原文链接：https://medium.com/@giorgioprovinciali/sovereignty-runs-through-orbit-ukraine-prepares-its-own-satellite-network-russia-builds-rassvet-3e783f53c679?sk=6a1c1fa3e3192d6c043c79235ee68e98
Sovereignty Runs Through Orbit: Ukraine Prepares Its Own Satellite Network, russia Builds Rassvet
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
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Lozova — By confirming that Ukraine is working on a satellite system of its own, President Zelensky raised a question that directly concerns the strategic sovereignty of a country fighting for its very existence, announcingon Sunday that «There has been progress. We are working on something similar to Starlink». Although the details remain confidential, Ukraine’s announcement comes amid a competition already underway with its enemy. The russian federation is building Rassvet, a low Earth orbit constellation for broadband communications developed by Bureau 1440.
The two programs address different needs in the context of the war: for Kyiv, the goal is to strengthen its ability to resist by building infrastructure it can use without repeating tragic experiences such as the U.S. intelligence blackout during the Kursk operation. For Moscow, it means building infrastructure it can use without the control of a Western operator and without increasing its dependence on China. In both cases, the strategic value depends on what the network can actually deliver.
In russia’s case, the first launches of the series intended for the operational network took place in 2026, following experimental missions in previous years. Ukraine’s industrial trajectory, meanwhile, shows that a publicly documented initiative already exists.
On April 22, 2026, Denmark’s GomSpace and Ukraine’s STETMAN announcedan agreement to establish the UASAT joint venture in Ukraine, dedicated to developing sovereign satellite communications capabilities for civilian and military use. The announcement called for a first satellite to be launched in the fall of 2026, providing operational feedback for subsequent phases. UASAT’s official website also presents UASAT LEO as a national low Earth orbit constellation project within an infrastructure comprising satellites, terminals, and services, describing the intention to build an end-to-end capability, from user access to communications management.
Although Zelensky did not explicitly mention UASAT in his October 4 statement, the industrial connection is entirely plausible given the announced timeline. For Ukraine, this would mean that cooperation with Europe can once again provide a path to autonomy. As we wrote many months ago about solving the ballistic missile defense problem, proposing Ukraine’s integration into the production chain for SAMP/T and its Aster 30 interceptors, the only viable route to sustainable solutions fully compatible with its integration process runs through Europe.
But what does it mean to build something «similar to Starlink»?
A low Earth orbit constellation uses satellites relatively close to Earth, reducing the distance a signal must travel and therefore the lag, or communications delay. These satellites, however, move relative to the surface and cross the user’s sky. To maintain coverage, they must succeed one another in a coordinated sequence: ESA describes precisely this cooperation among multiple spacecraft as the principle behind low Earth orbit communications constellations.
Moving from a demonstration satellite to continuous service therefore requires the entire system to grow. It takes manufacturing capacity, launches, constellation management, ground infrastructure, and reliable terminals. Even the number of satellites, taken on its own, says little, because their distribution, the capacity available to each user, and the continuity of connections matter much more. Studies of different satellite architectures show precisely how coverage, capacity, and connection handovers between satellites are closely interrelated problems.
The resemblance to Starlink may therefore lie in its function, without implying a replication of its commercial scale.
The decisive question in assessing Ukraine’s project will be a concrete one: what communications will it be able to guarantee, for how many users, with what continuity, and under whose control?
In this respect, access to Starlink has taught both Ukraine and the russian federation a lesson. The value of controlling the network became clear in February 2026, when Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense announced that it was introducing a list of authorized terminals together with SpaceX. The measure responded to russian use of Starlink devices, including on drones, and on February 5 the ministry reported that registered Ukrainian terminals remained operational while russian ones had been blocked.
The episode shows how decisive authorization management can be.
