A War Denied被否认的战争
原文链接：https://medium.com/@giorgioprovinciali/a-war-denied-35ad204b74e0?sk=2eb354342d4ea37b53031d8ff68566f4
A War Denied
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
Dnipro — These days, in 2022, there was talk of ‘recognizing’, while today there is talk of ‘normalizing’. Yet, the geopolitical logic remains the same: transforming might into right.
After a lengthy historical excursus — identical to the one given the day before yesterday in Geneva by his emissary Vladimir Medinsky — Russian dictator Vladimir Putin announced on February 21, 2022, the decision to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the ‘Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’. This was the prelude to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which materialized within hours thanks to the ‘treaties of friendship and mutual assistance’ with the Russian Federation signed by the leaders of those chimerical enclaves.
During a lengthy speech, historical falsehoods and fabrications abounded: Putin went so far as to claim that NATO weapons and troops were already deployed in Ukraine against Moscow and that Kyiv had already lost its sovereignty, becoming ‘a servant of Western masters’. He pointed the finger at the alleged «ingratitude» of its neighbor in the face of the «zealous solidarity» of the Russian people, who supposedly shouldered Ukrainian debts when the opposite occurred: Ukraine never succumbed to that blackmail, demanding a list of its share of the former USSR’s assets and liabilities.
Over the years, we have reported on these pages that those phantom Western wunderwaffen did not exist (if only they had!), along with the valuable testimonies of people of the highest integrity, such as David Piguet — one of the ten regional directors and team leaders of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine — who confirmed that their reports did not mention the «discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine» that Putin fantasizedwas instead taking «the form of genocide».
There is no trace of this in the reports of other international organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Council of Europe. The reason is simple: it never happened, and fact-checkers from major global media outlets confirmed it in the years that followed. Too late.
In a televised address to the nation that same day, Putin claimed that Ukrainian society was neo-Nazi (while right-wing and ultranationalist parties failed to win a single seat in the 2019 parliamentary elections) and that Russia had set itself the goal of «demilitarizing and denazifying» Ukraine.
Except by sending real Nazis like Dmitri “Wagner” Utkin — a military commander with the SS symbol tattooed on both sides of his neck — among the Russian troops entering Donbas in full force.
The parallel with today’s times is less rhetorical than it seems.
The logic is more sophisticated but similar, because it no longer speaks of the recognition of «independence» but of «special economic zones», «demilitarized areas», and «transitional or joint civilian administration».
The essence, however, is the same: transforming a military reality into a political one.
When Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, it presented the world with a de facto situation on the ground and then asked the international community to adapt. Back then, it constructed the moral legitimacy of its intervention with unproven pretexts, such as the alleged genocide of Russian-speaking people. With Washington’s complicity, it now seeks to construct the moral legitimacy of partition by claiming that it is time for «realistic compromises». It demands«elections under martial law», insisting that the Ukrainian people are no longer «sovereign» but subservient to a «regime», referring to this as to a «questionable legitimacy».
The language is more diplomatic, of course, because the Russian delegation no longer speaks of «denazification» but of «progressive demilitarization», but the essence is the same: reducing Ukraine’s capacity for self-defense while Russia maintains its offensive structure. Putin today doesn’t need immediate formal recognition because functional recognition is enough. No one needs to explicitly state ‘this is Russia’; it’s enough that no one says ‘this is Ukraine’ anymore.
It’s the same principle that led to the freezing of the front in 2015 under the Minsk agreements: a line of contact that became a political line.
We know how it ended.
On February 21, 2022, Putin violated history to construct the legal basis for the invasion. Four years later, his emissaries in Geneva did the same to establish the basis for its irreversibility.
The international community’s reaction at the time was swift on the declarative level but less uniform on the structural one. The special military operation was labeled a ‘war’, yet it was not fought as such.
Putin did the opposite, waging a total war in the most classic sense of the term and progressively expanding its objectives and theater of operations. It was a thoughtful choice that avoided the consequences of a formal declaration of war and the initial general mobilization, while allowing him to maintain a semblance of internal normality and limit the perception of the conflict abroad.
The paradox is that while Moscow rejected the word ‘war’, it was the international community itself that defined it as such.
Today, we are witnessing a reversal of perspective, as many international actors treat the war as if it were a frozen crisis, a manageable territorial dispute, or a conflict that can be contained with administrative tools, while Putin himself now openly calls it «war». They speak of «normalization», «final settlement», and «regional stability», using a vocabulary more reminiscent of a political process than of a military reality.
Late in the evening of February 20, 2022, then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson told French President Emmanuel Macron: «Putin wants a diplomatic solution».
Today, the president of the United States is using the same phrase.
Two million lives lost later, yet the crux remains the same: formally recognize the war but treat it as a fait accompli to be administered.
The ongoing blackouts severely damaged our house’s heating system in Western Ukraine while we were in the Donbas.
Without electricity, the pump couldn’t circulate the liquid while the fire was lit. As a result, the system caught fire, and the whole house was at risk of burning. Fortunately, it did not, but the whole system needs to be changed, and the house needs to be restored. Tubes are all bent, walls are blackened by haze, and the heating system doesn’t work, requiring an entirely new system.
We are doing our best since Alla’s parents live there, but there’s still a lot to work on here, too, as the people around us are in no better situation.
We’re renewing our fundraising campaign and thanking everyone who joins us in helping us restore what Russia is destroying. Even a small donation helps. We’ll keep you updated on developments.
