The Ongoing Ukrainian Offensive Explained from the Field
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
Mykolaiv – «The Ukrainian Armed Forces are successfully conducting an offensive operation on the southern front, having re-established control over 400 square kilometers of territory since January». Officially released by the Ukrainian General Staff in the past few hours, this statement – formally impeccable – removes Ukraine from a position that was becoming thorny, explaining many things.
After the Russian General Staff spread the false news of a Ukrainian counteroffensive to justify its lack of control over a series of settlements already publicly declared «conquered», many pro-Ukrainian bloggers began to exploit that narrative.
On its side, the Ukrainian command initially denied that similar operations were underway, only to later confirm their existence in a fragmented manner and without going into much detail. One after another, villages such as Ternuvate, Zelenyj Hai, Orestopil’, Lukianivske, Nechaivka, Novooleksandrivka, Primorske, and Ternove were more or less officially declared «liberated», even though Russian troops had never occupied them.
Being in the immediate rear of the theater of such an anomalous ‘counteroffensive’ – inappropriately praised from afar by a slew of self-styled «OSINT analysts» – is astonishing, to say the least, especially after seeing how Russian troops instead capitalized on very slow but substantial gains in Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Chasiv Yar, Rivne, Toretsk, and Huliaipole.
Although poorly portrayed in this way, the Ukrainian offensive has gradually assumed increasing strategic importance, not only at the narrative level – to overshadow negative events such as those illustrated, thus restoring Kyiv’s weight at the (alleged) negotiating table – but also at the operational level, to actively counter them through rapidly implementable and effective measures with limited technical and human costs.
The official intervention of the Ukrainian General Staff serves to correctly frame the scope of this operation.
It is not being conducted with the deployment of large-scale personnel and mechanized equipment – as misrepresented by certain so-called milbloggers, who, in exaggerating its scope, ended up reducing it to a farce – but it is nevertheless producing more than satisfactory results.
In modern warfare, control of an area the size of one of those settlements is no longer achieved solely through physical occupation but by establishing such air and ground supremacy that the enemy cannot capitalize on it.
This occurs primarily through the use of drones, jamming systems typical of electronic warfare (EW), and artillery. As we have been writing for some time now, the concept of a ‘gray zone’ as it has always been understood is now largely obsolete. There is no longer a clear line between Russian and Ukrainian control.
There are gradients of risk, shades of gray that extend well beyond the line of contact. The distinction between front lines and rear areas has become porous. The gray zone is no longer a defined geographical space but a dynamic and variable condition, which changes from hour to hour based on ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) coverage, the availability of jammers, and the presence of FPV operators.
Talking about «liberated» or «conquered» villages therefore risks being misleading. General Syrskyj’s statement is timely in this context, clarifying any doubts by clarifying that Ukraine has «reestablished control» over those areas.
Observed through the real-time images visible on the integrated system used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the ongoing offensive therefore appears to be a modern offensive in full swing, exploiting Kyiv’s dominance in unmanned and EW systems to capitalize on significant strategic gains while minimizing human and mechanized intervention in the traditional sense. Therefore, losses are far more costly – and increasingly unsustainable – for the Russians as well.
Ukraine is increasingly aggressively adopting an innovative military doctrine, which allows it to inflict devastating losses on the enemy while greatly limiting its own.
In the classic paradigm – from World War II to the Russian invasion of Donbas between 2014 and 2021 – territorial control was marked by a continuous infantry presence, the consolidation of defensive lines, stable logistical rotation, and military administration of the area.
Today, that model is technically obsolete.
Control is measured by three variables: ISR dominance, electromagnetic supremacy (EW), and persistent kinetic interdiction capability (FPV, artillery, and drones as loitering munitions). If a force can constantly observe an area, jam enemy communications, and strike any enemy concentration within minutes, the enemy cannot capitalize on that area, regardless of whether a flag is raised there. This is exactly what Kyiv is doing, while the Russians continue to send cannon fodder to take selfies with the imperial flag in kill zones, where they hold out for only a few minutes.
