Front And Rearways In Modern Warfare
Front And Rearways In Modern Warfare
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Love from Ukraine
Synelnykove – Although the Russian army is essentially stationary in positions that, like Pokrovsk, are about 50 kilometers far from where they were twelve years ago, cities like this one – which is 150 kilometers far from the current contact zone – are subjected to near-constant attacks daily. The scene in Synelnykove is almost ground zero: the roofs of most of its houses are torn apart or patched up with tarpaulins provided for humanitarian purposes by international organizations and volunteer groups, while the more imposing buildings are mostly eroded or completely destroyed by bombs.
As described yesterday in Pavlohrad, the last years of the war here too show that physical control of the terrain is no longer the sole metric of operational success.
Moscow can, in fact, remain virtually immobile along certain lines while increasing the depth of engagement, persistence on target, and saturation density.
As we have also reported in videos (available on the YouTube channel of the Italian newspaper “La Ragione”) from various sides of the front, the result is an artificial expansion of the kill zone, which is no longer limited by the mere range of multirotor radio frequency (≈ 20 km) or fiber optic (≈ 50 km) drones, as they are in turn released by other, larger vectors to locations more than 200 km far from the contact zones.
This blurring of the distinction between front and rear areas puts constant pressure on the population – especially civilians – far from the front, with the aim of eroding their resilience. The Russian Air Force initially launched its drones over Synelnykove to paralyze the railway, energy, and logistics infrastructure. As we have documented in our previous video reports, the success of those strikes was extremely limited and confined to short time frames, which the Ukrainians further reduced by restoring the station and railway tracks in record time and adopting alternative measures, such as using coal to fuel locomotives and power plants, as well as production facilities and heating systems. Furthermore, Ukraine has invested in decentralization and technological innovation.
The subsequent waves of Russian strikes have been aimed at disrupting civilian life. Moscow’s air force targeted local businesses, administrative buildings, apartment buildings, and individual homes not only to degrade Ukrainian military capacity but also to terrorize the civilian population.
The desertification of areas as far as 150 km from the contact zones fuels an illusion, still measurable in square kilometers, that the Kremlin has now adapted to modern warfare: control rather than occupation.
What we are experiencing has therefore already become a network war that erases distances, making unconquered areas uninhabitable.
It’s not so much Russian soldiers on the ground who are advancing, but rather their technology – primarily Chinese, but also incorporating Western components – despite the various economic sanctions packages adopted so far, which have attempted to limit Moscow’s purchasing and productive power without, however, impacting its core business of selling fossil fuels.
While Russia’s ability to advance territorially is very limited, its capacity to deploy deep-lying fire has grown exponentially.
Since 2014, the war in Donbas has been fought primarily with artillery, and since 2022 with increasingly infantry and armored units. In 2026, guided glide bombs, cruise and ballistic missiles, and, above all, drones will have the greatest impact. The technical capabilities of what until a few months ago were considered short-range versions of these devices have progressively expanded to the point of obliterating the very concept of a rear-line presence. Multirotor drones are used both as loitering munitions and as sentries. Once landed on the ground or at a convenient elevated position, they can wait for weeks on standby before striking their intended target, which is not necessarily a military vehicle but could also be an ambulance, a van loaded with humanitarian aid, or a press car like ours. This has extended the concept of the kill zone well beyond the positions where the Russians have managed to establish more or less permanent footholds.
Similarly, the ability to launch long-range strikes has also grown, as long-range, high-explosive drones now produce almost the same effect as other, much more expensive cruise missiles, with the difference that they, in turn, are increasingly being used to carry other, even more selective, weapons of death.
This is the case in Synelnykove, which, despite being so far from the most critical areas of the front, is itself becoming a kill zone. Only yesterday, Ukrainian containment measures allowed the elimination of two Russian FPV drones, controlled from a full 150 km away by operators who, strictly speaking, are perhaps inappropriate to call soldiers today.
However, limiting the idea that Moscow is not advancing to a flag raised over the rubble of a large city would be a huge misjudgment.
Russia’s territorial stagnation – evident along axes such as Pokrovsk – is not a denial of its offensive capacity but rather a sign of a different way of exerting power: no longer, or not primarily, maneuver, but rather the technological projection of deep fire. It’s a model that, in updated form, recalls the transformation already seen in Donbas between 2014 and 2015: back then, Grad, Uragan, and tubular artillery transformed cities like Debaltseve or Avdiivka into permanent friction zones; today, it’s the integration of drones, glide bombs, and civilian networks that dissolves the very concept of rear areas.
The ongoing blackouts severely damaged our house’s heating system in Western Ukraine while we were in the Donbas.
Without electricity, the pump couldn’t circulate the liquid while the fire was lit. As a result, the system caught fire, and the whole house was at risk of burning. Fortunately, it did not, but the whole system needs to be changed, and the house needs to be restored. Tubes are all bent, walls are blackened by haze, and the heating system doesn’t work, requiring an entirely new system.
We are doing our best since Alla’s parents live there, but there’s still a lot to work on here, too, as the people around us are in no better situation.
We’re renewing our fundraising campaign and thanking everyone who joins us in helping us restore what Russia is destroying. Even a small donation helps. We’ll keep you updated on developments.
