[from Mao's Great Famine]
3 Purging the Ranks
In Moscow, Khrushchev had provided Mao with the ammunition to charge ahead. Not only had the sputnik demonstrated the ability of the relatively backward Soviet Union to take a lead over an economically advanced nation like the United States, but Soviet planners themselves were preparing a major economic drive similar to the Socialist High Tide the Chairman had been forced to abandon.
Back in Beijing, less than two weeks after his return from the Soviet Union, Mao secured the backing of senior vice-chairman Liu Shaoqi for a leap forward. A frugal and taciturn man, tall but slightly stooped with greying hair, Liu had dedicated his career to the party line, regularly toiling away through the night. He also saw himself as the Chairman’s successor, a position he believed would come to him as a reward for years of hard and selfless work. A few months earlier Mao himself had indicated his intention of stepping down from the post of head of state, and may even have privately assured Liu that he supported him in his role as heir apparent.1Liu embraced Mao’s vision: ‘In fifteen years, the Soviet Union can catch up with and surpass the United States in the output of the most important industrial and agricultural products. In the same period of time, we ought to catch up with and overtake Britain in the output of iron, steel and other major industrial products.’2Before the end of the year press articles heralding great advances in water conservancy, grain production and steel output appeared all over the country. On New Year’s day in 1958 the People’sDailypublished an editorial approved by Liu Shaoqi which captured the leader’s vision: ‘Go All Out and Aim High’.3
Li Fuchun, a bookish man with a self-effacing air who as head of the State Planning Commission regularly sent blueprints as thick as a telephone book to each province, detailing how much of each product should be produced, also lent his support to Mao. A fellow Hunanese and childhood acquaintance of the Chairman, a veteran of the Long March, Li was the first among the economic planners to jump on to the bandwagon of the Great Leap Forward, whether out of fear, conviction or ambition. He joined Liu Shaoqi in praising Mao’s bold vision.4
Under the drumbeat of propaganda, and goaded and coaxed by Mao in private meetings and party conferences, provincial leaders threw their weight behind his go-all-out campaign, promising higher targets in a whole range of economic activities. At a small gathering of party bosses in Hangzhou in early January 1958, Ke Qingshi, a tall man with a bouffant haircut who was mayor of Shanghai and lived in genuine awe of the Chairman, enthused about the ‘new high tide in socialist construction’, proposing that the country ‘ride the wind and break the waves’ by relying on the great masses.5 Surrounded by supporters, and energised by Ke Qingshi, Mao was no longer able to contain the anger pent up over several years, exploding in the face of Bo Yibo, one of the chief economic planners who had resisted his vision. Bo was a veteran revolutionary, but one of his concerns was to keep a balanced budget. ‘I will not listen to that stuff of yours!’ Mao yelled. ‘What are you talking about? For the past few years I have stopped reading the budgets, but you just force me to sign off on them anyway.’ Then he turned to Zhou Enlai: ‘The preface to my book The Socialist Upsurge in the Countrysidehas had a tremendous influence on the entire country. Is that a “cult of personality” or “idolatry”? Regardless, newspapers and magazines all over the country have reprinted it, and it’s had a huge impact. So now I have really become the “arch criminal of rash advance!” ’6The moment had come to crack the whip and herd the planners on to the road to utopia.
Situated in the extreme south of the country, Nanning is known as the ‘green city’ because of its lush, subtropical climate, mild enough for sweet peach, betel nut and palm trees to thrive all the year round. With citrus trees in blossom and a balmy temperature of 25 degrees Celsius in the middle of January, the setting should have provided some relief for party leaders coming from wintry Beijing, but the atmosphere was tense. As Zhang Zhongliang, the zealous leader of Gansu province, enthused, ‘From start to finish the Chairman criticised rightist conservative thinking!’7Mao set the tone on the opening day of the meeting: ‘Don’t mention this term “opposition to rash advance” again, all right? This is a political problem. Any opposition would lead to disappointment, and 600 million discouraged people would be a disaster.’8
Over several days Mao repeatedly lost his temper as he badgered the planners, accusing them of ‘pouring cold water on the enthusiasm of the people’ and holding back the country. Those guilty of opposing ‘rash advance’ were a mere ‘fifty metres away from the rightists’. Wu Lengxi, editor of the People’sDailywhich had published the critical editorial on 20 June 1956, was at the very top of the list of leaders summoned by Mao. The Chairman’s verdict: ‘Vulgar Marxism, vulgar dialectics. The article seems to be anti-leftist as well as anti-rightist, but in fact it is not anti-rightist at all but exclusively anti-leftist. It is sharply pointed against me.’9
Huge pressure was applied to the assembled leaders, and even for hardened men accustomed to the rigours of party life the stress was soon to prove too much. Huang Jing, chairman of a commission responsible for technological development and former hu*****and of Mao’s wife, collapsed after the Chairman took him to task. Lying in bed, staring at the ceiling and mumbling incomprehensibly, he gave the doctor a bewildered look, begging for forgiveness: ‘Save me, save me!’ Put on a plane for medical treatment, he fell to his knees to kowtow before Li Fuchun, who was accompanying him to Guangzhou. Placed in a military hospital, he jumped through a window and broke a leg. He died in November 1958 aged fortyseven.10
