风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
报告：中美之间的“战略不信任”?
https://www.npr.org/2012/04/04/150011703/report-strategic-distrust-between-u-s-and-china
2012 年 4 月 4 日
Kenneth Lieberthal is co-author of a new monograph called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." He's also director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Robert Siegel speaks with Lieberthal about what is behind the distrust between the two countries and what can be done about it.
肯尼斯·李伯索 (Kenneth Lieberthal) 与人合着了一本名为“解决美中战略不信任”的新专着。 他还是布鲁金斯学会约翰·桑顿中国中心的主任。 罗伯特·西格尔 (Robert Siegel) 与李博索 (Lieberthal) 谈论了两国之间不信任背后的原因以及可以采取的措施。
罗伯特·西格尔，主持人：
美中关系充满了不对称。 我们认为他们的经济和军事实力正在迅速增长。 他们认为我们是一个正在衰落的国家。 我们认为美国的对华政策试图让北京在既定的国际规则和体系中发挥更具建设性的作用。 他们认为我们试图遏制或挫败对全球权力的假设。 举出一个重大的全球问题——朝鲜、伊朗、叙利亚、货币政策——两国很可能会就此争论不休。
布鲁金斯学会的一份新报告将这些差异归结为一个词：战略不信任。 该报告名为“解决美中战略不信任”。 它是由一个中国人和一个美国人合着的，他们都是各自国家与对方打交道的专家。 美国的合著者、布鲁金斯学会约翰·L·桑顿中国中心主任肯尼斯·李伯索现在也加入了我们的行列。
很高兴和你在一起。
衡量我们和中国差距的一个指标是，每个国家的领导层是否都将战略不信任视为一个问题。 我想，有，我们没有。
我认为两国都将长期不信任问题视为一个严重的问题。 我认为不同之处在于他们的不信任更多地基于过去的历史。 我们的不信任更多是基于对中国未来将如何行动的不确定性。
那种认为美国正在走出去、正在衰落的观点在中国广泛存在，还是存在一些争论？ 你会如何描述它？
我认为人们普遍持有的观点是，美国要么开始衰落，要么在未来十年左右的时间里看到其实力达到顶峰并开始衰落。 不过，让我再补充一点，每个人都认为美国仍然是迄今为止世界上最强大的国家。 所以这并不是说美国现在很弱。 但是当你展望未来时，他们认为美国已经达到顶峰，现在唯一的问题是它什么时候真正开始下降，然后下降的速度有多快。
这里一个明显的不信任点是美国促进民主、人权和公民权利的政策。 中国人不认为这是某种良性的美国世界观。 他们认为这是一种阻挠他们的尝试，我想。
对于那些中国精英来说，美国的民主议程被视为试图改变中国政治制度并让他们下台的议程。 所以，当然，他们认为这并不受欢迎。 他们将我们在世界各地所做的很多事情解释为有效地试图为中国政权更迭创造机会。
我想让你描述一下另一个非常令人担忧的不信任领域，那就是军事问题。 中国人认为，他们在其公认领海以外的海域拥有真正的战略利益，即他们的海岸线。 美国认为它在同一水域拥有正当的安全利益。
这是潜在危险的观点差异。 你认为两军实际上有办法解决这些问题，也许可以更好地理解彼此。
我认为客观上我们将在这个问题上有很大的紧张关系。 中国确实有非常合法的安全利益可以超越他们的领海。 我们对这些水域有着长期的、严肃的利益。 我们与韩国和日本结盟。 我们与台湾等地有着牢固的关系。 这些都是非常重要的航道。
我认为存在真正的利益冲突。 所以这不仅仅是一个感知问题。 它们可以通过明智的谈判和加强相互理解来减少。 他们无法被淘汰。 但是，即使在冷战最激烈的时候，我们也可以进行核武器谈判，达成协议，在某些领域相互克制，这样我们双方都不会做一些会破坏稳定的事情。
所以我认为外交确实可以在帮助调和真正的利益冲突方面产生重大影响。 无法完全解决它们，但它可以创造一个成本更低、更安全的未来。
Kenneth Lieberthal，感谢您接受我们的采访。
我的荣幸，很高兴和你交谈。
布鲁金斯学会的肯尼斯·李博索 (Kenneth Lieberthal) 是新报告“评估美中战略不信任”的合著者。
主持人 AUDIE CORNISH：
这是 NPR 新闻。
Report: 'Strategic Distrust' Between U.S. And China
https://www.npr.org/2012/04/04/150011703/report-strategic-distrust-between-u-s-and-china
Kenneth Lieberthal is co-author of a new monograph called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." He's also director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Robert Siegel speaks with Lieberthal about what is behind the distrust between the two countries and what can be done about it.
