss recent cases from a variety of
jurisdictions demonstrating the varying circumstances in which insurance coverage has been
upheld or denied.
Indoor Air Quality
While there are very few decisions specifically using the term “sick building syndrome”
or “indoor air quality,” several cases uphold insurance coverage for carbon monoxide poisoning
claims. A few key decisions by state highest courts are illustrative. The Illinois Supreme Court
traced the history of coverage for pollution and the polluter’s exclusions and held that the so-
called “absolute” polluter’s exclusion did not preclude claims for carbon monoxide poisoning
from a cracked heater at a commercial building:
Our review of the history of the pollution exclusion amply demonstrates that the
predominate motivation in drafting an exclusion for pollution-related injuries was the
avoidance of the “enormous expense and exposure resulting from the ‘explosion’ of
environmental litigation.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the 1986 amendment to the
exclusion was wrought, not to broaden the provision’s scope beyond its original purpose
of excluding coverage for environmental pollution, but rather to remove the “sudden and
accidental” exception to coverage which, as noted above, resulted in a costly onslaught of
Page 4
4
litigation. We would be remiss, therefore, if we were to simply look to the bare words of
the exclusion, ignore its raison d’être, and apply it to situations which do not remotely
resemble traditional environmental contamination. The pollution exclusion has been, and
should continue to be, the appropriate means of avoiding “the yawning extent of potential
liability arising from the gradual or repeated discharge of hazardous substances into the
environment.” (Emphasis in original). We think it improper to extend the exclusion
beyond that arena.(citations omitted)
13
The Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to apply the polluter’s exclusion to a restaurant whose
fan malfunctioned, causing a patron to be poisoned by carbon monoxide, stating:
The exclusion should not reflexively be applied to accidents arising during the course of
normal business activities simply because they involve a “discharge, dispersal, release or
escape” or an “irritant or contaminant.”
* * *
The insureds obviously did not contemplate that their ordinary cooking operations
would poison patrons while they were enjoying traditional Indian foods and dinners.
Surely, when they purchased their policy from Western Alliance, they expected that
accidents causing injuries to patrons at the restaurant due to the negligence of employees
or the malfunctioning of ovens and other equipment — claims arising during the course
of normal business activities — would be covered. A reasonable policyholder might well
understand carbon monoxide is a pollutant when it is emitted in an industrial or
environmental setting, [but] would not reasonably characterize carbon monoxide emitted
from a [malfunctioning or improperly operated restaurant oven] as ‘pollution.’ (citation
omitted)
14
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed two lower court rulings which had excluded
claims for bodily injury based on a buildup of exhaled carbon dioxide. Holding the definition of
“pollutant” in the “absolute” pollution exclusion to be ambiguous, the court stated:
It is also significant that, unlike the nonexhaustive list of pollutants contained in
the pollution exclusion clause, exhaled carbon dioxide is universally present and
generally harmless in all but the most unusual instances. In addition, the respiration
process which produces exhaled carbon dioxide is a necessary and natural part of life. We
are therefore hesitant to conclude that a reasonable insured would necessarily view
exhaled carbon dioxide as in the same class as “smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste.”
15
While this result — that breathing is not a polluting activity — would appear obvious, the
insurance company had denied coverage on this basis, and two lower courts had found for the
insurance company.
Kentucky’s highest court upheld coverage for bodily injury from exposure to carbon
monoxide fumes due to a leak in a dry cleaner’s boiler’s vent stack.
16
The business was in a
Page 5
5
strip mall with a common attic, and adjoining tenants claimed bodily injury. The court refused to
deny coverage for what the trial court described as “inadvertent release of carbon dioxide during
course of RSJ’s normal business activities.” While finding language of the polluter’s exclusion
not inherently ambiguous, the RSJ court found that ambiguity “arises in the application of the
provision to the specifics of a particular claim.”
17
The court recognized the reasonable
expectations of the policyholder, stating:
we are convinced that an ordinary business person would not apprehend the provision as
excluding coverage for the type of damage incurred through an unexpected leak in a vent
pipe.
18
Nationwide Support for Policyholders
Most courts have found coverage for these types of claims relying on the rule that
ambiguities in an insurance policy are construed against the insurance company and in favor of
coverage, and on the reasonable expectations doctrine. A Connecticut state court upheld
coverage for lead-based paint poisoning under the exclusion:
The clause may also be deemed ambiguous to the extent that a reasonable insured would
interpret it to exclude coverage for claims arising out of factual circumstances more
analogous to classic environmental pollution, but not for claims of personal injury
allegedly sustained as a result of the type of paint covering the surfaces of rented
premises.