But the real target for Mao’s ire was Zhou Enlai. On 16 January Mao brandished in front of the premier a copy of Ke Qingshi’s ‘The New Shanghai Rides the Wind and Breaks the Waves, Accelerating the Construction of Socialism’. ‘Well, Enlai, you are the premier, do you think you could write anything as good?’ he asked scornfully. ‘I couldn’t,’ the premier muttered, straining to absorb the attack. Then, after the ritual of public humiliation, came the blow: ‘Aren’t you opposed to “rash advance”? Well, I am opposed to opposition to “rash advance”!’11A number of leftist party leaders joined the fray. Ke Qingshi and Li Jingquan, the radical leader of Sichuan, tore into the premier.12Three days later Zhou made a lengthy speech of self-criticism, taking full responsibility for the reversal in 1956, admitting that it was the result of ‘rightist conservative thinking’ and accepting that he had deviated from the Chairman’s guiding policy. Mao’s notion that mistakes made by the party should not be overemphasised, being only ‘one finger out of ten’, was enshrined in the meeting’s manifesto, thus marginalising those who had attacked the Little Leap Forward.13
Zhou Enlai, whose suave, soft-spoken, slightly effeminate manners made him the ideal choice as China’s foreign emissary, had a talent for landing right side up. He could be all modesty and humility when required. Before the communist victory the nationalists used to call him Budaoweng, the Chinese name for the weighted toy tumbler that always lands upright.14Early in his career as a revolutionary, Zhou had resolved never to challenge Mao. His decision was made after both had clashed in an incident that had left Mao seething with resentment. At a conference in 1932, critics of guerrilla warfare had ripped into Mao and handed command over the battlefront to Zhou instead. The result was a disaster, as a few years later nationalist troops mauled the Red Army, forcing the communists on the Long March away from their base areas. In 1943, as Zhou realised that Mao’s authority had become supreme, he proclaimed his undying support to the Chairman: ‘The direction and leadership of Mao Zedong’, he declared, ‘is the direction of the Chinese Communist Party!’ But Mao did not let him off the hook so easily. Zhou’s loyalty was tested in a series of self-criticism meetings in which he had to admit to his political crimes, labelling himself a ‘political swindler’ who lacked principles. It was a gruelling experience in self-abasement, but one from which Zhou emerged as the Chairman’s faithful assistant. From here onwards an uneasy and paradoxical alliance developed. Mao had to keep Zhou at bay as a potential contender for power; on the other hand he needed him to run the show. Mao lacked interest in matters of daily routine and organisational detail, and he was often abrasive with other people. Zhou was a first-rate administrator with a knack for organisation, a smooth operator skilled at forging party unity. As one biographer puts it, Mao ‘had to draw Zhou close even as he raised the whip, and sometimes lashed the man he could not live without’.15
The whipping did not stop at Nanning. Two months later, in Chengdu, the final days of a party gathering were devoted to rectification seminars. But first Mao spewed disdain on the blind faith with which the planners had been following Stalin’s economic path: a heavy emphasis on large industrial complexes, a sprawling apparatus of bureaucrats and a chronically underdeveloped countryside. As early as November 1956 he had lambasted some of his colleagues for ‘uncritically thinking that everything in the Soviet Union is perfect, that even their farts are fragrant’.16Creative thinking was needed to find China’s own path to communism, rather than rigid adherence to Soviet methods, now frozen into socialist dogma. China should ‘walk on two legs’, simultaneously developing industry and agriculture, tackling heavy as well as light industry. And Mao, as the leader on that road, now demanded full allegiance. ‘What is wrong with worship? The truth is in our hands, why should we not worship it? . . . Each group must worship its leader, it cannot but worship its leader,’ Mao explained; this was the ‘correct cult of personality’.17The message was immediately picked up by Ke Qingshi, who quivered enthusiastically: ‘We must have blind faith in the Chairman! We must obey the Chairman with total abandon!’18
Having consecrated his own cult of personality, Mao handed over the proceedings to Liu Shaoqi, his political crony. While virtually all the participants offered self-criticisms, the situation must have been agonising for Zhou. Both men were intensely competitive, and Liu may have seen Zhou as a threat to his prospects of taking over from the Chairman.19That day Liu outdid Zhou in adulation of the leader: ‘Over the years I have felt Chairman Mao’s superiority. I am unable to keep up with his thought. Chairman Mao has a remarkable knowledge, especially of Chinese history, which no one else in the party can reach. [He] has practical experience, especially in combining Marxist theory and Chinese reality. Chairman Mao’s superiority in these aspects is something we should admire and try to learn from.’20Zhou, for his part, felt intense pressure to appease the Chairman, who had stripped him of his authority in economic planning after Nanning. Again, he submitted a long confession about his errors, but his offerings failed to impress Mao.