ROBERT SIEGEL, HOST:
The relationship between the U.S. and China is full of asymmetries. We see them as growing rapidly in economic and military power. They see us as a country on the decline. We see U.S. China policy as trying to get Beijing to play a more constructive role within established international rules and systems. They see us as trying to contain or frustrate assumption of global power. Name a big global issue - North Korea, Iran, Syria, monetary policy - and the two countries are likely arguing about it.
A new report from the Brookings Institution has boiled these differences down to a phrase: Strategic Distrust. The report is called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." It was co-authored by a Chinese and an American, each an expert on his country's dealings with the other. And the American co-author, Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, joins us now.
Welcome to the program.
It's a pleasure to be with you.
One point that's a measure how apart, we and the Chinese are, is whether each country's leadership regards strategic mistrust as a problem. And I gather, there is does and ours doesn't.
I think both countries regard the issue of long-term distrust as a serious problem. I think the difference is that their distrust is based much more on past history. Our distrust is based much more on uncertainty about how China will act in the future.
That notion that the U.S. is on the way out, that it's in decline, widely held in China or a matter of some debate? How would you describe it?
I think what's very widely held as the notion the U.S. is either starting to decline or, within the coming decade or so, will have seen its power peak and will be in decline. Let me add one more point on that though, everyone thinks America is still by far the most powerful country in the world. So it isn't that America is now weak. But as you look to the future they see America as having peaked, and now the only question is when it will actually begin to decline and then how rapidly.
One obvious point of distrust here is the dimension of U.S. policy that fosters democracy and human rights and civil rights. The Chinese don't see that as some benign American worldview. They see it as an attempt to thwart them, I gather.
For those of the Chinese elite, America's democracy agenda is seen as an agenda of trying to change the Chinese political system and get them out of power. So, of course, they regard that as not all welcomed. And they interpret a lot of things we do around the world as effectively trying to tee-up the chances for regime change in China.
There's one other pretty worrying area of distrust that I want you to describe a bit, which is military issues. And the Chinese feel that they have a real strategic interest in seas that are beyond their recognized territorial waters, around their coast. And the U.S. believes that it has valid security interests in the very same waters.
That's potentially dangerous difference of views. And you think that there actually are ways in which the two militaries could address them, and perhaps understand each other a bit better.
I think it is objectively the case that we're going to have a lot of tension over this issue. The Chinese do have very legitimate security interests to go beyond their territorial waters. We have very long-standing, serious interests in those same waters. We have alliances with South Korea and Japan. We have a strong relationship with Taiwan and so forth. And these are very important shipping lanes.
I think there are real conflicts of interests. So this is not all a matter of perception. They can be reduced by intelligent negotiation and enhanced and mutual understanding. They can't be eliminated. But look, even at the height of the Cold War we could have nuclear arms negotiations that produced agreements, that involve mutual restraint in some areas so that neither of us did some things that would have been destabilizing.
So I think diplomacy can really have a significant impact in helping to reconcile real conflicts of interest. Can't fully resolve them but it can create a less costly, more secure future.
Kenneth Lieberthal, thanks for talking with us.
My pleasure, nice to talk to you.
Kenneth Lieberthal, of the Brookings Institution, is the co-author of the new report "Assessing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust."
AUDIE CORNISH, HOST: This is NPR News.
19 April 2012
"Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust"–A Must-Read!
Center for China and Globalization
https://www.andrewerickson.com/2012/04/addressing-u-s-china-strategic-distrust-a-must-read/
Blog Posts Chinese Language 中文
Mandatory reading for all concerned observers of Sino-American relations!
Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2012).
Click here for Podcast and both Chinese and English versions of the paper.
The issue of mutual distrust of long-term intentions—termed here “strategic distrust”—has become a central concern in US-China relations. Vice President Xi Jinping recognized this reality in giving this issue first place in his review of key problems in U.S.-China relations during his major policy address in Washington, DC on February 15, 2012.
Both Beijing and Washington seek to build a constructive partnership for the long run. U.S.-China relations are, moreover, mature. The two sides understand well each others’ position on all major issues and deal with each other extensively. The highest level leaders meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular government-to-government dialogues between agencies in the two governments each year.
This history and these extensive activities have not, however, produced trust regarding long-term intentions on either side, and arguably the problem of lack of such trust is becoming more serious. Distrust is itself corrosive, producing attitudes and actions that themselves contribute to greater distrust. Distrust itself makes it difficult for leaders on each side to be confident they understand the deep thinking among leaders on the other side regarding the future U.S.-China relationship.