19
This doctrine enforces the policyholder’s reasonable expectations, recognizing that build-
ing owners expect their insurance policies to provide protection for indoor air quality or lead-
based paint and similar claims. Nonetheless, insurance companies continue to deny insurance
coverage based on a very broad reading of these exclusions.
The insurance companies over expansive reading of the so-called “total” pollution
exclusion was demonstrated in California where it was contended that a policyholder whose
plowing to plant grapes resulted in some soil entering adjoining water was barred from coverage
by that exclusion.
20
The Tsakopoulos court rejected “defendants argue[ment] that the term
‘pollutants’ unambiguously includes soil displaced by Tsakopoulos’s plowing operations.”
21
Soil discharged into previously-unspoiled waters of the United States might
constitute a “contaminant” or an “irritant” if those terms were to be construed
liberally. However, the definition of “pollutants” in each policy sets forth specific
examples of contaminants and/or irritants: “smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, chemicals and waste.” According to the principle of ejusdem generis, the
proper construction of the term “pollutant” is therefore “restricted” to
contaminants and irritants which are “of the same kind, class, or nature” as the
specific examples listed. . . . Defendants argue that the use of the word
“including” before the specific examples means that the definition of “pollutants”
should not be limited to substances which are similar to the specified examples.
However, the use of the word “including” does not affect the application of the
ejusdem generis doctrine.
22
Page 6
6
An Illinois appellate court examined the pollution exclusion in the context of a lead-
based paint case.
23
The court found it had no evidence that lead was an “irritant” and as to
whether lead based paint was a contaminant it found that “a reasonably prudent layperson could
conclude” that the dictionary definition of contaminant, does not “encompass the lead in lead-
based paint.”
24
The court found that
the definition [of contaminant] implies that there must be a contemporaneous association
between the contaminating substance and the time it corrupts the substance, no matter
how toxic, dangerous, or undesirable it might later be determined to be. Thus, the paint
could only have been “contaminated” at the time the lead was added. We do not believe
that a reasonably prudent layperson would understand that lead-based paint was
contaminated from its time of creation. It was also not later contaminated since there was
not subsequent corruption by lead, which caused the paint to become contaminated, such
as would occur if lead pipes corrupted a water supply.
25
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit interpreting Maine law held that
a policyholder which injured a worker with “hazardous fumes discharged by roofing products
used to …repair the roof” was entitled to use its insurance coverage, despite a so-called “total”
polluters exclusion.
26
[A]n individual. . . engaged in a business not known to present the risk of environmental
pollution “would not understand that the Nautilus policy excluded coverage for injuries
arising from the use of products associated with that business for the purpose for which
those products [were] intended.” Indeed, such an interpretation would render the Nautilus
policy virtually meaningless.
27
The Washington Supreme Court held there is insurance coverage for a suit by a diesel
fuel delivery man who was significantly injured when a faulty intake valve caused the diesel fuel
to backflow over him into his eyes, lungs and stomach.
28
The court examined the exclusion in the
context of the case and the purpose of the exclusion, finding “the insurance companies’ objective
in creating both clauses [the so-called “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion and the so-
called “absolute” pollution exclusion] was to avoid liability for environmental pollution . . . [and]
relates to environmental damage.”
29
The court rejected the argument that because diesel fuel is a
pollutant the exclusion precludes coverage. The delivery man
was not polluted by diesel fuel. It struck him…. Most importantly, the fuel was not
acting as a ‘pollutant’ when it struck him….We have previously held the average
purchaser of a comprehensive liability policy reasonably expects broad coverage for
liability arising from business operations and ‘exclusions should be construed strictly
against the insurer.’
30
When underlying Indiana plaintiffs claimed they were “exposed to harmful toxic fumes from
substances used to install carpet in the” policyholders building. The insurance company denied
coverage based on the pollution exclusion.
31
The court held that the pollution exclusion was
ambiguous.
Page 7
7
While the policy’s definition of pollutants includes the term “fumes,” it does not include
carpet glue or any other substance used to install carpet. Furthermore, as determined by
the Kiger court, this clause cannot be read literally as it would negate virtually all
coverage.
32
Virginia also weighed in on the side of the policyholder. In a lead-based paint case involving
lead poisoning of a child living in a rental unit, the court found “it is reasonable to conclude that
the exclusion clause applies only to claims based on environmental pollution.”
33
The Arizona Court of Appeals upheld a policyholder’s right to insurance coverage for
personal injuries arising from drinking water which was contaminated by bacteria at a mixed use
development.
