苏联1969年8~9月要对中国进行 “外科手术式核打击” 的真伪小考。
根据 美国外交部（DoS）解密的外交档案，节选1969-8-18 ~~~ 1969-9-10，特别是
1969-8-28前后几天，这一天是网传的 美国华盛顿明星报 披露 苏联要对中国 “动手术”的那一天，那几天。
/// 8月20日，苏联驻美大使多勃雷宁奉命在华盛顿紧急约见美国总统国家安全事务助理基辛格，向他通报了苏联准备对中国实施核打击的意图，并征求美方意见。///
在同他的高级官员紧急磋商后，尼克松认为西方国家的最大威胁来自苏联，一个强大中国的存在符合西方的战略利益。苏联对中国的核打击，必然会招致中国的全面报复。到那时，核污染会将直接威胁驻亚洲25万美军的安全。最可怕的是，一旦让苏联人打开核打击这个潘多拉盒子，整个世界就会跪倒在北极熊面前。到时美国也会举起白旗的。
8月28日，《华盛顿明星报》在醒目位置刊登一则消息，标题是《苏联欲对中国做外科手术式核打击》。文中说:“据可靠消息，苏联欲动用中程弹道导弹，携带几百万吨当量的核弹头，对中国的重要军事基地——酒泉、西昌发射基地、罗布泊核试验基地，以及北京、长春、鞍山等重要工业城市进行外科手术式的核打击。” /// ---- 这是不少中文媒体通用的关键词语。
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so it's possible that this was a bluff from the Soviet leaders. Maybe they believed that the threat of nuclear war could end the border clashes with no need to actually send any missiles or bombers up.
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On August 28, 1969, the "Washington Star" 华盛顿明星报 published a message in a prominent position, entitled "The Soviet Union wants to do a surgical nuclear attack on China." The article said: "According to reliable news, the Soviet Union wants to use medium-range ballistic missiles, carrying millions of tons of nuclear warheads, important military bases for China - Jiuquan, Xichang missile launching base, Lop Nur nuclear test base, and Beijing, Changchun, Surgical nuclear strikes in important industrial cities such as Anshan.”【酒泉，西昌，罗布泊基地，北京，长春，鞍山 - 注】
On September 16, London’s Saturday Post 周六邮报 published an article by Soviet freelance journalist Victor Louis 维克多-路易斯, stating that “the Soviet Union may conduct an aerial attack against base in China’s Xinjiang Lop Nur ." 【Lop Nur , 罗布泊，罗布淖尔 - 注】
Many years later, the former KGB senior official Shi Xiaoqin, 【石小钦 - 音译 - 注】who was in the West, wrote in the New York Times that after 1969, the Soviet military hardliners advocated "to eliminate the Chinese threat once and for all", and indeed considered China. The nuclear facility carried out a surgical assault air raid, which has allowed the Soviet nuclear warheads of 35 missile bases in Asia to target China's missile bases and important urban targets, and has tested the attitude of the United States.
In that situation, China had to make a more urgent estimate of the danger of war. At that time, it was judged that a large-scale war would be launched at a glance. It was even estimated that the time of the Soviet Union’s sudden attack might be on National Day, or it may be the same time that the Soviet delegation arrived in Beijing in October.
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苏联驻美大使（1962~1986）
Anatoly Fyodorovich Dobrynin
阿纳托利·费奥多罗维奇·多勃雷宁
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Document 10 | |
| U.S. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, "US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR [Chinese Peoples Republic] Nuclear Capability; Significance of Latest Sino-Soviet Border Clash, ...," 18 August 1969, Secret/Sensitive | ||
| Source: National Archives, SN 67-69, Def 12 Chicom | ||
A few days after the Kissinger-Whiting meeting, the Soviets directly probed for U.S. reactions to a strike on Chinese nuclear facilities. During the early 1960s, the United States had probed Soviet interest in possible joint action against China's incipient nuclear capabilities but Moscow would go no further in pressuring China than signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.9 Six years later, the tables turned. Boris Davydov, a KGB officer with diplomatic cover, surprised INR Vietnam expert William Stearman by asking how the United States would react if the Soviets solved one nuclear proliferation problem: by attacking Chinese nuclear weapons facilities. The fact that this extraordinary meeting took place has been disclosed before, but Stearman's "memcon" has never been published.10 Soviet archives and perhaps the memories of former Soviet officials may someday disclose whether Davydov's approach was part of a campaign to intimidate the Chinese or an effort to test U.S. reactions to real contingency plans (or both).
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Document 11 | |
| State Department cable 141208 to U.S. Consulate Hong Kong etc., 21 August 1969, Secret, Limdis11 | ||
| Source: National Archives, SN 67-69, Pol Chicom-USSR | ||
Davydov's query caused some consternation at the State Department and a few days later a cable went out (drafted by Stearman) asking a number of U.S. embassies to keep their ears open for similar queries from Soviet officials. Stearman prefaced his message with an excerpt from National Intelligence Estimate on Sino-Soviet relations; intelligence community analysts opined that there "is at least some chance" that Moscow "may be preparing to take action" to prevent Chinese nuclear forces from threatening the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the analysts suggested that the likelihood was not high that such a scenario could unfold because the Soviets, like the Chinese, wanted to avoid a "full-scale war."
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Document 12 | |
| State Department cable 143579 to U.S. Mission to NATO, 25 August 1969, Secret, Limdis | ||
| Source: National Archives, SN 67-69, Pol Chicom-USSR | ||
Prompted by concern over a particularly bloody clash at the Xinjiang province border on 13 August, political advisers (POLADs) to the various national delegations at NATO headquarters in Brussels prepared to discuss Sino-Soviet developments. As background for the discussion, INR prepared background information for the U.S. POLAD, Gerald B. Helman. INR considered the possibility of a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear facilities but saw many reasons why the Kremlin would conclude that such an attack was unwise.