A terminal that is physically available remains entirely dependent on network access: we have seen for ourselves how — even after a device has been properly registered on the ‘white list’ — possessing the equipment and being able to use the service are two distinct conditions. At the sole discretion of Ukraine’s defense authorities, in certain situations, such as during an air raid alert, devices can be blocked and rendered unusable even if they are authorized.
For Kyiv, cooperation with SpaceX therefore made it possible to address a concrete vulnerability, highlighting the strategic value of a function that depends on cooperation between national authorities and an external operator.
The issue remains relevant because, in the same October 4 remarks, Zelensky argued that Ukraine should be allowed to use Starlink for operations against targets on russian territory, linking the request to the prospect of Moscow receiving satellite technology from other countries.
This is the rationale for a Ukrainian capability: reducing exposure to external restrictions and building alternatives. Additional infrastructure would have value even while Ukraine continued to use Starlink and other services, providing more options and preventing a single decision from interrupting an essential function.
Rassvet, meanwhile, is a real program whose capabilities have yet to be measured
Bureau 1440 presents it as a global broadband communications network. Its stated architecture includes satellites connected by lasers, terminals for fixed and mobile users, and gateways connecting to terrestrial networks. The company lists applications for transportation, businesses, government bodies, and public services, and on paper the infrastructure clearly has potential for both civilian and military use.
Gunter’s Space Page records two launches of the first Rassvet-3 generation: sixteen satellites on March 23, 2026, and another sixteen on July 19. The thirty-two spacecraft launched on those two missions do not, however, equal thirty-two fully operational satellites, nor do they provide continuous coverage.
Interpreting anomalies also requires precision. In his monitoring update published on August 25, astronomer Jonathan McDowell distinguished, for example, one confirmed failure to raise orbit from satellites still ascending. The position observed at any given moment must therefore be interpreted in light of planned maneuvers and subsequent data.
The russian program has therefore moved beyond a statement of intent. The next challenge is to turn launches into a reliable service that can be replicated at scale.
A military assessment must also consider interim capabilities, however, since an incomplete network could offer limited utility, depending on the availability of connections and terminals.
More than competition between brands, it is the possibility that russia could gain an operational advantage before achieving global coverage or a commercial scale comparable to Starlink that makes Rassvet’s development significant and causes concern in Kyiv.
In itself, Rassvet is a telecommunications system, and its stated function is to carry data. As we have repeatedly described from the field, its military effect comes from integrating those communications with sensors, command systems, and platforms that generate or use information. This is why Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense has already described, in connection with russian use of Starlink, the danger posed by drones that can be controlled in real time even over long distances.
A network under russian control could strengthen coordination and make some communications independent of SpaceX’s authorizations, since measures such as the one adopted in February against unauthorized terminals would not automatically carry over to infrastructure managed by Moscow.
Kyiv is therefore right to treat Rassvet as a matter for preventive action. Waiting until an infrastructure reaches full maturity means intervening once a substantial share of the investment, supplies, and expertise has already been consolidated.
We mentioned China to bring the discussion back to the significance of sanctions
In the interview published by the Financial Times on October 3, Zelensky stated that China is helping russia develop a system similar to Starlink, pointing to late 2026 or early 2027 as a possible timeframe for it to become operational and saying he had asked Donald Trump to sanction the russian and Chinese companies involved.
Any Chinese contribution should be assessed above all for its potential effect on industrial capacity. Building a constellation requires a supply chain capable of continuously manufacturing, integrating, and replacing spacecraft, and external support that reduced these obstacles could accelerate russia’s progress.
On September 30, Reuters reported Ukraine’s request for the United States to sanction companies and individuals supporting Rassvet. The Associated Press also reported Kyiv’s concern about component suppliers that remain outside the restrictions despite sanctions against the main developer.
The logic is to target the conditions that allow the program to grow: financing, supplies, and commercial relationships. As with sanctions, success would therefore depend on the precision of the measures and their enforcement.