In May, at a formal party gathering of over 1,300 people, Zhou Enlai and the party’s economics tsar Chen Yun were summoned to prepare yet another self-examination. No longer knowing what would satisfy Mao, Zhou spent days in self-imposed isolation, struggling to find the right turn of phrase. After a telephone conversation with Chen Yun, who was in a similar predicament, he sank into such dejection that his mind simply went blank. All he could do was mumble a few words followed by long silences as he stared at his secretary. That evening late at night his wife found him sitting slumped at his desk. Trying to help, the secretary pencilled in a passage about Zhou and Mao having ‘shared the boat through many storms’. When Zhou later pored over the document, he angrily rebuked the secretary, tears welling in his eyes, accusing the man of knowing too little about party history.21In the end Zhou grovelled, lavishing praise on the Chairman in front of the assembled party leaders and telling the audience that Mao was the ‘personification of truth’ and that mistakes occurred only when the party became divorced from his great leadership. A few days after this display, Zhou handed Mao a personal letter promising to study his writings earnestly and to follow all his directives. The Chairman was finally satisfied. He declared Zhou and the others to be good comrades. Zhou had saved his job.
During these first months of the Great Leap Forward, Zhou was repeatedly humiliated and demeaned, but he never withdrew his support, choosing instead quietly to accept the Chairman’s blistering outburst in Nanning. Zhou Enlai did not have the power to overthrow his master, but he did have the planners behind him, and he could have stepped back – at the cost of his career. But he had learned to accept humiliation at the hands of the Chairman as a way of staying in power, albeit in his colleague’s shadow. Zhou was loyal to Mao, and as a result the many skills of the servant went to abet his master.22Mao Zedong was the visionary, Zhou Enlai the midwife who transformed nightmares into reality. Always on probation, he would work tirelessly at the Great Leap Forward to prove himself.
As Zhou Enlai was debased in a spectacle of power and humiliation, other top economic officials quickly fell in line. Li Fuchun, chair of the State Planning Commission, never had to resort to self-criticism, having broken ranks with the other planners by rallying round Mao’s slogans in December 1957. Chen Yun made several self-critical statements. Li Xiannian, minister of finance, and Bo Yibo, chair of the State Economic Commission, both opponents of the Little Leap Forward in 1956, now realised that they could not resist the tide. None dared to disagree. Li Fuchun and Li Xiannian were enlisted in the secretariat, the inner core of the party, after they had proclaimed their allegiance to Mao.
To increase the political pressure on the top echelon, the Chairman also presided over a shift in power from the centre to the provinces. Nanning was the first in a series of impromptu conferences called by Mao, who strictly controlled the list of participants, set the agendas and dominated the proceedings, allowing him to cajole his followers towards the Great Leap Forward. He brought the secretariat to the provinces, rather than summon the provinces to come to the more formal sessions of established bodies like the State Council in Beijing.23By so doing he tapped into a deep current of dissatisfaction among provincial leaders. Tao Lujia, first secretary of Shanxi, spoke for many local cadres when he expressed his impatience with the country’s widespread poverty.24Mao’s vision of a China which was ‘poor and blank’ resonated with idealists who believed in the party’s capacity to catapult the country ahead of its rivals. ‘When you are poor you are inclined to be revolutionary. Blank paper is ideal for writing.’25 Radical provincial leaders lapped up their leader’s vision. Wu Zhipu, leader of Henan, heralded a ‘continuous revolution’ to crush rightist opponents and leap forward. Zeng Xisheng, long-term veteran of the People’s Liberation Army and leader of Anhui, provided the slogan ‘Battle Hard for Three Years to Change the Face of China’. But most of all, having witnessed the ritual abasement of their superiors on their own turf, the provinces were encouraged to launch their own witch-hunts, as a wind of persecution blew through the country.
