契约和外交好玩；契约和外交不是好玩的。

20年前读过“Paris 1919”（NYT bestseller）。作者是多伦多大学历史学教授Margaret Macmillian，她是参加和会的英国首相劳合乔治的曾孙女。书中有一章写在巴黎和会的中国使团，和处在世界秩序大变更时期struggling的中国。100年后，不禁感慨又是一个n年未遇之大写的X。

书写得很好，易读，就是太长。关于中国那章也长，我就转述一下那个惹了大麻烦的“中日密约”吧。一是契约和外交好玩，二是契约和外交不是好玩的。

一战结束消息传来，北洋政府宣布放假3天。北京6万人（大部分是大中学校师生）举行胜利大游行。人们推到了20年前为义和团杀掉的德国外交官立的纪念碑。由于美国参战后提出了新外交理念，倡导公理正义民族自决，中国朝野大受鼓舞，对巴黎和会抱有很高的期望。年轻学生们尤其激动，“there was an uncritical admiration for Western democracy, Western liberal ideals and Western learning. Many Chinese also hoped that the peace would bring an end to interference by the Great Powers in China’s affairs.”

中国1917对德宣战，德国潜水艇还击沉了载有华工的法国轮船，500多人丧生地中海。作为战胜国，中国要收回德国在山东的所有权益是理所当然的。当时中国外交人才奇缺，“It was easier for China to find laborers for the war effort than experienced diplomats for the peace” （这话Macmillan教授说得未免尖刻了一点，这在任何历史时期任何国家都成立）。中国倾其所有，由外长，驻华盛顿、布鲁塞尔、伦敦的大使，加外国顾问组成了60多人的代表团赴巴黎。据说，中国的总统或总理没有像其它大国的那样出席巴黎和会，是因为国内政治不稳而不敢出国。中国雇外国顾问是想与西方更有效地沟通。有意思的是，美国政府为了维护一个honest broker的形象，禁止她的公民为中国的巴黎使团工作。由于美国忌惮日在东亚的扩张，不承认日中间的各种条约，同情支持中国，中国决定在和会上解决山东问题，势在必得。

带点理想主义色彩的美国是不是100%主持公道呢？作者是这样写的，“China’s situation was grim. Foreign nationals were staking out their spheres of influence: the Russians in the north, the British in the Yangtze valley (the Yangtze ran for 3,500 miles from the China Sea to Tibet), the French in the south, the Germans in the Shantung peninsula—and the Japanese here, there and everywhere. The Americans, who did not join in—partly, said the cynics, because they did not have the resources— talked idealistically about an open door through which everyone could exploit the Chinese equally.”

其实最倒霉的是德国，他们重资投入山东还没有任何收益，却为日本做了嫁衣裳。“The German government lavished money on its new possession, far more than it spent on any of its much larger African colonies. It enticed German business, which was curiously reluctant to invest in Shantung, to build a railway and dig mines. (None ever showed a profit.) The navy took charge of the new port at Kiachow. Tsingtao (Qingdao), as it was known, was a model development with superb modern harbor facilities, neatly laid-out paved streets, piped water and sewage, an up-to-date telephone network, German schools, hospitals, and even a brewery that made excellent German beer, as it still does today. One admiring foreign visitor called Tsingtao “the Brighton of the East.” By 1907 it was the seventh most important port in China. The only drawback was that it was many thousands of miles from the nearest German colonies and from Germany itself“

日本觊觎中国已久，但手段绝非简单粗暴。“In 1918, with the war nearly over, Japan made a final effort to get matters in China settled to its satisfaction. In May it signed a defense treaty with the Chinese government, and in September it exchanged secret notes reiterating the 1915 agreements on Shantung. In a phrase that was particularly damaging to China’s case in Paris, the Chinese representative in Tokyo said that his government “gladly agreed” to the notes. In other words, the Chinese government compromised its own bargaining position before the war ended. Chinese delegates in Paris claimed that they knew nothing of the secret agreements until they were produced by the Japanese in January 1919.”

1918年9月24日，驻日公使章宗祥与日本外相后藤新平签署关于济顺高徐二铁路、“满蒙四路”、解决山东悬案等三事的换文。章宗祥表示：中国决定向日本借款，筹建（原计划借德款）“满蒙四路”及济南至顺德、高密至徐州二铁路。后藤新平复：“日本政府欣然承认，并当速执必要之处置。”他允诺解决日军占领山东东部后产生的各悬案，致函称：

　　顾念贵我两国间所存善邻之谊，本和衷协调之意旨，提议关于山东省诸问题照左记各项处理：

　　（一）胶济铁路沿线之日本国军队，除济南留一部队外，全部均调集于青岛。

　　（二）胶济铁路之警备，可由中国政府组成巡警队任之。

　　（三）右列巡警队之经费由胶济铁路提供相当之金额充之。

　　（四）警队本部及枢要驿并巡警养成所内，应聘用日本国人。

　　（五）胶济铁路从业员中，应采用中国人。

　　（六）胶济铁路所属确定以后，归中、日两国合办经营。

　　（七）现在施行之民政撤废之。

章宗祥覆函：“欣然同意日本政府之提议。” 欣然同意这件“中日密约”，白纸黑墨4个字，给中国在巴黎和会上造成了巨大的被动。

巴黎和会上日方的立场是：日本对德国战败做出贡献，并事实上占领青岛。中日两国关于青岛租借地及胶济铁路已有条约，约定将原德国在山东权益交给日本，再由日本有条件交还中国。日本坚持1915及1918年中日条约有效，即使民国四年的条约有武力胁迫之嫌，中国在参战后或可质疑其法理效力，但1918年密约是中国政府参战后，为取得日本借款而签订的，且垫款已被北京政府支领并花费殆尽，中国难以否定其法律效力。史实是徐世昌于1918年9月4日当选大总统，为促进南北和平（广州那边也不是省油的灯），动用了这两笔各2000万日元的借款。

