哈佛学者Huff比较了伊斯兰文明，中华文明和西方文明的科学发展史，论证了思想自由是近四百年西方科技遥遥领先的原因之一。2

2017年Huff的书“The Rise of Early Modern Science，Islam，China and the West”出了第三版。他在新版前言的最后一段，专门谈到了经济成功后的中国的科学发展前景。

大家都能读英文，我就不翻译了。

Because of the broad civilizational and long-term framework of the present study, it may raise questions about the present state of the Islamic world and China. The so-called Arab Spring has proven to be a disappointment, with some observers concluding that the "Arab Spring" was a misnomer: that the Middle Eastern segment of the Muslim world has come apart.' The rise of al-Qaeda and then ISIS, but even before that, the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928), suggests that Middle Eastern discussions are still captured by foundational questions as to whether or not Islamic societies can become fully modern, with the full panoply of modern law and institutions, or whether Islamic law (the sharia) is the answer.

China's economic take-off, on the other hand, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, seems promising, but can China suddenly and radically transform its cultural, legal, and intellectual institutions so as to join the Western leadership of modern science? The spurning of the seventeenth-century missionary efforts to provide China with the foundations of modern science, discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, suggests that changing China's deep institutional arrangements governing the pursuit of science and open discourse is not so easy. Economic take-off approaching the level defined as a "developed" economy is one thing; joining the leadership in science (and applied science) may be something different. The broad and sweeping restrictions on freedom of expression, discussions of Western culture, communication on the Internet, and a host of related constrictions in China today are entirely opposite to the building of a public sphere and neutral spaces seen historically with the rise of modern science. I shall return to these questions in the new Epilogue.