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Document 13 | |
| State Department cable 143440 to U.S. Consulate Hong Kong, 25 August 1969, Secret, Exdis | ||
| Source: National Archives, SN 67-69, Pol Chicom-US | ||
Besides Zhou's worried comments about a Soviet attack, U.S. China watchers became aware of other indications of Chinese apprehension about Moscow's intentions. At the same time, by the late summer of 1969, Beijing was beginning to send out "feelers" expressing interest in improved relations with Washington. In this cable, a staffer at State's Asian Communist Affairs (ACA) desk commented on a CAS (Controlled American Source or CIA) report that the State Department was "struck by the frequency with which these feelers [were] accompanied by new and more urgent expressions of concern that Soviets may be about to take further military action against China."
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Document 14 | |
| Memorandum from William Hyland, National Security Council Staff, to Henry Kissinger, "Sino-Soviet Contingencies," 28 August 1969, Secret | ||
| Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, box 710, USSR Vol. IV | ||
William Hyland, the author of this paper, was a Soviet analyst at CIA's Directorate of Intelligence before he was recruited for Kissinger's NSC staff. In this memorandum, Hyland critiqued an interagency study on Sino-Soviet relations that Kissinger has requested in National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 63. In the course of the analysis, which Kissinger characterized as "1st rate," Hyland acknowledged that a limited Sino-Soviet war was "by no means a disaster for the US." For example, implying that a war would involve Soviet strikes to destroy Chinese nuclear facilities, Hyland observed that it might be a "solution" to the China nuclear problem.12
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Document 15 | |
| Memorandum from Miriam Camps, State Department Planning and Coordination Staff, to Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, "NSSM 63 - Meeting with Consultants," 29 August 1969, Secret | ||
| Source: FOIA Release to National Security Archive | ||
State Department academic consultants on China and the Soviet Union were less sanguine than Hyland about the benefits of a Sino-Soviet war. During a discussion of the draft response to NSSM 63, the consultants argued that a Soviet attack could inflame Chinese nationalism and strengthen Mao's standing; moreover, a "non-nuclear Soviet strike would have a vast destabilizing effect" in Asia and Europe. Like Whiting, the consultants worried that Beijing might believe that the United States was tacitly colluding with the Soviet Union against China, the consultants recommended that Washington "avoid any whiff of collusion" with Moscow, a point that Under Secretary of State Elliott Richardson would include in a speech a few days later to the American Political Science Association.13
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Document 16 | |
| U.S. Embassy Tehran airgram A-383 to State Department, "Soviet Chicom Hostilities," 4 September 1969, Secret | ||
| Source: National Archives, SN 67-69, Pol 32-1 Chicom-USSR | ||
The danger of the border situation and the hope of some Soviet military officers that Washington would collude with Moscow against Beijing is apparent in this summary of a conversation with Major General Sergei Krakhmalov, the Soviet military attache in Tehran. Showing no compunction about nuclear weapons use, the general argued that Moscow "would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese if they attacked with major forces."
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Document 17 | |
| U.S. Embassy Moscow cable 4709 to State Department, "Question of Soviet Belligerent Moves Against China," 4 September 1969, Secret, Limdis | ||
| Source: National Archives, SN 67-69, Pol 32-1 Chicom-USSR | ||
Like INR's Soviet analysts, observers at the U.S. embassy in Moscow saw "many rules of reason" why the Kremlin was unlikely to launch a premeditated attack on China. Nevertheless, the Soviets saw the "Maoists" as a "universal threat" and if border fighting escalated, embassy analysts did not rule out the possibility that Moscow would take punishing military actions to teach Beijing an "exemplary lesson."
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Document 18 | |
| U.S. Mission to the United Nations cable 2888 to State Department, "Soviet-Chinese Relations," 5 September 1969, Secret, Exdis | ||
| Source: National Archives, SN 67-69, Pol Chicom-USSR | ||
In a conversation with a U.S. diplomat Michael Newlin, Arkady Shevchenko, a Soviet official at the United Nations, showed hawkishness on the border dispute: the Chinese were wrong to think that Moscow would "compromise" or to think that the Kremlin would not "use larger-than-tactical nuclear weapons."14 During the early 1970s, Shevchenko switched sides and began to provide information to the CIA. He defected in 1978 and later published a controversial memoir of his years in the Soviet system, Breaking with Moscow.
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Document 19 | |
| Memorandum for the President from Secretary of State William Rogers, "The Possibility of a Soviet Strike Against Chinese Nuclear Facilities," 10 September 1969, Secret | ||
| Source: National Archives, SN 67-69, Def 12 Chicom | ||
On 10 September, Secretary of State Rogers presented Nixon with the memcon for the Davydov-Stearman meeting as well with more details on Soviet threats against China and the INR's analysis of Davydov's probe for U.S. reactions to Soviet military action. Downplaying the significance of Davydov's query, the Department saw it as a "curiosity" and estimated a less than "fifty-fifty" chance that the Soviets would attack Beijing's nuclear facilities.
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《华盛顿明星报》（The Washington Star）是一份在华盛顿出版的报纸，前身是1852年12月16日创建的《华盛顿明星晚报》。1972年，《华盛顿明星晚报》收购了1921年创办的竞争对手《华盛顿新闻》。此后该报纸改名《华盛顿明星新闻》，后改为现名。1978年2月2日被时代公司收购。收购后时代公司于1981年8月7日关闭了该报纸。此时《华盛顿邮报》成为了华盛顿唯一的主流报纸，直到1982年《华盛顿时报》建立。