The coauthors of this paper explicate both the underlying concerns each leadership harbors about the other side and the reasons for those concerns. Each coauthor has written the narrative of his government’s views without any changes made by the other coauthor. The coauthors have together written the follow-on analysis and recommendations. The focus is not on day-to-day willingness to cooperate on various issues but rather on the factors on each side that create underlying distrust of the long-term intentions of the other.
The purpose of these narratives of distrust is to enable each leadership to better fathom how the other thinks—and therefore to devise more effective ways to build strategic trust. The coauthors hope this paper will improve the potential for a long-term normal major power relationship between the United States and China, rather than an adversarial relationship that might otherwise develop. …
For further ideas about how Washington and Beijing might reduce strategic distrust, see:
Andrew S. Erickson, “From Shanghai to Somalia: China’s Contributions to the Security of Seaborne Commerce in Asia and Beyond,” in 沈丁立, 张贵洪, 主编 [Shen Dingli and Zhang Guihong, eds], 亚洲国际关系的重构 [Restructuring of International Relations in Asia] (Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 [Shanghai People’s Press], 2011), 241-75.
Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Nan Li, eds., China, the United States, and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010).
Andrew S. Erickson and Wei He, “U.S.-China Security Relations,” in Task Force Report—U.S.-China Relations: A Roadmap for the Future, Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Issues & Insights 9.16 (August 20, 2009), 7-12, available in English and Chinese.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region,” in Wu Shicun and Zou Keyuan, eds., Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation (London: Ashgate, 2009), 51-80.
Andrew S. Erickson, “The Container Security Initiative and Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” in 沈丁立, 任晓, 主编 [Shen Dingli and Ren Xiao, Chief Editors], 亚洲地缘经济与政治 [Geoeconomics and Politics in Asia], (Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 [Shanghai People’s Press], 2008), 139-73.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Combating a Truly Collective Threat: Sino-American Military Cooperation Against Avian Influenza,” Global Health Governance: The Scholarly Journal for the New Health Security Paradigm, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (January 2007).
美中战略不信任
https://asiancenturyinstitute.com/international/174-us-china-strategic-distrust
2014 年 3 月 22 日
不幸的是，美国参议院对奥巴马总统外交政策和安全团队的确认听证会将重点放在中东问题上，而不是中国的“主要游戏”。
美国总统奥巴马已提名约翰克里为新任国务卿，查克哈格尔为下一任国防部长，约翰布伦南接任中央情报局局长。
这些提名必须得到美国参议院的批准，而后两者现在肯定会经过参议院的确认程序。 议程上的首要问题将是对以色列的支持、对伊朗的强硬态度以及美国的国家和军事实力。
在不降低任何这些问题的重要性的情况下，它们不是 21 世纪的主要游戏。 美国在未来四年及以后面临的最大外交政策和安全挑战将是管理美中关系和解决两国之间的战略不信任（对长期意图的相互不信任），肯尼斯对这个问题进行了很好的分析 Lieberthal 和 Wang Jisi 在最近的 Brookings Publication 中。
美国和中国是世界上最大的两个经济体，中国的GDP总量将在几年内超过美国。 自尼克松总统首次访华以来，他们相识已有40多年。 他们的经济通过贸易、投资、金融和移民密切相关。 最高级别领导人会面相对频繁，两国政府机构每年定期举行60多次政府间对话。
然而，他们深深植根于历史的战略不信任只会越来越严重——尽管美国声称它准备适应中国崛起为负责任的超级大国，而中国并不寻求取代美国的全球领导地位。 举出一个全球性问题——朝鲜、伊朗、叙利亚或货币政策——两国很可能会就此争论不休。
总之，中国的崛起正在改变世界的经济和政治格局，美中关系将决定21世纪的格局。
在北京看来，是美国的政策、态度和误解导致两国之间缺乏互信。 中国政治精英认为，美国谋求维护全球霸权，制约甚至搅局中国的崛起。 他们对美国的战略不信任源于四种情绪：中国认为自 2008 年以来，它已经成为并且应该被视为一流的全球大国； 美国正走向衰落的评估； 观察到金砖国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）正在挑战西方的主导地位； 以及中国强有力的政治领导有效管理社会和经济事务的发展模式（“北京共识”）为其他发展中国家提供了西方模式的替代方案。
就美国领导人而言，他们深感担忧的是，中国正试图以美国的影响力和利益付出巨大代价来主导亚洲地区——也就是说，这是一种零和关系，而不是双赢关系。 在经贸领域，美国关注的是知识产权盗窃、中国的货币政策、对中国外国直接投资的限制以及中国将稀土出口限制作为外交政策工具。
日益增长的战略不信任有三个基本来源：不同的政治传统、价值体系和文化； 对彼此决策过程的理解和欣赏不足； 以及两国之间明显缩小的实力差距。
两国必须更加紧密地合作，以增进在经贸、军事、网络安全和三边关系（如中国/日本/美国和中国/印度/美国）等领域的相互了解。
但两国政治传统、价值体系和文化根本上不可调和，这给两国关系带来了巨大挑战。 美国人不信任自称为共产主义政党的独裁政治制度。 专制政治制度本质上不太稳定，更容易将国内不满归咎于他人，而且透明度较低。 但从中国的角度来看，美国的民主制度对其治理体系构成了生存威胁。
简而言之，美中关系需要非常谨慎的管理。 在战略互信日益加深的背景下，一个“意外”就可能引发美中之间毁灭性的政治或军事危机。 必须不惜一切代价避免这种情况。
在此背景下，最令人遗憾的是，美国国会尚未对美国乃至世界在 21 世纪面临的最大外交政策和安全挑战的确认程序表现出任何兴趣。
These nominations must be approved by the US Senate, and a bruising Senate confirmation process is now certain for the latter two. Issues at the top of the agenda will be support for Israel, toughness on Iran, and the US's national and military strength.
