Djokovic played very close to the baseline to counter Nadal’s heavy forehand, which typically pushes opponents back and delivers shorter, easier balls for Nadal to feast on.
Standing up in the court neutralized Nadal’s forehand and also enabled Djokovic to go down the line to find Nadal’s backhand at will.
Nadal’s most potent weapon, the run-around forehand in the deuce court, was a non-factor as Djokovic forced Nadal to hit backhands in the deuce court instead.
Djokovic owned the back of the court Monday night, and Nadal could do little more than react to his opponent’s superior court position by running side to side desperately trying to stay in the point.
This real estate battle enabled Djokovic to hit 55 winners for the match to Nadal’s 32.
Playing around the baseline also helped Djokovic be in better position to attack the net when Nadal routinely dropped the ball short.
Controlling the baseline gave Djokovic control of the net where he won 31/47 (66 percent) approach points. The primary pattern was to come in to Nadal’s backhand and then surprise to the forehand once he had Nadal’s mind conditioned to that strategy
By contrast, Nadal only came to the net 17 times in four sets – about a quarter of total approach points. Nadal won 13 of those points, but to come forward so few times displayed a major flaw in his strategy, especially since it provided him with his best winning percentage of any tactic for the match.
Djokovic averaged almost 12 approaches per set (tour average is eight), while Nadal averaged just over four. It makes it impossible for Nadal to win when Djokovic owns the back and the front of the court.
Djokovic also took control of Nadal’s service games, breaking him 11 times from 26 break point opportunities. Converting break point on Nadal’s serve used to be the toughest point to win on tour, but Djokovic now makes it look easy.
Again, it’s the Djokovic backhand that wreaks havoc with Nadal’s favorite patterns of play.
Nadal loves to serve out wide in the Ad court to take advantage of his natural lefty slice. In the 2010 Wimbledon final against Tomas Berdych, Nadal won 13/14 points on first serves out wide in the Ad court, and 3/3 on second serves. He owned that position against Berdych, which was a major factor in Nadal saving all four break points he faced.
Monday night it was Djokovic who owned this favorite Nadal pattern.
Through the first three sets, Nadal served out wide in the Ad court 19 times on first serves, where he would normally expect to win at least 16 of those points. He only won eight.
Djokovic’s improved backhand, and the improved court position he hits it from, takes away Nadal’s dominance in rallies, helps Djokovic get to the net a lot more, and steals points from Nadal’s favorite serve patterns.
Djokovic’s backhand dominated during the point, and his mental toughness was also superior between the points.
When Djokovic developed back problems at the end of the third set, he knew trouble was on the horizon, and the match could easily slip away.
“I knew I wasn’t physically there,” Djokovic said. “I wasn’t as fit as I was at the start of the match. I needed to take the chances I did.”
He was in trouble and he knew that the only way out was to attack even more and keep the points short.Djokovic hit 17 winners in the fourth set, made only four unforced errors, and won it 6-1. Djokovic attacked every way possible in the fourth set, winning 8/11 (73 percent) approaching, while Nadal only won 2/2 (100 percent).
The fourth set is a metaphor for all six matches that Djokovic has won over Nadal in 2011. When the going got tough, Djokovic attacked even more. How Djokovic played the fourth set should have been how Nadal played the first three.
After all, what has Nadal got to lose, except another six matches in a row?
2. Enough cannot be said about how poorly Nadal served. Yes, Djokovic was hitting the serve cleanly enough and early enough that he would have broken him a few times, no doubt. But Nadal's MPH and placement were extremely poor - especially on that Ad Court slice to the backhand. More often than not, Djokovic didnt even have to move to strike a return. Whether it was nerves, strength, or technique, Nadal's serve was back to his early days, when he served, on average, in the 100 mphs. He still would have lost this match, but he wouldnt have gotten broken as ridiculously easy as he was.
Nadal has to start being more aggressive on the backhand, and start striking it with greater variety and venom. he actually has a most powerful down the line shot, which he does not employ out of risk aversion. he simply has to change his attitude and hit out.
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