Mao could be cryptic, leaving his colleagues guessing at the nature of his message, but this time there was plenty of pressure from Beijing concerning the right direction. To make sure that the purges against rightist elements were carried out thoroughly, Mao sent his bull terrier Deng Xiaoping to a series of regional meetings. Instructions were clear. In Gansu, Deng explained, the struggle against vice-governors Sun Diancai, Chen Chengyi and Liang Dajun had to be unequivocal.26Gansu boss Zhang Zhongliang wasted no time, and a few weeks later he announced that an anti-party clique had been uncovered inside the party provincial committee. Coincidentally, its leaders were Sun Diancai, Chen Chengyi and Liang Dajun: they were accused of denying the achievements of the Socialist High Tide in 1956, attacking the party, denigrating socialism and promoting capitalism – among other heinous crimes.27
These were powerful leaders toppled with the support of Beijing. The purges, however, were carried out at all levels of the party, silencing most critical voices. Few dared to oppose the party line. In parts of Gansu, a poor province near the deserts of Inner Mongolia, any critical comment about grain procurement or excessive quotas simply became unthinkable. The message to party members concerned about the crop was blunt: ‘You should consider carefully whether or not you are rightists.’28In Lanzhou University, located in the capital city of Gansu, up to half of all students were given a white flag, the sign of a politically conservative laggard. Some had a note pinned on their back: ‘Your father is a white flag.’ Others were beaten. Those who took a neutral stand were denounced as reactionaries.29 The purge continued for as long as Zhang Zhongliang remained in power. By March 1960, some 190,000 people had been denounced and humiliated in public meetings, and 40,000 cadres were expelled from the party, including 150 top provincial officials.30
Similar purges took place throughout the country, as radical leaders seized the opportunity to get rid of their more timorous rivals. From December 1957 onwards, the southern province of Yunnan was in the grip of an anti-rightist purge that reached from party seniors down to village cadres. In April 1958 the tough local boss Xie Fuzhi, a short man with a double chin, announced the overthrow of the leaders of an ‘anti-party clique’: Zheng Dun and Wang Jing, the heads of the Organisation Department, were guilty of ‘localism’, ‘revisionism’, advocating capitalism, attempting to overthrow the party’s leadership and opposing the socialist revolution.31By the summer of 1958 the inquisition had resulted in the removal of some 2,000 party members. One in fifteen top leaders were fired, including more than 150 powerful cadres working at the county level or higher up in one of the province’s dozen administrative regions. A further 9,000 party members were labelled as rightists as the campaign unfolded.32
‘Anti-party’ cliques were uncovered almost everywhere. Mao prodded the provincial leaders on. ‘Better me than you as dictator,’ he declared in March 1958, invoking words from Lenin. ‘It’s similar in the provinces: is it going to be Jiang Hua or Sha Wenhan as dictator?’33In Zhejiang Sha Wenhan was hounded by Jiang Hua, and similar battles took place in Guangdong, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, Anhui, Liaoning, Hebei and Yunnan, among other provinces.34In Henan, one of the provinces that would be most affected by famine, a moderate leader called Pan Fusheng was swept aside by Wu Zhipu, a zealous follower of Mao. Pan had painted a grim picture of collectivisation during the Socialist High Tide. ‘The peasants . . . are the same as beasts of burden today. Yellow oxen are tied up in the house and human beings are harnessed in the field. Girls and women pull ploughs and harrows, with their wombs hanging out. Co-operation is transformed into the exploitation of human strength.’35Here, it seemed, was a blatant case of a retreat to capitalism, and all of Pan’s followers were hunted down, dividing party and village. Scarecrows with slogans appeared along dusty roadsides, reading ‘Down with Pan Fusheng’ or ‘Down with Wu Zhipu’. Most local cadres could see which way the wind was blowing, and fell in line behind Wu Zhipu.36
But, however great the pressure, there were always choices to be made. When Mao toured Jiangsu and asked the local leader whether they were fighting the rightists, Jiang Weiqing gathered up his courage and told the Chairman that if there were any bad elements he would have to be counted as their leader. The party should get rid of him first. Mao laughed: ‘You don’t fear being cut in pieces for pulling the emperor off his horse! Well, just leave it then . . .’37As a result, fewer cadres were denounced in Jiangsu than elsewhere.
But rare were those who had the conviction, the courage or the inclination to swim against the tide. The purges percolated down the ranks of the party. Just as Mao imposed his will in Beijing, local overlords laid down the law in their own provinces, denouncing any opposition as ‘conservative rightism’. And just as provincial capitals had their hegemons, county leaders and their cronies used the purge to eliminate their rivals. They turned a blind eye on local bullies. On the ground, a world far removed from the utopia envisaged on paper started to emerge.