The civilian dimension is just as important. Last Sunday, Zelensky also discussed russian attacks on Ukraine’s internet, data centers, and mobile communications, which we have covered extensively. In this context, it is clear how a satellite component could provide alternative routes when part of the terrestrial infrastructure is interrupted. We need only observe what is already happening with the relays in Belarus.
This is why resilience must be built across the entire service. An alternative connection makes it possible to reach systems that remain available, but for a communication to succeed, the terminal, power supply, applications, and destination infrastructure must also work. Here, too, the same need is reflected in Europe’s IRIS² program, which the Commission describes as infrastructure intended to provide secure communications for governments, emergency services, businesses, and citizens, including during crises and disruptions to terrestrial networks. Sovereign connectivity therefore concerns European security as a whole.
Ukraine’s future therefore lies along the path it has already taken.
It is up to its future family to recognize the urgency of certain decisions and act early.
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主权延伸至轨道：乌克兰筹建自主卫星网络，俄罗斯推进“曙光”计划
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
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洛佐瓦——乌克兰总统泽连斯基证实，乌克兰正在研发自己的卫星通信系统。这一表态引出了一个对于一个正在为生存而战的国家而言，关乎国家战略主权的问题。周日，泽连斯基宣布：“已经取得进展。我们正在研发类似星链的东西”。尽管具体细节仍属机密，乌克兰的声明却恰逢一场与其敌手之间的太空通信竞争已经展开之际。俄罗斯联邦正在建设“曙光”系统，由1440局研发、用于宽带通信的低地球轨道卫星星座。
在战争背景下，这两个计划针对的是不同需求。对基辅而言，目标是通过建设自主可用的基础设施，增强抵御能力，避免重演库尔斯克行动期间美国情报支持中断等痛苦经历。对莫斯科而言，目标则是建设不受西方运营商控制、也不会加深对中国依赖的基础设施。两者的战略价值，最终都取决于网络实际上能够提供什么。
就俄罗斯而言，面向运营网络的首批系列卫星于2026年发射，此前几年则进行了试验任务。与此同时，乌克兰的产业发展路径表明，一项已有公开记录的计划已经启动。