The Russian General Staff declared settlements it had never occupied permanently as «conquered». Subsequently, to explain the physical absence of its troops, it spoke of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Some pro-Ukrainian bloggers amplified the idea of ??a classic liberation, generating a misunderstanding: it seemed to be a matter of mechanized columns, breakthroughs, and visible advances.
This is not the current model.
Today, there are no static margins, but interdiction zones. Ukraine possesses a qualitative and quantitative advantage in the unmanned domain, allowing it to continuously interdict Russian rear areas, selectively destroy logistics, and prevent safe enemy rotations. Moscow, on the other hand, pays a very high price for every meter consolidated, as in the cases mentioned above.
Demonstrating persistent offensive capabilities in the fifth year of a full-scale war against the supposedly second-largest army in the world disrupts the psychological linearity of the front and therefore also impacts the (alleged) negotiating table. Syrsky speaks of «control». Not of conquests, liberations, and occupations. Expressing in modern language the profound paradigm shift that has characterized his management of the ЗСУ .
The ongoing blackouts severely damaged our house’s heating system in Western Ukraine while we were in the Donbas.
Without electricity, the pump couldn’t circulate the liquid while the fire was lit. As a result, the system caught fire, and the whole house was at risk of burning. Fortunately, it did not, but the whole system needs to be changed, and the house needs to be restored. Tubes are all bent, walls are blackened by haze, and the heating system doesn’t work, requiring an entirely new system.
We are doing our best since Alla’s parents live there, but there’s still a lot to work on here, too, as the people around us are in no better situation.
We’re renewing our fundraising campaign and thanking everyone who joins us in helping us restore what Russia is destroying. Even a small donation helps. We’ll keep you updated on developments.
Thank you all, dear friends
乌克兰前线现场解读：正在进行的乌克兰攻势
作者: Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道
尼古拉耶夫——“乌克兰武装部队在南线成功开展攻势，自一月以来已重新控制400平方公里领土。”该声明由乌克兰总参在过去数小时正式发布，措辞上无懈可击，也将乌克兰从日益棘手的立场中解脱出来，并解释了许多问题。
（照片来源：RBK）