An early warning sign came in the summer of 1958, as a report circulating among the top brass showed how violence had become the norm during the anti-rightist campaign in Fengxian county, just south of Shanghai. A hundred people committed suicide, many others being worked to death in the fields. Wang Wenzhong, county leader, set the example with a motto that compared ‘the masses’ to dogs intimidated only by the sight of a stick in a cadre’s hands. Thousands of villagers were accused of being ‘landlords’ or ‘counterrevolutionaries’ in public meetings that punctuated daily life for months on end. Many were routinely beaten, tied up and tortured, some being carried away to special labour camps set up throughout the county.38
Fengxian was a dire warning of the darkness to come. At the top, however, floating far above the ground, faith in the ability of the people to change heaven and earth was boundless. In December 1957 Chen Zhengren, one of Mao’s most trusted colleagues, attacked the conservatism of ‘rightists’ who hampered the enthusiasm of the masses in the water-conservancy campaign. This was the rallying cry of the Great Leap Forward.39
GOOGLE TRANSLATE:
清除的队伍
在莫斯科，赫鲁晓夫提供了毛泽东与弹药冲上去。不仅有人造卫星证明了相对落后的苏联带头在像美国这样的一个经济发达的国家的能力，但苏联的规划者自己正在准备类似的社会主义高潮主席的主要经济驱动被迫放弃。
回到北京后不到两周他返回苏联，毛抵押资深副主席刘少奇的一个飞跃的支持。构建节约和沉默寡言的男人，身材高大但稍有驼背的头发花白，刘献给了他的职业生涯，以党的路线，经过一夜定期辛苦工作。他也看到了自己作为主席的接班人，他相信会来，他作为奖励多年的努力和忘我工作的位置。几个月前，毛泽东本人也表示，他从加强国家元首一职下来的意图，甚至可能私下放心刘先生说，他支持他的作为继承人apparent.1Liu角色拥抱毛泽东的愿景：“在十五年，苏联可以赶上和超过美国最重要的工业和农业产品的产量。在相同的时间内，我们应该赶上并在钢铁等主要工业产品的产量超过英国。 '2年度报刊文章预示着水利，粮食生产和钢材产量巨大进步月底前出现在全国各地。在新年的日子在1958年People'sDailypublished经刘少奇的社论其中捕获的领导者的愿景：“全力以赴，力争上游' .3
李富春，一个书生气十足的男人与一个谦虚的空气谁作为国家计委负责人定期发送蓝图厚如电话簿到每个省，详细介绍了如何每种产品的多少应该生产，还借给他的支持毛泽东。同系湖南人及主席，长征老牌的童年相识，李是经济规划者之间的第一个跳的大跃进的浪潮，无论是出于恐惧，信念和雄心。他称赞毛泽东的大胆vision.4加入刘少奇