2026年4月22日，丹麦的GomSpace与乌克兰的STETMAN宣布达成协议，将在乌克兰成立合资企业UASAT，致力于开发自主卫星通信能力，服务于民用和军事领域。公告称，首颗卫星计划于2026年秋季发射，为后续阶段提供运行反馈。UASAT官方网站也将UASAT LEO列为一项国家低地球轨道卫星星座计划，纳入由卫星、终端和服务组成的基础设施体系；其目标是打造端到端能力，涵盖用户接入和通信管理的完整工业链。
泽连斯基在10月4日的讲话中没有明确提到UASAT，但鉴于此前公布的时间表，两者之间存在产业关联完全合乎情理。对乌克兰而言，这意味着与欧洲合作可再次成为实现自主的途径。正如我们数月前在关于弹道导弹防御问题的文章中所写，乌克兰融入SAMP/T及其“紫菀-30”拦截弹生产链，是解决问题的一种设想。要获得可持续、并与乌克兰融入欧洲进程完全兼容的解决方案，唯一可行的路径就是通过欧洲。
（图：版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali 与 Alla Perdei，Terykon）
建设“类似星链”的系统意味着什么？
低地球轨道卫星星座由距离地球相对较近的卫星组成，因此信号传输距离较短，通信延迟也随之降低。然而，这些卫星相对于地表不断移动，会从用户上空掠过。为了维持覆盖，下一颗卫星必须及时接替前一颗卫星接续工作。欧洲航天局正是以多个航天器相互协作，来说明低地球轨道通信星座的运行原理。
因此，从一颗演示卫星演进到提供持续服务，需要整个系统不断扩展。这需要制造能力、发射服务、星座管理、地面基础设施和可靠的终端。单看卫星数量甚至说明不了太多，因为卫星如何分布、每位用户可获得的容量，以及连接能否持续，重要得多。对不同卫星架构的研究恰恰表明，覆盖范围、容量以及卫星之间的连接切换，是彼此紧密关联的问题。
因此，“类似星链”或许指的是功能相似，并不意味着要复制星链的商业规模。
评估乌克兰项目时，关键问题将十分具体：它能够保障什么样的通信？服务多少用户？连接能有多稳定？又由谁掌控？
在这方面，乌克兰和俄罗斯都从使用星链的经历中吸取了教训。2026年2月，乌克兰国防部宣布与SpaceX共同实施授权终端名单，网络控制权的价值由此显而易见。这项措施是针对俄罗斯使用星链设备、包括在无人机上使用而采取的。2月5日，乌克兰国防部称，已登记的乌克兰终端仍可正常运行，而俄罗斯终端已被封锁。
这一事件表明，授权管理可能具有决定性意义。
即便拥有终端设备，能否使用仍完全取决于网络接入。我们亲身经历过：即使设备已正确登记在“白名单”上，拥有设备与能够使用服务仍是两回事。在某些情况下，即使这些设备已获授权，例如防空警报期间，乌克兰国防部门可自行决定封锁设备，使其无法使用。
因此，对基辅而言，与SpaceX合作使其能够应对一个具体的脆弱环节，也凸显了一项功能的战略价值：它依赖国家主管部门与外部运营商之间的合作。
这个问题依然重要，因为泽连斯基在10月4日的同一番讲话中还表示，应允许乌克兰利用星链打击俄罗斯境内目标，并将这一诉求与莫斯科可能从其他国家获得卫星技术的前景联系起来。
这正是乌克兰发展自主能力的理由：减少受外部限制的风险，并建立替代方案。即便乌克兰继续使用星链及其他服务，考虑到能提供更多选择和避免一项关键功能因单一决策而中断，增加额外基础设施仍然具有重要意义。
（图：尽管我们的设备是最早登记在白名单上的设备之一，当限制措施实施时，我们的连接状态）
“曙光”是一项真实计划，但其能力仍有待检验
1440局将“曙光”描述为一个全球宽带通信网络。该公司公布的架构包括通过激光互联的卫星、供固定用户和移动用户使用的终端，以及连接地面网络的网关。公司列出的应用场景涵盖交通运输、企业、政府机构和公共服务。从设计描述看，这套基础设施显然兼具民用和军事用途的潜力。
Gunter’s Space Page记录了首批“曙光-3”系列卫星的两次发射：2026年3月23日发射16颗，7月19日又发射16颗。不过，两次任务发射的32颗航天器，并不等于32颗都已完全投入运行，更不意味着已经能够提供连续覆盖能力。
解读异常情况也需要谨慎。天文学家Jonathan McDowell在8月25日发布的监测更新中举例区分了两种情况：一颗卫星已确认未能成功升轨，另一些卫星则仍在爬升轨道。因而，任何时点观测到的位置，都必须结合预定轨迹和后续数据来解读。
（图：莫斯科要制造这样的破坏，往往会借助白俄罗斯境内的中继设施，以确保获得不中断的连接——版权所有，Alla Perdei 与 Giorgio Provinciali）