在俄军总参散布乌克兰反攻的虚假消息，以为其对一系列已公开宣称“已被占领”的定居点失去控制找借口后，许多亲乌博主开始利用这一叙事。
乌方方面起初否认有类似行动正在进行，后来又以零散且不详的方式予以确认。先后有特尔努瓦特、泽连伊·海伊、奥雷斯托皮尔、卢基亚尼夫斯克、内查伊夫卡、诺沃奥列克桑德里夫卡、普里莫尔斯克和特尔诺韦等村庄或多或少被正式宣称“解放”，尽管俄军从未占领过这些地方。
（图：Alla正在乌克兰顿巴斯阵地报道——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
处在这样一场异常“反攻”战场的直接后方——遭一众自封“OSINT分析师”在远处不当赞颂——至少可以说简直令人惊愕，尤其是在看到俄军反而在波克罗夫斯克、米尔诺格拉德、查西夫雅尔、里夫内、托列茨克和赫利亚伊波利等地以缓慢但实质性的推进获利之后。
尽管被如此弱化描绘，乌克兰的攻势已逐步获得越来越重要的战略意义，不仅在叙事层面——以掩盖前述负面事件，从而恢复基辅在（所谓）谈判桌上的分量——也在作战层面——通过可快速实施、且技术与人员成本有限的有效措施积极予以遏制对方。
乌克兰总参谋部的官方介入有助于正确界定此次行动的范围。
（图：我指向波克羅夫斯克前线后方小路上一枚俄制无人机留下的弹坑。照片拍摄于撰写此文约两周前 ——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
此次行动并非像某些所谓军博所误传的那样，通过大规模兵力与机械化装备的投入来实施——那些人夸大其规模，反而把它贬为一出闹剧——但它仍然取得了相当令人满意的成果。
在现代战争中，对与这些定居点规模相当地区的控制，不再仅靠物理占领，而是通过建立足以使敌方无法加以利用的空中与地面压制来达成。
这主要靠无人机、典型的电子战干扰系统和火炮来达成。正如我们早已指出的，传统意义上的“灰色地带”概念现在在很大程度上已过时。俄乌控制已不再有明确界线。
存在风险的梯度和超越接触线的多种灰色地带。前线与后方的界限已变得不清晰。灰色地带不再是明确的地理空间，而是一种动态可变的状态，随情报-监视-侦察（ISR）覆盖、干扰器可用性和第一视角无人机（FPV）操作员的存在而小时级别地变化。
因此称某些村庄为“解放”或“征服”容易产生误导。在此情境下，西尔斯基将军的声明是及时的，明确指出乌克兰已“重新建立对这些地区的控制”，以消除疑虑。
（图：我在扎波罗热前线附近一村庄，指着被FPV——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
通过观察乌克兰武装部队所使用的集成系统上可见的实时影像，当前的攻势因此呈现为一场全面展开的现代攻势，利用基辅在无人系统与电子战方面的优势，在尽量减少传统意义上人力与机械化介入的情况下，获取重大战略收益。因此，对俄方而言，损失代价更高且日益难以承受。
乌克兰正日益积极采用一种创新的军事学说，使其在极大限度降低自身损失的同时，对敌方造成毁灭性损失。
在经典范式中——从二战到2014至2021年间俄罗斯对顿巴斯的入侵——领土控制以持续的步兵驻守、防御线巩固、稳定后勤轮换与该地域军事行政为标志。
如今，这一模式在技术层面上已趋于过时。
控制由三项变量衡量：ISR主导、电子战（EW）电磁优势，以及持续的动能干预能力（第一视角无人机、火炮和作为滞空弹药的无人机）。如果一支部队能持续监视某一地区、干扰敌方通讯，并在数分钟内打击任何敌方集结点，那么敌方无论是否在那里升旗，都无法利用该地区。这正是基辅所为，而俄方则继续派炮灰到死亡地带与帝国旗帜合影，最多坚守几分钟。
（图：俄军声称多次占领波克羅夫斯克，仅仅是在几名士兵在被乌方消灭之前在那里挥舞俄国旗帜— 照片来源：半岛电视台）
俄军总参将其从未长期占领的定居点宣称为“征服”。随后为解释其部队实际缺席，便宣称是乌克兰的反攻。一些亲乌博主放大了 “经典解放”这一概念，产生误解：似乎是在谈论装甲纵队、突破与可见的推进。
这不是当前的模式。
如今不存在静态的边界，而是封锁带。乌克兰在无人领域拥有质与量上的优势，使其能持续封锁俄方后方，选择性摧毁后勤并阻止敌方安全轮换。莫斯科则为每一米的固守付出极高代价，如上文所举诸例所示。
在对抗所谓世界第二大军队的全面战争进入第五年时，展示出持久的攻势能力打破了前线的心理线性，因此也影响到（所谓的）谈判桌。西尔斯基谈的是“控制”，不是征服、解放或占领。用现代话语表达了自他掌管乌克兰武装部队以来那一深刻范式转变。
（图：我在乌克兰尼古拉耶夫拍摄的照片，拍摄于撰写本文前片刻 ——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
***
持续的停电严重损坏了我们在乌克兰西部的家中的供暖系统，而我们当时就在顿巴斯。
没有电，点着的炉火无法通过水泵循环热水。结果，系统起火，整个房子面临着烧毁的风险。幸而未被烧毁，但整个系统需要更换，房子也需要修复。管道都是歪的，墙壁被烟雾熏黑，供暖系统无法正常工作，需要彻底更换。
我们正在尽最大努力，因为Alla的父母住在那里，但这里还有许多工作要做，周围的人处境也好不到哪儿去。
我们正在重启筹款活动，感谢每一位支持我们修复被俄罗斯摧毁一切的朋友。即使是小额捐款也有帮助。我们会及时更新进展。
感谢大家，朋友们。
如果你相信我们的工作，请支持我们
在过去的三年里，我们一直在乌克兰战争的各个前线进行报道……
https://www.paypal.com/pools/c/9mFvpzKUrU