更糟糕的是中国使团事先不知1918年密约的详情。北洋政府内部激烈争论是否公开“中日密约”。徐世昌不顾段祺瑞（亲日派）的反对，决定将其提交巴黎和会。

山东在巴黎和会上是比较边缘化的问题。到了1月27日，日程才到了处理德国在太平洋殖民地的问题。日本竭力想把山东与她从德国手中夺来的在太平洋的几个岛屿一并讨论。但列强不答应，坚持山东问题要分别处理，而且中国必须参加。“Makino tried to lump the Shantung concessions in with the various islands that had been seized from Germany. He argued that Shantung was merely a matter involving Japan and Germany and that there was no need for China to be there when it came up. He was clearly hoping that Shantung would be disposed of briskly, along with the Pacific islands, as part of the spoils of war. The other powers decided that Shantung should be discussed separately and that China should be invited to the discussion later that afternoon.”。

次日上午就是我们都知道的顾维钧的出色表现。他承认了密约的存在，但还是以言真义切，为中国争得了道义的高地。下面是书中对这一历史时刻的描述。

Koo replied for China the following morning. Although his voice shook at first, he tore into the Japanese in a dazzling speech replete with learned references to international law and Latin tags. It was true, he admitted, that China had signed agreements with Japan in 1915 and 1918 which seemed to promise that Japan would get the German rights in Shantung, but China had signed under duress and could not be held to the agreements. In any case, all questions dealing with German possessions had to be dealt with by the Peace Conference.

China, Koo went on, was grateful to Japan for liberating Shantung from the Germans. “But grateful as they were, the Chinese delegation felt that they would be false to their duty to China and to the world if they did not object to paying their debts of gratitude by selling the birthright of their countrymen and thereby sowing the seeds of discord for the future.” National self-determination and territorial integrity, those Wilsonian principles, obliged the powers to give Shantung back to China. 

Shantung was, said Koo, “the cradle of Chinese civilization, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, and a Holy Land for the Chinese.” Moreover, to allow Shantung to fall under foreign control would be to leave a “dagger pointed at the heart of China.”

Borden called the Chinese presentation “very able,” and Lansing thought that Koo had simply overwhelmed the Japanese. Clemenceau’s warm congratulations, which were supposed to remain private, were common knowledge later the same evening. On eloquence alone, the Chinese were the clear winner.

不幸的是，事情没有当时就定夺下来。山东问题就有了夜长梦多的结局。“Unfortunately, the issue of Shantung was not decided in January. It had to wait until the frantic race in April, when the final clauses of the treaty with Germany were put together. By that time the peacemakers were juggling hundreds of decisions, giving way on one, insisting on another, trying to satisfy impossible demands so that there would be a treaty for the Germans that all the Allies would sign. The Chinese and their hopes were a small and insignificant part of the calculations. Wilson himself was being forced into the sort of horse-trading he hated, gaining Japan’s assent to the League covenant, even without the racial equality clause, at the cost of his own principles. If the League was the best hope of the world, then perhaps the sacrifice of a small piece of China was worth it.”

到最后，威尔逊对中国人多少有点愧疚。“Wilson offered reassurance. The League would ensure that the Chinese need not worry about future aggression from Japan or any other nation. And he, too, made a plea for understanding. The powers were in a very embarrassing position because of all the agreements that had been signed during the war. He was very sympathetic to the Chinese but they must recognize that treaties, including their own with Japan, were sacred. “Since this war began by the protest of the western nations against the violation of a treaty, we must, above all, respect treaties.” Lloyd George agreed: “We cannot consider treaties as scraps of paper which can be torn up when one no longer needs them.” With what one embittered Chinese observer described as “an air of innocence, ignorance and indifference,” Clemenceau noted that whatever Lloyd George said went for him as well”

上面是围绕“中日密约”的史实。它引起的五四运动的轩然大波不表，当时在巴黎的中国人悲愤欲绝，后来投日的汪精卫也在场。他们通过了一个决议，使得威尔逊的保安升级。

By this point, the news that things were going badly for China had leaked out. Paris was full of rumors, which the press picked up. On the evening of April 29, Chinese students in Paris held a very stormy meeting in a hall in the Rue Danton. Speaker after speaker denounced the West. Wang Chingwei, who later won fame as the head of a Japanese puppet government in China, warned in fluent English of the reaction among the Chinese. A young woman art student called for an end to talk of peace: “We must go in for force.” Eugene Chen, a journalist who was later to be China’s foreign minister, introduced a resolution condemning the Big Four and singling out Wilson for particular mention. It was passed unanimously. That night Wilson’s security was stepped up.

The Chinese delegation got the full details of the settlement on April 30. One member threw himself to the floor in despair. When Baker arrived at the Hôtel Lutétia late that evening to convey Wilson’s excuses and his sympathy, he found a very depressed group who blamed the president for letting them down. Some of them wanted to leave Paris at once rather than sign the treaty. (Koo later told Bonsal that he would sign only if his government gave him a direct order: “I hope they will not make me sign. It would be my death sentence.”)

看来，北洋政府拒绝签字，是救了顾维钧一命。

英文摘自 https://erenow.net/modern/paris1919/27.php