在宣传的鼓声，并唆使和毛泽东的私人会议和宴会会议哄着，省领导把自己的体重身后去，全力以赴的行动，在经济活动的整个范围看好更高的目标。在1958年1月上旬小型聚会杭州方老板，柯庆施，一个高大的男人与一个蓬松的发型谁是上海市长，住在主席的真正敬畏，感激关于“新高潮在社会主义建设” ，建议该国的乘风，打破波“所依托的大masses.5被支持者包围，并通过柯庆施通电时，毛泽东不再能够包含被压抑了数年的愤怒，爆炸在脸上的薄一波，谁曾抗拒他的眼光首席经济规划师之一。博是个老革命，但他关注的问题之一是保持预算平衡。 “我不会听你的东西！ ”毛喊道。 “你在说什么？在过去的几年里，我停止了阅读的预算，但你只是逼我签字他们反正“然后他转向周恩来：”前言到我的书的社会主义高潮的Countrysidehas对本影响巨大整个国家。那是一个“个人崇拜”或“偶像崇拜” ？无论如何，报纸和杂志在全国各地都转载了，并且它产生了巨大的影响。所以，现在我已经真正成为了“冒进的犯罪老手！ ” '6的时刻已经到了破解的鞭子和放养的规划者落在马路上，以乌托邦。
位于该国最南端，南宁被称为“绿色城市”，因为它郁郁葱葱，属亚热带气候，甜的桃子，槟榔和棕榈树茁壮成长一年四季都有足够温和。随着柑橘树开花和25摄氏度在1月中旬一个风和日丽的温度，设定应该提供一些救济的党的领导人从寒冷的北京来了，但气氛很紧张。由于张中良，甘肃省热心的领导者，热情， '！从开始到结束，主席批评右倾保守思想'7毛集在会议开幕当天的语气： “不要提这个词”反对冒进“再一次，好吗？这是一个政治问题。反对任何会导致失望， 6亿气馁的人会是一场灾难。 '8
过几天毛泽东一再失去了他的脾气，因为他纠缠的策划者，指责“泼冷水人民的热情” ，并阻碍该国的他们。那些犯反对“冒进”的是一个单纯的“离右派50米” 。吴棱惜的People'sDailywhich编辑出版了于1956年6月20日社论的关键，是在毛泽东召见领导人名单的最顶端。主席的裁决： “庸俗马克思主义，庸俗的辩证法。这篇文章似乎是反左派以及反右，但实际上它不是反右派，但在所有专门抗左派。这是一针见血的指出了我。 '9
巨大的压力施加到组装的领导人，甚至对于习惯了党内生活的严酷硬化男人的压力很快就证明太多。黄精，负责毛泽东的妻子的技术开发和前夫一个委员会的主席，倒塌后的主席把他带到任务。躺在床上，盯着天花板，喃喃自语不可思议，他给医生一脸茫然的样子，乞求宽恕：'救救我，救救我'放在就医飞机，他跪倒在地，李富春前磕头，谁陪同他去广州。放置在一个军事医院，他透过窗户跳下，摔断了一条腿。他于11月去世1958岁fortyseven.10
但是，对于毛泽东的愤怒的真正目标是周恩来。 1月16日毛泽东挥舞在柯庆施的副本总理面前'新上海乘风和休息的波浪，加快社会主义建设“ 。 “嗯，恩来，你是总理，你觉得你能写什么好？ ”他轻蔑地问道。 “我不能， ”首要的嘀咕着，使劲吸了攻击。然后，公开羞辱的仪式后，来到了打击： “难道你不反对”冒进“ ？好吧，我反对反对“冒进” ！左派党领导人'11A号加入了战团。柯庆施和李井泉，四川激进的领导人，撕到premier.12Three天后周做自我批评长篇大论，同时为反转承担全部责任，于1956年，承认它是“右倾保守思想的结果“并接受，他从董事长的指导方针偏离。毛泽东的观点，即党所犯的错误不应该被过分强调，暂时只有“一根手指，十个” ，被供奉在会议上的宣言，从而边缘化那些谁攻击了小飞跃Forward.13
周恩来，他的风流倜傥，说话轻声细语，略带女性化的举止使他成为理想的选择，因为中国的外交使者，有巧夺天工的登陆正面朝上。需要的时候，他可能是所有的谦虚和谦卑。共产主义的胜利之前，民族主义者习惯叫他不倒翁中日，中国名称为加权不倒翁玩具总是登陆upright.14Early在他的职业生涯作为一个革命性的，周已议决从来没有挑战毛泽东。作出他的决定后，双方曾发生冲突，在离开毛泽东与怨沸腾的事件。在1932年一次会议，游击战争的批评者撕开成毛泽东和移交指挥权战线周某代替。其结果是一场灾难，因为几年后国民党军队打伤红军，迫使共产党长征远离自己的根据地。 1943年，由于周意识到，毛泽东的权威已成为至高无上的，他宣告了他不朽的支持主席： “毛泽东的方向和领导” ，他宣称， “是中国共产党的方向！ ”但毛泽东没有让他打爆那么容易。周的忠诚度是在一系列自我批评的会议中，他不得不承认他的政治罪，标注自己是“政治骗子”谁缺乏原则的检验。这是在自卑一个艰苦的经历，而是一个从周成为主席的忠实助手。从这里开始的不安和矛盾的联盟开发的。毛泽东只好保持周在海湾作为电源一个潜在的竞争者，而另一方面，他需要他来主持。毛泽东在缺乏日常工作和组织细节方面的兴趣，他经常磨料与其他人。周是一个一流的管理者与诀窍组织，平稳运营商擅长锻造党的团结统一。正如一位传记作者所说的那样，毛泽东不得不动用周关闭，即使他举起鞭子，有时猛烈抨击的人，他不能没有“ 0.15