Without diminishing the importance of any of these issues, they are not the main game in the 21st century. The greatest foreign policy and security challenges facing the US over the coming four years and beyond will be managing the US/China relationship and addressing the strategic distrust (mutual distrust of long term intentions) between the two countries, an issue very well analysed by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi in a recent Brookings Publication.
The US and China are the world's biggest two economies, with China's total GDP set to overtake America's in a matter of years. They have known each other for more than 40 years since President Nixon first visited China. Their economies are intimately linked through trade, investment, finance and migration. The highest level leaders meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular government-to-government dialogues between agencies in the two governments each year.
And yet, their strategic distrust, deeply rooted in history, is only getting worse -- even though the US claims that it is prepared to accommodate China's rise as a responsible superpower, while China is not seeking to replace America's global leadership. Name a global issue -- North Korea, Iran Syria, or monetary policy -- and the two countries are likely to be arguing about it.
In short, China's rise is changing the economic and political structure of the world, and the US/China relationship will define the shape of the 21st century.
In Beijing's view, it is US policies, attitude and misconceptions that cause the lack of mutual trust between the two countries. Chinese political elites believe that the US is seeking to maintain global hegemony and constrain or even upset China's rise. Their strategic distrust of the US derive from four sentiments: China's feeling that since 2008 it has become and should be treated as a first-class global power; the assessment that the US is heading for decline; the observation that the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are challenging Western dominance; and the notion that China's development model of strong political leadership that effectively manages social and economic affairs ("Beijing consensus") provides an alternative from Western models for other developing countries.
For their part, American leaders are deeply concerned that China is seeking to dominate the Asian region at significant cost to US influence and interests -- that is, a zero sum relationship, not win-win. In the economics and trade area, the US is concerned about intellectual property theft, China's currency policy, restrictions on foreign direct investment in China, and China's use as a foreign policy tool of export restrictions on rare earths.
There are three fundamental sources of the growing strategic distrust: different political traditions, value systems and cultures; insufficient comprehension and appreciation of each other's policy-making process; and the perceived narrowing power gap between the two countries.
It is essential that the two countries work ever more closely together to improve mutual understanding in areas like economics and trade, military affairs, cyber security, and trilateral relations (like China/Japan/US and China/India/US).
But the two countries' fundamentally and irreconcilable different political traditions, value systems and cultures pose great relationship challenges. Americans don't trust authoritarian political systems run by parties that call themselves communist. Authoritarian political systems are inherently less stable, more prone to blaming others for their domestic discontent, and less transparent. But from China's point of view, the US democratic system poses an existential threat to its system of governance.
In short, the US/China relationship will require very careful management. In the context of growing strategic distrust, an "accident" could trigger a devastating political or military crisis between the US and China. And this must be avoided at all costs.
In this context, it is most regrettable that the US Congress has not yet shown any interest for its confirmation process in the biggest foreign policy and security challenge facing America, and indeed the world, in the 21st century.
Author
John WestExecutive Director
Asian Century Institute
www.asiancenturyinstitute.com
