陆以正∶美国有人想民进党复辟？
http://www.chinareviewnews.com 2010-03-29 16:39:00
中评社台北3月29日电／台湾退休外交官陆以正今天在中国时报撰文，提醒马英九政府留意“美国在台协会（ＡＩＴ）”总部理事卜道维对台湾政坛的观察和结论。文章如下。
上星期二即三月廿三日，华府著名智库“战略及国际研究中心（简称ＣＳＩＳ）”设在夏威夷的“太平洋论坛（Pacific Forum）”出版的《太平洋资料网（PacNet）》今年第十三期，刊出一篇文章，内容比自由时报错误引用里昂证券一事，严重千百倍；台北却没人注意，马政府更无人出面反驳。令我甚感诧异。
主持ＣＳＩＳ太平洋论坛的是Ralph A. Cossa。凡注意美、中、台三角关系以及东亚各国政经发展的学者或政府官员，几乎都认识此人，而且经常会在个人电脑上收到PacNet的研究报告及有关资料。虽然以美国国家利益为前提，内容大体翔实，颇受重视。
今年PacNet第十三期这篇文章的作者，是曾驻台多年，虽从国务院退休，在二○○四到二○○六年间代理华府“美国在台协会（ＡＩＴ）”理事会主席，至今仍为ＡＩＴ总部理事的卜道维（David G. Brown）。他在台北更是交游广阔，朝野无人不识。
卜道维现在马里兰州巴尔的摩（Baltimore, Md.）的约翰霍布金斯大学国际关系研究院（School of Advanced International Studies）做兼任教授。美国政学两栖人物退休後总住在华府附近，以便随时东山再起；他也在等候旋转门重新开启。
这篇文章令我诧异，第一是作者与国务院的深厚渊源。第二是该文公然为民进党再度执政，不避嫌疑，公开鼓吹的态度。第三则是它虽未明言，却反映出来的国务院及其周遭人士，观察台湾政治风向所获的结论。
什麽结论呢？文章的标题说得一清二楚∶《想到未来的民进党政府（Thinking About a Future DPP Government）》。换句话说，美国像卜道维这样的“台湾专家”，眼看马英九民调支持度直往下掉，已经认定国民党将再度失去政权；退为在野党，只是迟早问题。读者如有兴趣，可上PacNet网站，或向卜氏（dgbrown@jhu.edu）直接索取全文。
卜道维观察的结论，斩钉截铁，毫不遮掩躲藏。他直言∶“在台湾民主的正常旋律下，民进党必定会重新执政。如果二○一二年就发生的话，必须面对两岸关系中许多关键性的问题；而如何应付这些问题，又必然牵扯到美台关系。”他列举出“下届民进党‘总统’候选人”将面临的问题，口气有点像老师在教导学生如何准备学年末的大考。
他举出的要点可归纳为三项。首先是下届民进党政府应如何看待海协会和海基会做为对口单位的既存关系。卜道维预料，“新的民进党政府无疑会做出若干改变”，但只要大体保持原状，美国会比较放心。他甚至希望下届民进党“总统”候选人，能像陈水扁和马英九一样，在就职演说里能勾划出两岸关系的远景，使华府和北京两方都可安心。
其次，是如何使两岸现有对口单位能继续顺畅运作。卜道维了解∶对民进党而言，最大的障碍是“一个中国”的观念。他也很清楚蔡英文主席因此反对各说各话的“九二共识”。他认为谢长廷的“宪法一中”观念，或可做为解套之法。归根究底，民进党终须酌量修改“台湾前途决议文”的内容。他并未使用“修正（revise）”这个字，而是巧妙地用update（更新），以冲淡含意，避免招致深绿群众的反感。
更次，卜道维指出，“十八个月来”，北京对台湾的态度“非常务实”。请注意他尽量避免把两岸关系改善一事，归功於马英九和国民党政府。但他也不得不承认，如果民进党再度执政，须考虑大陆对台态度是否仍会如此平和。他含蓄地点出∶民进党执政後，短程必须顾及美台友谊，长期则须记住中国已非当年可比了。
他说，如果民进党要等到二○二○年才重新执政，必须了解今日大陆已非陈水扁在二○○○年时的吴下阿蒙了。到那时，中国的ＧＤＰ将高达全球总额百分之十五，军事力量也将仅次美国。卜道维给民进党的忠告是∶再度执政後千万别更改国名、修订现有“宪法”、或寻求独立。那样做只会使美国国会中支持台湾的议员人数锐减，甚至影响“台湾关系法”。
上星期四即三月廿五日，《天下文化》出版社高希均、王力文主办的“第七○场远见人物论坛”邀请ＡＩＴ台北办事处长司徒文（William A. Stanton）演讲。接受被邀来宾提问时，我请教司徒文∶知不知道卜道维有这篇文章？他的回答避重就轻，本报记者仇佩芬已有报导。司徒文很清楚我提问的真实用意，我也不想让他受窘。但卜道维的文章把台湾实情过份扭曲，不容忽视，马政府须严加驳斥以正视听。
http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-13-thinking-about-future-dpp-government
Pacific Forum CSIS
Honolulu, Hawaii
1003 Bishop Street, Suite 1150, Honolulu, HI 96813
Tel: (808) 521-6745 Fax: (808) 599-8690
Email: PacificForum@pacforum.org Web Page: www.pacforum.org
Number 13 March 23, 2010
PacNet: Thinking about a Future DPP Government
by David G. Brown
David G. Brown (dgbrown@jhu.edu) is adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Fresh from recent electoral victories and with hopes of more to come, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is beginning to think about the possibility of returning to government. Study groups have been named to consider future policy, and Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has announced plans for a new party platform. Pragmatists hope to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Chen Shui-bian era that saw escalating tensions with China and severely strained relations with the US. On the other hand, some DPP activists appeal for support by sticking their fingers in the dragon’s eye or by mobilizing protests against visiting mainland representatives. However, future party policy remains unclear.
