“Each time, the attack emerged from justbeyond what security planners assumed was “good enough” standoff distance— high ground outside the venue fence, a concealment point just beyond the fairway boundary, or a magnetometer line that turned out to be just spread-out enough for a rapid charge from around the corner.“
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Combine those three stories, and our N=3 dataset starts to look a lot less like three independent miracles of bad fortune and a lot more like a system that keeps failing in eerily specific ways.
One rooftop that was covered and then mysteriously uncovered. One would?be sniper who spends hours inside the outer perimeter without any sweep pushing him out. One gunman who manages to pick the exact right moment when a half?dozen security professionals aren’t physically in his way at a choke point designed precisely so that someone should always be in the way.
We can dismiss those questions as coincidence —as lottery-level luck— for three separate, consecutive “lone wolves.” If so, well, the crack where “incredible luck” lives is getting microscopically skinny.“
详细分析见
https://www.coffeeandcovid.com/p/third-time-is-not-a-charm-sunday
Did these shooters get help —active or passive— from people inside who know how the system really works? Remember the Ian Fleming chestnut: once is coincidence. Twice is happenstance. Three times is enemy action.
In the case of Trump assassination attempts, we’ve now reached three— three gunmen, three “lone wolves,” three times the system somehow accidentally left the exact wrong piece of ground uncovered. One hopes that the Administration knows its James Bond lore