鞭刑并没有停止在南宁。两个月后，在成都，一个党集会的最后几天，专门进行整改研讨会。但首先毛泽东喷出不屑于迷信的规划者已经在与斯大林的经济路径：一个沉重的重视大型工业园区，官僚的一个庞大的设备和长期落后的乡村。早在1956年11月，他曾毫不留情地批评他的一些同事对'不加批判地思考，一切都在苏联是完美的，即使他们的屁都是香的“ 0.16创造性思维，才可以找到中国自己的道路，以共产主义，而不是一成不变的坚持苏联的方法，现在冻成社会主义的教条。中国应“两条腿走路” ，同时发展工业和农业，解决重以及轻工业。并茂，因为在这条道路的领导者，现在要求全面效忠。 “有什么不对的崇拜？事实是，在我们手中，我们为什么不崇拜呢？ 。 。 。每个组都必须拜它的领导者，不能不崇拜及其领导人， “毛泽东解释说，这是”人格正确的崇拜“ 0.17该消息立即拾起柯庆施，谁颤抖着热情： ”我们必须在迷信主席！我们必须服从主席与总放弃！ '18
经奉献他自己的个人崇拜，毛泽东移交诉讼，以刘少奇，他的政治密友。虽然几乎所有的参与者提供了自我批评，这种情况一定是痛苦的周某。两人竞争非常激烈，刘可能已经看到周先生为他从Chairman.19That一天胜过刘周中的佼佼者的阿谀奉承接管前景构成威胁： “多年来我都觉得毛主席的优势。我无法跟上他的思想。毛主席有一个显着的知识特别是中国历史上，这是任何其他人在党内可以达到。 [他]有实践经验，特别是在结合马克思主义理论和中国的现实。毛主席的优势在这些方面是值得我们钦佩，并尝试从。 '20Zhou学习，对他而言，感到巨大压力，安抚主席，谁剥夺了他的权力在经济规划南宁后的他。再次，他提交了一份长长的表白对他的错误，但他的产品没能打动毛泽东。
今年五月，在超过1300人的正式宴会聚会，周恩来等党的经济沙皇陈云被传唤准备另一个自我反省。不再知道什么将满足毛，周花了好几天自我孤立，苦苦寻找的短语右转。在电话里交谈陈云，谁是在一个类似的困境后，他陷入了这样的沮丧，他的心中只是一片空白。所有他能做的就是咕哝了几句后长时间的沉默，因为他在他的秘书瞪大了眼睛。那天晚上深夜他的妻子发现他颓然坐在他的办公桌。想帮忙，秘书用铅笔在一个关于周恩来和毛泽东有'经过许多风雨共享船'通道。当周以后深入研究该文件，他愤怒地斥责秘书，泪水在他的眼里夺眶而出，指责大智若愚一点关于党的人history.21In结束周摇尾乞怜，在组装党的领导人面前慷慨地称赞主席和告诉观众，毛泽东是“人格化真理” ，出错发生，只有当党成为他伟大的领导离婚了。这显示之后几天，周递给毛泽东的亲笔信承诺要学习他的著作认真和跟随他的所有指令。主席终于满意。他宣布周和其他人是好同志。周救了他的工作。
在大跃进的头几个月，周曾多次羞辱和贬低，但他从来没有撤回了他的支持，而是选择静静地接受主席在南宁起泡爆发。周恩来没有推翻他的主人的权力，但他确实有规划者在他身后，他也已经向后退了几步 - 在他职业生涯的成本。但他已经学会了接受屈辱的主席的手中停留在权力的一种方式，尽管在他的同事的影子。周忠于毛泽东，并因此仆人的许多技巧去怂恿他master.22Mao毛泽东是有远见的，周恩来谁转化噩梦变成现实的助产士。总是在缓刑，他会继续努力，不遗余力的大跃进来证明自己。
正如周恩来是庸俗的权力和屈辱的奇观，其他高级经济官员很快失守年线。李富春，国家计委的椅子上，从来没有诉诸自我批评，具有由振臂一轮毛泽东的口号在1957年12月打破队伍与其他策划者。陈云提出了一些自我批评发言。李先念，财政部长和薄一波，国家经济委员会的主席，小大跃进在1956年的两个对手，现在意识到，他们无法抗拒的潮流。谁也不敢不同意。李富春，李先念被征召秘书处，党的内部核心，他们宣布效忠毛泽东之后。
加大对高层的政治压力下，主席还主持了一个权力转变，从中央到各省。南宁市是第一个在一系列临时会议的叫毛泽东，谁严格控制与会者名单，设置议程，并主导了诉讼，这让他哄着他的追随者对大跃进。他带来秘书处向各省，而不是召集各省来建立的机构，如国务院Beijing.23By这样做，他挖掘到不满的省级领导人之间的深刻电流的比较正式的会议。陶陆家，山西第一书记，讲了许多当地干部时，他表示他的不耐烦与该国的普遍poverty.24Mao “一个中国的愿景这是”一穷二白“的共鸣与谁在党的容量相信未来弹射全国理想主义者它的对手。 “当你是穷人你倾向于是革命性的。白纸是理想的写作。 '25激进省领导欣然接受了他们的领袖的愿景。吴芝圃，河南的领导者，预示着'不断革命'粉碎右派对手和飞跃。曾西渑中，解放军的长期退伍军人和安徽的领导者，所提供的口号“加倍努力，为三年来改变中国的面貌” 。但最重要的是，目睹他们在自己的地盘上级的礼仪自卑，各省鼓励推出自己的政治迫害，迫害的风通过国家一泻千里。