Given the normal rhythm of Taiwan’s democratic politics, it seems certain that sooner or later the DPP will return to power. If the party returns in the short-term, meaning 2012, it would face key decisions on cross-Strait relations that would, in turn, set the tone for US-Taiwan relations. Since the key to maintaining good US-Taiwan relations is for Taipei to be seen as pursuing stable cross-Strait relations, there are signs the US would be looking for in DPP policy. Some decisions should be easy for the next DPP presidential candidate; others harder.
One key decision would be whether a future DPP government would maintain the newly institutionalized arrangements that have been negotiated between Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) ˉ that is the SEF-ARATS agreements and the pattern of regular day-to-day contacts between the two sides that take place under those agreements. A DPP administration would undoubtedly want to change some details, but it would be reassuring to Washington if the existing arrangements were maintained. Another relatively easy decision would be for the DPP presidential candidate to provide reassurance to Washington and Beijing on the parameters within which cross-Strait policy will be pursued ˉ as both Chen and Ma Ying-jeou did in their first inaugural address. These parameters will be set by the DPP candidate in the course of the campaign.
The more difficult challenge for the DPP would be to keep the SEF-ARATS negotiating channels open. To do this, Taipei and Beijing would need to work out a political basis for talks. Inevitably, this will require the DPP to face up to the “one China” issue. The Chen administration, which included current DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, rejected the “1992 consensus,” which has allowed Beijing and the Ma administration to conduct talks without reaching agreement on the meaning of “one China.” It will not be easy for a future DPP candidate to accept the “1992 consensus,” but finding a way to do so would be very significant for Beijing and Washington. Alternatively, some in the DPP have considered possible approaches to the “one China” issue. Frank Hsieh has talked of a “constitutional one China,” based on the party’s acceptance that the Republic of China constitution assumes “one China.” Coming to grips with this issue would be facilitated if the DPP were to update the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future to reflect the changed circumstances in cross-Strait relations and reformulating the old resolution’s explicit rejection of “one China.” Party leaders are understandably reluctant to reopen the issues in the 1999 resolution, but doing this would appear necessary to establish a basis for continuing cross-Strait talks.
Finding an acceptable basis for SEF-ARATS talks would also require China to be flexible. Beijing has been remarkably pragmatic in dealing with Taipei over the past 18 months. Whether it would continue to do so with a future DPP government is uncertain. It is possible that China’s risk-averse leaders will look for a way to respond if the DPP moves away from the outright rejection of “one China” and away from its advocacy of de jure independence. Regardless of Beijing’s response, if Taipei is seen in Washington as pursuing moderate cross-Strait policies, that would help ensure good US-Taiwan relations. However, if DPP cross-Strait policies cause a rise in tensions, a widening gap between US and Taiwan interests and relations would be inevitable.
The DPP’s challenge can also be seen in a longer-term perspective. If the party’s return to office does not to occur until 2020, Taipei would be dealing with a very different China than the one Chen Shui-bian faced in 2000. By 2020, it is likely that China’s economy will have doubled in size to account for about 15 percent of world GDP, the modernization of the PLA will have made it the second most powerful military, and China will have become the second country to land a man on the moon. Equally important, the Chinese government and people will likely assume that this increased power will lead others to accommodate China’s “core interests.” A greater assertiveness is already evident in some government actions, and a nationalistic public opinion will become a factor that Beijing increasingly will have to take into account in framing policy.
That prospect warrants a fundamental reassessment of long-term goals by the DPP. Is the DPP the party of de jure independence or is it a party committed to preserving Taiwan’s de facto independence by opposing closer integration with China? The latter would mean leaving to other groups the pursuit of the fundamentalists’ dream of an internationally recognized independent Taiwan that has explicitly state-to-state relations with China. Continued pursuit of de jure independence would set the party on a collision course with a risen China. That the DPP would continue to assert that Taiwan is sovereign and independent is understood. However, steps such as changing Taiwan’s name, altering the sovereignty aspects of the current constitution, or seeking membership in UN organizations under the name “Taiwan” would provoke renewed confrontation with a more powerful China. Americans would likely see such DPP actions as quixotic, dangerously provocative, and contrary to broader US interests as they would threaten to embroil the US in a conflict with China. Assuming otherwise stable US-China relations, the then US administration would likely distance itself from a DPP candidate espousing domestic or international actions to achieve de jure independence. This could include the US adopting a policy of explicitly opposing (rather than not supporting) independence. To ensure that US power and prestige were not associated with such steps, Washington would also likely suspend both arms sales and the quiet consultation on defense issues that it now conducts with Taipei. Support for Taiwan in the US Congress declined markedly during the Chen Shui-bian era. Actions by a future DPP government to achieve de jure independence would likely further undermine support for the Taiwan Relations Act.
The DPP is wise to consider now the policies of a future government. As democratic leaders, they have the right and responsibility to adopt whatever policies they believe will best advance Taiwan’s interests. The litmus test ultimately will be what Taiwan voters will support and relations with the US are but one factor. If the review process moves away from Chen’s past pursuit of de jure independence that would be welcome. However, if the party remains wedded to pursuing policies to achieve de jure independence, it should understand that Taiwan and US interests would increasingly diverge and that Taipei would likely not enjoy continuing support from a future US administration or Congress.