Thank you all, dear friends
被否认的战争
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道
第聂伯——如今，在2022年有人谈及“承认”，而今天人们谈起的是“常态化”。然而，地缘政治逻辑依然如故：把强权变为正当。
在进行了一段冗长的历史性回顾之后——与前天在日内瓦由其特使弗拉基米尔·梅金斯基所做的回顾如出一辙——俄罗斯独裁者弗拉基米尔·普京于2022年2月21日宣布决定承认“顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克人民共和国”的独立与主权。这成为对乌克兰进行全面入侵的前奏；数小时内，这场入侵得以实现，得益于这些虚构飞地的领导人与俄罗斯联邦签署的“友好与互助条约”。
在一场冗长的演讲中，历史谬误与捏造比比皆是：普京竟声称北约的武器和部队已部署在乌克兰，对准莫斯科，并称基辅已丧失主权，成为“西方主人”的“仆从”。他指责其邻国的所谓“忘恩负义”，而在俄罗斯人民“热忱的团结”面前理应承担乌克兰债务，事实上情况正好相反：乌克兰从未屈服于那种勒索，而是要求列出其在前苏联资产与负债中应分得的份额。
（图：Alla在乌克兰顿巴斯的战区——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
多年来，我们在本栏中报道过，那些西方幻影般的神兵并不存在（（要是有就好了！），并刊登了许多高诚信人士的宝贵证词，例如戴维·皮盖——前任欧安组织驻乌克兰特别监测任务的十位区域主任与组长之一——他证实他们的报告中并未提及普京所幻想的对俄语使用者的“歧视”，更不可能“演变成种族灭绝”。
联合国人权事务高级专员办公室与欧洲委员会等其他国际组织的报告中也未见此类记载。原因很简单：这从未发生，而主要国际媒体的事实核查在随后数年也证实了这一点。为时已晚。
同日，在一次全国电视讲话中，普京声称乌克兰社会是新纳粹（尽管右翼和极端民族主义政党在2019年议会选举中未赢得任何席位），并宣称俄罗斯的目标是“非军事化和去纳粹化”乌克兰。
然而，现实是俄罗斯派出了真正的纳粹分子，如德米特里·“瓦格纳”·乌特金——这位军队指挥官脖颈两侧纹有纳粹党卫军（SS）标志——与大批俄军一道进入顿巴斯。
（图：德米特里·“瓦格纳”·乌特金——照片来源：La Regione）
与今日的情形相比，这种类比并非看起来那么具有修辞性。
逻辑更为复杂但相似，因为如今不再谈论承认“独立”，而是谈论“特别经济区”、“非军事区”以及“过渡或联合民事管理”。
然而本质相同：把一种军事现实转化为政治现实。
2014年俄罗斯入侵克里米亚时，它向世界呈现了一个既成事实，然后要求国际社会适应。那时，它用未经证实的借口构建了其干预的道德合法性，例如所谓对俄语人群的种族灭绝指控。如今在华盛顿的纵容下，它试图通过声称该到“现实的妥协”之时来构建分割的道德正当性。它要求“戒严下的选举”，坚持称乌克兰人民不再“主权独立”，而是服从于一个“政权”，并将其称为“值得质疑的合法性”。
措辞当然更为外交化，因为俄方代表不再谈论“去纳粹化”，而改称“渐进式非军事化”，但实质相同：削弱乌克兰的自卫能力，同时俄罗斯保留其进攻性结构。普京如今不再需要立刻的形式承认，因为功能性的承认已足够。无需有人明确宣称“这是俄罗斯”；只要没人再说“这是乌克兰”就够了。
这正是导致2015年在明斯克协议下战线被冻结的逻辑：接触线变成了政治线。
我们知道其结局如何。
2022年2月21日，普京篡改历史以构建入侵的法律依据。四年后，他在日内瓦的特使们重复了同样的把戏以确立其不可逆性的基础。
当时国际社会的反应在宣言层面迅速，但在结构性层面则不够统一。那场特别军事行动被贴上“战争”标签，然而并未以战争方式来应对。
普京采取了相反的策略，以最经典意义发动了一场全面战争，并逐步扩大其目标与作战范围。这是一个深思熟虑的选择：避免了正式宣战和最初的大规模动员随之而来的后果，同时又让他得以维持一种内部常态的假象并限制冲突在国外的认知。
矛盾在于：莫斯科拒绝“战争”一词，而国际社会自己却将其定义为战争。
（图：我们在乌克兰基辅录制了这段录像——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
如今，我们目睹着视角的逆转，许多国际行为体将这场战争视为一个已冻结的危机、一个可控的领土争端或一个可用行政手段遏制的冲突，而普京本人现在却公开称之为“战争”。他们谈论“常态化”、“最终解决”和“地区稳定”，使用的词汇更像是政治进程而非军事现实。
2022年2月20日深夜，当时的英国首相鲍里斯·约翰逊对法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙说：“普京想要一个外交解决方案”。
如今，美国总统也在使用同样的措辞。
两百万条生命已逝，关键仍然如故：在形式上承认战争，却把它当作一个可被管理的既成事实来处理。
（图：我在乌克兰顿巴斯战区——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
***
持续的停电严重损坏了我们在乌克兰西部的家中的供暖系统，而我们当时就在顿巴斯。
没有电，点着的炉火无法通过水泵循环热水。结果，系统起火，整个房子面临着烧毁的风险。幸而未被烧毁，但整个系统需要更换，房子也需要修复。管道都是歪的，墙壁被烟雾熏黑，供暖系统无法正常工作，需要彻底更换。
我们正在尽最大努力，因为Alla的父母住在那里，但这里还有许多工作要做，周围的人处境也好不到哪儿去。
我们正在重启筹款活动，感谢每一位支持我们修复被俄罗斯摧毁一切的朋友。即使是小额捐款也有帮助。我们会及时更新进展。
感谢大家，朋友们。
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