Thank you all, dear friends
现代战争中的前线与后方
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道
辛涅利科沃 —— 虽然俄罗斯军队基本上在阵地上停滞不前，那些阵地（如波科夫斯克）距离十二年前其所在位置大约相距50公里，但像辛涅利科沃这样距离当前接触带约150公里的城市，仍每天几乎不断遭受袭击。辛涅利科沃的场景几乎可称 “震中”：大多数民房的屋顶被掀开或用国际组织与志愿团体提供的人道主义防水布临时修补，而较为宏大的建筑多被炸蚀或完全毁坏。
正如我们昨天在帕夫洛赫拉德所描述的，这里的战争近年同样表明，对地面的实际控制已不再是衡量作战成功的唯一标准。
莫斯科实际上可以在某些战线上保持几乎静止的态势，同时提升打击深度、延长目标持久性并提高饱和打击密度。
正如我们在意大利报纸《La Ragione》YouTube 频道发布的多方前线视频所示，结果是杀伤区域的人为扩展，这一区域不再仅受多旋翼无线电频率无人机（≈20公里）或光纤无人机（≈50公里）射程的限制，因为这些无人机又由其他更大的运载载具投放到距接触带200多公里之外的地点。
这种前线与后方界限的模糊对远离前线的民众——尤其是平民——施加持续压力，目的是削弱他们的抗压能力。俄空军最初对辛涅利科沃发动无人机打击，意在瘫痪铁路、能源与后勤基础设施。正如我们在以往的视频报道中记录的那样，那些打击的成效非常有限并且仅持续短暂时间，而乌克兰方面通过创纪录的速度修复车站与铁轨并采取替代措施，例如用煤为机车和发电厂、以及生产设施和供暖系统供能，进一步缩短了影响时效。此外，乌克兰还在去中心化与技术创新。
（图：我在乌克兰辛涅利科沃的火车站，该站曾被俄军击中两次——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
随后几波俄方打击则旨在扰乱民众生活。莫斯科空军将矛头指向了当地商业、行政楼、公寓楼与单户民宅，不仅为了削弱乌克兰的军事能力，更在于恐吓平民。
即便距接触带150公里之远的区域也出现了荒芜化，在若干平方公里尺度上仍会滋生一种错觉，即克里姆林宫已适应现代战争：控制而非占领。
我们所经历的已然成为一种抹除距离的网络化战争，使未被征服的地区变得无法居住。
不是地面上的俄军士兵在推进，而是他们的技术在进步——以中国制造为主，但也包含西方零部件——尽管迄今为止已有多轮经济制裁试图限制莫斯科的采购与生产能力，但并未触及其销售化石燃料这一核心经济命脉。
（图：Alla在波科夫斯克后方报道 ——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
尽管俄军在地面上推进的能力非常有限，其部署远程火力的能力却呈指数级增长。
自2014年以来，顿巴斯战争主要以炮兵为主，自2022年起步兵与装甲部队的比重逐渐增加。到2026年，制导滑翔炸弹、巡航和弹道导弹，尤其是各类无人机，将产生最大的影响。几个月前还被视为短程版本的这些装备，其技术能力逐步扩展到几乎抹除后方存在这一概念的程度。多旋翼无人机既被用作自杀式弹药，也被用作哨兵。一旦降落在地面或某个有利的高处，它们可以待命数周，然后再发动打击，目标未必是军用车辆，也可能是救护车、载有人道物资的货车，或像我们这样的新闻车。由此，杀伤区的概念被远远延伸，超出了俄方已建立或多或少保持的阵地范围。
（图：当我们在曾经被称为“零点”的战壕里报道时，我拍下了Alla这张照片，现在，这个概念已被颠覆 ——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
同样，发动远程打击的能力也在增强，如今远程高爆无人机几乎能产生与更加昂贵的巡航导弹相近的效果，不同之处在于这些无人机又越来越多地被用来携带更具选择性的致命武器。
辛涅利科沃便是这种情况，尽管离前线最关键的地区甚远，但它本身正在成为一个杀伤区。就在昨天，乌克兰的遏制措施成功击落了两架从150公里外操控的俄制FPV无人机，那些远程操作者如今在严格意义上被称为士兵也许并不贴切。
然而，如果将莫斯科未能推进基于一面在大城市废墟上插上的国旗的理解，那将是重大误判。
俄罗斯在诸如波科夫斯克等轴线上的领土停滞，并不否认其进攻能力，而是表明其行动重点方式发生了变化：不再主要依靠机动作战，而是依靠纵深火力的技术投射。这一模式在更新后的形式上，令人联想到2014–2015年顿巴斯已显现的转变：当时，喀秋莎（Grad）、飓风（Uragan）和管状火炮将德巴尔采沃或阿夫迪伊夫卡等城市转为持久摩擦区；今天，是无人机、滑翔炸弹与民用网络的整合，消解了后方区域的概念。
（图：我在辛涅利科沃为本文报道之前片刻 ——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
***
持续的停电严重损坏了我们在乌克兰西部的家中的供暖系统，而我们当时就在顿巴斯。
没有电，点着的炉火无法通过水泵循环热水。结果，系统起火，整个房子面临着烧毁的风险。幸而未被烧毁，但整个系统需要更换，房子也需要修复。管道都是歪的，墙壁被烟雾熏黑，供暖系统无法正常工作，需要彻底更换。
我们正在尽最大努力，因为Alla的父母住在那里，但这里还有许多工作要做，周围的人处境也好不到哪儿去。
我们正在重启筹款活动，感谢每一位支持我们修复被俄罗斯摧毁一切的朋友。即使是小额捐款也有帮助。我们会及时更新进展。
感谢大家，朋友们。
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