34
Prior to the injury, the City of Scottsdale had detected total and fecal cloriform
bacteria in the development’s drinking water. Northbrook denied coverage under its commercial
general liability policy on the grounds that the pollution exclusion precluded coverage, as “the
total and fecal coliform bacteria that contaminated the water and caused Keggi’s illness were
excluded ‘pollutants’ within the meaning of the pollution exclusion clauses.”
35
The court
recognized that courts across the country have noted the breadth of the terms “irritant” and
“contaminant” but that “pollutants” are limited to “irritants” and “contaminants” that are “solid,
liquid, gaseous or thermal” and that “water-borne bacteria… do not fit neatly within this
definition.”
36
The court also found that “waste” as defined in the policy to include materials to be
reclaimed or recycled “implies that the term refers to industrial byproducts, rather than organic
matter which might have caused the contamination of the water.”
37
We also note that the exclusion clause appears to describe events, places, and
activities normally associated with traditional environmental pollution claims. .
.[and]directed at industrial insureds who must handle, store, and treat “hazardous wastes”
in conducting their daily operations….These provisions appear to be intended to preclude
coverage for clean-up operations ordered under RCRA, CERCLA, and other federal or
state environmental laws. Thus, the exclusion’s context confirms that the drafters
intended it to apply to traditional “environmental pollution” situations and substances.
38
“Public policy supports a narrow interpretation of the exclusion so that it does not
eviscerate coverage otherwise reasonably expected by the insured.”
39
Finally, the court
looked to the context in which the policy was purchased and the nature of the claim:
[T]he transaction as a whole supports a finding that the exclusion does not
apply in this case. Desert Mountain’s CGL premium specifically contemplated
the operation of golf clubs and restaurants, and even the provision of water
through its water company. Certainly an insured who purchases CGL insurance
expects to be covered for ordinary negligence in the course of its insured
operations. Where the insured’s operations include distribution or serving of
water, an insured would reasonably expect to be covered for negligently
distributing or serving contaminated water which causes an illness or disease.
(citations omitted).
40
The news is not all good for policyholders. Contrast the following Missouri case with the
Arizona water contamination case discussed above. The Missouri Court of Appeals decided in
Page 8
8
favor of the insurance company that damages to a plumbing system caused by a restaurant’s
discharge of “waste, including kitchen grease, scour pads, heavy plastic, and underwear, …in
their use of the premises as a restaurant” were excluded from insurance coverage by the total
pollution exclusion.
41
The court based its reasoning on the policy’s definition of “pollutant” as
including “waste” and the dictionary’s definition of “waste” as “refuse from places of human or
animal habitation.”
42
The Eighth District Court of Appeals in Ohio held that the so-called “absolute” polluters
exclusion precluded coverage for a death caused by carbon monoxide poisoning from a faulty
heating unit in an apartment owned by the policyholder.
43
The appellate court looked at a series
of Ohio cases which had found the exclusion to be unambiguous and reversed. One Ohio case
found for the policyholder. The owner of a residential dwelling sought insurance coverage under
its Commercial General Liability policy for a lawsuit by tenants for injuries sustained because of
exposure to lead based paint.
44
The policy did not have a lead paint exclusion. The insurance
company denied coverage relying on the pollution exclusion. The court found that the policy
language of the pollution exclusion was ambiguous as “shown by the fact that various courts in
construing the language in question have arrived at conflicting conclusions as to the correct
meaning, intent, and effect thereof, especially where the contract containing such language was
executed subsequently to the conflicting judicial constructions.”
45
Florida law continues to support the insurance companies on the pollution exclusion. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed a holding that the Tampa Housing Authority was not protected for a
lead poisoning claim.
46
The Florida Supreme Court had applied the so-called “absolute” pol-
luter’s exclusion to preclude coverage for sick building syndrome. .”
47
This decision has been
criticized for its “formal, superficial analysis and tone” as well as for its “fundamental
misunderstanding of the reasonable expectations concept.
48
Conclusion
The majority of courts which have decided sick building syndrome, lead-based paint and
similar claims have upheld the policyholder’s right to insurance coverage despite the so-called
“absolute” and “total” polluter’s exclusions.
Page 9
9
1 Westview Associates v. Guaranty National Ins. Co., No. 2000 NY. Int. 117(Ct. of App. October 26, 2000),
reprinted in Mealey’s Litigation Reports: Insurance, Nov. 1, 2000.