俄罗斯的“曙光”计划已经不止是意向声明。接下来的挑战，是将发射转化为可靠、并能够大规模复制的服务。
不过，军事评估也必须考虑过渡阶段的能力，因为即便网络尚不完整，只要连接和终端具备一定可用性，它仍可能发挥有限作用。
真正令人担忧的，并不是品牌之间的竞争，而是俄罗斯可能在实现全球覆盖、或达到星链同等商业规模之前，就先获得实际作战优势。这也是“曙光”项目的发展为何值得关注、并令基辅感到不安。
“曙光”本质上是一个电信系统，其公开宣称的功能是传输数据。正如我们在一线报道中多次指出的，它的军事效应取决于通信能否与传感器、指挥系统，以及生成或使用信息的平台整合。这也正是乌克兰国防部在谈及俄罗斯使用星链时指出的，能够实时远程操控无人机所带来危险的原因。
由俄罗斯控制的网络可以强化协同能力，并使某些通信不再依赖SpaceX的授权。对未经授权终端采取的措施，例如2月实施的封锁，并不会自动适用于由莫斯科管理的基础设施。
因此，基辅将“曙光”视为需要提前应对的问题是正确的。等基础设施完全成熟后再行动，就意味着大量投资、供应链和专业能力已经落地并稳固。
（图：我们驾车行驶时，地平线上出现了爆炸。气温零下30度，没有星链、没有GPS，也没有网络连接。所幸路况极佳，但彻底失联往往也会发生在情形远不那么乐观的情况下——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali与Alla Perdei）
我们提到中国，是为了回到制裁的意义
泽连斯基在《金融时报》10月3日刊出的采访中表示，中国正在帮助俄罗斯开发类似星链的系统。他指出，该系统可能于2026年末或2027年初投入运行，并称自己已请求唐纳德川普制裁与此相关俄罗斯和中国公司。
评估中国可能提供的支持，首先应关注其对产业能力的潜在影响。建设卫星星座，需要一条能够持续制造、系统集成和更换航天器的供应链。如果外部支持能够消除这些瓶颈，俄罗斯的进展就可能加快。
路透社9月30日报道称，乌克兰要求美国制裁为“曙光”项目提供支持的公司和个人。美联社也报道了基辅对零部件供应商的担忧：尽管主要开发商已遭制裁，这些供应商仍未被纳入限制措施。
制裁的逻辑，是打击那些使项目得以发展的条件：资金、供应和商业关系。因此，制裁是否有效，取决于措施是否精准以及执行是否到位。
民用层面同样重要。上周日，泽连斯基还谈到俄罗斯对乌克兰互联网、数据中心和移动通信的攻击。我们此前已对此作了大量报道。在这种背景下，卫星通信显然可以在部分地面基础设施中断时提供替代路径。我们只需看看白俄罗斯的中继设施目前发挥着什么作用就明白了。
这就是为什么必须增强整个服务体系的韧性。备用连接能够帮助用户接入仍可使用的系统，但要让通信真正成功，终端、电源、应用程序和目的地基础设施也都必须正常工作。同样的需求也体现在欧洲的IRIS²计划中。欧盟委员会将其描述为一项提供安全通信基础设施，旨在为政府、应急服务、企业和公众在危机和地面网络中断期间提供通信保障。由此可见，自主连接关乎整个欧洲的安全。
因此，乌克兰的未来仍在它已经走上的道路上。
未来的伙伴家庭有责任认识到某些决策的紧迫性，并及早采取行动。
（图：感谢您阅读本文。唯有得到您的支持，我们才能继续报道）
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在1609天的战争中，我们从前线录制了300多段视频，并撰写了3000多篇文章——其中至少1600篇 为英文，1400篇为意大利文。
我们尽最大努力从几乎没有媒体敢进入的地带进行真实的一手报道，这意味着我们长期生活在“杀伤区”。我们承担风险，但若没有你们宝贵的支持，我们的声音将无从传出。若没有远方的勇敢的人们转发分享我们的文章，它们将无人问津。我们的报道会被忽视，我们的努力将付诸流水。这里还有大量工作要做，周围的人们境况同样艰难。
我们正在更新筹款活动，感谢每一位加入我们、帮助修复俄罗斯破坏的人们。仅靠一家勇敢的报纸为我们每篇文章支付微薄稿酬以维持前线报道极为困难。因此，我们感激所有支持并信任我们使命的善良人们。
哪怕是小小的捐助也有助益。
我们会持续为你们更新事态进展。
谢谢大家，亲爱的朋友们
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