毛泽东可能是神秘的，让他的同事们猜测他的消息的性质，但这次有很多来自北京关于正确方向的压力。为了确保对右派分子的清洗进行了摸底，毛泽东派他的斗牛梗邓小平的一系列区域性会议。指示清晰。在甘肃，邓解释说，对副省长孙滇菜，陈称依和梁答郡的斗争必须是unequivocal.26Gansu老板张中良没有浪费时间，和几个星期后，他宣布了一个反党集团被破获里面党的省委。巧合的是，它的领导人孙滇菜，陈称椅和梁答军：他们被指控否认社会主义高潮的成就在1956年，攻击党，诋毁社会主义和资本主义推动的 - 其中包括令人发指的crimes.27
这些都是强有力的领导推翻了与北京的支持。清肃，然而，进行各级党的，沉默的大多数批评的声音。少数敢于反对党的路线。在甘肃，一个贫穷的省附近的内蒙古沙漠地区，大约粮食购销或过度配额的任何批评意见只是变得不可想象。该消息关注作物党员是直言不讳： “你应该仔细考虑是否是右派'28In兰州大学，坐落在首都甘肃，高达一半的学生分别获得了白旗，在一个政治上保守落后的迹象。有些人寄托在他们的后面一张纸条： “你父亲正白旗”其他被殴打。那些谁了中立的立场被指责为reactionaries.29吹扫持续，只要张中良仍然大权在握。由1960年3月，一些190,000人被批斗，羞辱的公众集会，以及40,000干部被开除党籍，其中包括150名省级officials.30
类似的清洗发生在全国各地，作为激进的领导人抓住机会干掉他们更胆小的对手。从1957年12月起，云南南部省份是从党的老年人达到了下来村干部的反右吹扫的抓地力。 1958年4月艰难的本地老板谢富治，短男子与一个双下巴，宣布了一个“反党集团”的领导人被推翻：郑敦，王婧，组织部的负责人，是犯了“地方主义'，'修正主义' ，崇尚资本主义，企图推翻党的领导，反对社会主义revolution.31By 1958年的宗教裁判所的夏天已导致拆除约2,000党员。在15一高层领导人被解雇，其中包括150多名县级工作强大的干部或更高版本在全省十几个行政区域之一。另有9,000党员被打成右派的运动unfolded.32
“反方”拉帮结派被发现几乎无处不在。毛泽东打了招呼的省领导。 “更好的我比你作为独裁者， ”他1958年3月宣布，援引列宁的话。 “这是在各省类似：它是将是姜华或沙文汉的独裁者'33In浙江沙文汉是由江华追逐，以及类似的战斗发生在广东，内蒙古，新疆，甘肃，青海，安徽，辽宁，河北，云南，除其他provinces.34In河南，这将是受影响最严重饥荒的省份之一，一个温和的领导人叫潘复生被搁置了吴芝圃，毛的狂热追随者席卷而来。社会主义高潮期间，潘曾画集体化的一个严峻的画面。 “农民。 。 。相同牛马今天。黄牛被捆绑在房子里，人类被利用，在现场。女孩和妇女拉犁和耙，用她们的子宫挂出。合作转化为人类的力量的剥削。 '35Here ，似乎，是撤退到资本主义赤裸裸的情况下，所有的平底锅的追随者被追杀，分裂党和村庄。稻草人与口号似乎沿着尘土飞扬的路边，阅读“打倒潘复生'或'打倒吴芝圃” 。大多数地方干部可以看到哪个方向的风拂面，并且符合落后吴Zhipu.36
但是，但是巨大的压力，总有选择的作出。当毛泽东参观了江苏，并要求当地领导人是否他们在打右派，江渭清收集了他的勇气，并告诉主席，如果有任何不良分子，他将不得不算作他们的领导。党要摆脱他第一。毛泽东笑道： “你不害怕被切成块的拉皇帝下马！那么，就让它再。 。 。 '37As因此，减少干部被指责在江苏比其他地方。
但难得的是那些谁的信念，勇气或意愿游泳逆潮流而动。清肃渗透到整个党的队伍。正如毛泽东强加他的意志在北京，当地的领主在自己的省份所规定的法律，谴责任何反对为“右倾保守” 。而且，正如省会城市有自己的霸权，县领导和他们的亲信所用的清洗，以消除他们的对手。他们视而不见的地方恶霸。在地面上，一个世界远非设想在纸上的乌托邦删除开始出现。
一个早期预警迹象是在1958年的夏天，作为报告的高层之间流传表明丰县反右运动中如何暴力已经成为一种常态，只是上海以南。百人自杀，许多人正在地里干活死亡。王文忠，县领导，以身作则一个座右铭相比'群众'狗只能被一棒子的视线在一个干部的手吓倒。数千名村民被指控为“地主” ，或者直接打断日常生活几个月就结束集会'反革命' 。许多人遭到殴打，捆绑和折磨，有的被带走建立整个county.38特别劳改营。
奉贤是黑暗来的可怕的警告。在顶部，但是，浮离地面，在信仰的人来改变乾坤的能力是无限的。 1957年12月陈正人，毛的最值得信赖的同事之一，被攻击的'右派'谁阻碍了水水利竞选群众的积极性的保守主义。这是大跃39的振臂高呼。