2 Slip op. at 4.
3 Slip op. at 4-5.
4 Roofers’ Joint Training v. General Acc. Ins. Co. No.,(1361), 00-00401, (N.Y. Sup. App. Div. Sept. 29, 2000),
reprinted in Mealey’s Litigation Reports: Insurance, Oct. 3, 2000, slip op. at 1-2.
5 Roofers, slip op. at 2.
6 Roofers’, slip op at 3-4.
7 A-One Oil Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 672 NYS2d 423 (2d Dep’t 1998).
8 Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 47 F3d 34 (2d Cir. 1995).
9 Garfield Slope Housing Corp. v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins.Co., 973 FSupp 326 (EDNY 1997).
10 Id. at 337.
11 Id.
12 Lefrak Org., Inc.v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 942 FSupp 949 (S.D.N.Y.1996).
13 American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 687 NE2d 72,81(Ill. 1997).
14 Western Alliance v. Gill, 686 NE2d 997, 999,1000 (Mass. 1997).
15 Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 564 NW2d 728,732-33(Wis. 1997).
16 Motorist Mutual Ins. Co. v. RSJ, 926 SW2d 679(1996).
17 Id. at 680.
18 Id. at 682.
19 Danbury Insurance Company v. Joseph Novella, No. LPLCU 9503/991 15, 1993 WL 830935 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 13, 1998).
20 Tsakopoulos v. American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co., No. S-99-0853 (E. D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000), reprinted in
Mealey’s Litigation Reports: Insurance, Sept. 19, 2000.
21 Tsakopoulos, slip op. at 12.
22 Tsakopoulos, slip op. at 14-15.
23 Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Stringfield, 292 Ill. App. 3d 371, 685 N.E.2d 980 (1997).
24 Stringfield, 685 NE2d 980, 982-3 (1997).
25 Stringfield, 685 NE2d 980, 983-984.
Page 10
10
26 Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Jabar, 188 F3d 27, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1999)
27 Jabar, 188 F.3d 27, 30.
28 Kent Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., No. 67635-6 (Sup. Ct. Wash. Apr. 27, 2000), reprinted in Mealey’s
Litigation Reports: Insurance, May 2, 2000.
29 Kent Farms, slip op. at 5.
30 Kent Farms slip op. at 5-6.
31 Freidline v. Shelby Ins. Co., No. 71A03-0004-CV-132(Ct. of App. Ind. Nov. 29, 2000), reprinted in Mealey’s
Litigation Reports: Insurance, Dec. 12, 2000, slip op. at 2.
32 Slip op. at 9.
33 Unisun Insurance Co. v. Schulwolf, No. L97-3179 (Cir. Ct, Norfolk, Va. August 23, 2000, letter opinion)
reprinted in Mealey’s Litigation Reports: Insurance, Nov. 1, 2000, slip op. at 4-5.
34 Keggi v. Northbrook Property and Cas.Ins. Co., No. 1 CA-CV 99-0566(Ariz. Ct. App., Dec. 5, 2000), reprinted
in Mealey’s Litigation Reports: Insurance, Dec.12, 2000.
35
Keggi, slip op. at 8.
36 Slip op. at 10-11.
37 Slip op. at 12.
38 Keggi, slip op. at 13-14.
39 Keggi, slip op. at 17.
40 Keggi, slip op. at 18.
41 Boulevard Investment Company v. Capitol Indemnity Corporation, No. ED77363 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis, Mo., Sept.
26, 2000), reprinted in Mealey’s Litigation Reports: Insurance, Oct. 3, 2000, slip op. at 2.
42 Id. at 3.
43 Andersen v. Highland House Company, No. 75769 (Ct. of App. Ohio May 11, 2000), reprinted in Mealey’s
Litigation Reports: Insurance, May 23, 2000, slip op. at 9-10.
44 Auto-Owners’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Harden, No. 99-06-068 (Ct.Common Pleas, Van Wert Co.,Ohio), reprinted in
Mealey’s Litigation Reports: Insurance, Nov. 1, 2000.
45 Wood, slip op. at 5.
46 .Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. City of Tampa Housing Authority, No. 00-10283 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000), Reported in
Mealey’s Litigation Reports: Insurance, Oct. 3, 2000, slip op. at 2.
47 Deni Assaciates of Florida Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 1998).
48 Stempel, “Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong Approach to Construing the Liability Insurance
Pollution Exclusion,” 50 Fla. L. Rev. 463, 466 (1998).

所有跟帖： 

• my goodness. I gave up after reading 3 pages -sunskitehomes- ♂ (0 bytes) () 02/08/2010 postreply 20:55:48