Ukraine’s Anti-ballistic Defenses Are Vital, And Stressing For Patriots Is Not The Right European Choice
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
Chernihiv — More than Kyiv’s structural weaknesses, the Russian Federation’s recent, devastating attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has exposed the political, industrial, and strategic weaknesses of its partners, along with the accompanying hypocrisy.
On Sunday, Defense Express analysts estimated that to neutralize an average of 61 Russian ballistic missiles per month — which require interception by Patriot or Samp/T systems — Ukraine would need between 122 and 244 PAC-3 MSE interceptors in the former case (at least half the US standard, which requires 2–4 Patriot launchers per ballistic threat). They noted that Ukrainian defense forces often deploy only one per threat, unable to afford anything better.
Their calculation is based on the estimate that Ukraine has 10 Patriot systems, each with 6 launchers (compared with the standard setup of 8), similar to those typically deployed by the US military.
This led them to conclude that Ukraine’s minimum requirement is at least 60 PAC-3 MSE interceptors per month.
This rate is unsustainable for Lockheed Martin, which, despite announcing a tripling of production, has produced 620 units (51.6 per month) in 2025 and must supply all Patriot operators, with the US as the top priority. With a unit cost of $4.97 million per interceptor, the minimum necessary outlay would be $300 million per month.
This figure — for reasons already extensively discussed in these pages — tends to double due to fees, certifications, and export tariffs.
It should also be clarified that even this worst-case scenario is optimistic, because — given unfulfilled promises from its partners and partially damaged systems — Ukraine could have fewer operational systems, with a conservative estimate of eight Patriot batteries — not always in the six-launcher configuration — and two Samp/T systems.
Furthermore, not all Patriot systems destined for Ukraine are in the PAC-3 MSE configuration. The decommissioned Israeli systems that should be delivered via the United States are, in fact, the previous and technically inferior PAC-2 iteration, with no guarantee of upgradeability.
Even exacerbating the worst-case scenario, it remains clear that Russia’s firepower exceeds its ability to supply Ukraine with modern interceptors.
Paradoxically, after 12 years of sanctions against a country with a GDP comparable to Italy’s but a territory 56 times larger, this is exactly what is happening. None of the restrictions imposed on Moscow so far have affected its core business; indeed, the European countries currently engaged in discussions about a 20th package of smaller measures remain the main buyers of Russian LNG and gas. A recent analysis of Kpler data published by the NGO Urgewald highlights this hypocrisy: from 2022 to the end of 2025, the EU allocated over €216 billion to Russia and approximately €167 billion to Ukraine’s defense. Despite a slight decline in global volumes, in 2025 the EU’s share of shipments related to the Yamal project — Russia’s main export route to Europe — rose to 76.1%, up from 75.4% the previous year, which was already a record.
While European ports serve as a logistical hub for Russia’s largest LNG terminal, North Korean ports continue to see ships carrying weapons, including KN-23 and similar ballistic missiles, sail toward the Russian Federation: 250 from 2023 to date, according to a study published Friday by “NK Pro”. This number is already presumably greater than the number of PAC-3 MSE interceptors Ukraine has received to date.
Moscow also maintains large stockpiles of missiles for the S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, adapted to attack ground targets by exploiting operational caveats — and incompatible with international law — that were imposed on Kyiv by Western “partners”, which prevented Kyiv from conducting deep-sea strikes from those launchers, thereby increasing the burden on each interceptor.
This political paradox has produced a deliberate asymmetric advantage at the technical and operational levels, further exacerbated by Chinese support, which has provided crucial technologies, components, and assistance to sustain and expand Russian missile production.
In the next article, I will examine how, at a strictly technical level, Patriot and Samp/T are not antagonistic but rather parallel implementations of the same conceptual architecture.
Today, however, it is important to draw a logical conclusion before any engineering argument: continued insistence on an American supply of PAC-3 MSEs will lead to nothing.
Although the Pentagon does not publicly disclose the levels of operational stockpiles in the War Reserves and Prepositioned Stocks, cross-referencing Lockheed Martin production data with the US Department of Defense budgetallows us to estimate that 2,200–2,500 PAC-3s of all variants have been produced since 2001, of which 1,200–1,400 PAC-3 MSEs have been produced since 2015. 40–50% of these have been exported or contractually pre-assigned.
The available US stockpile of the most modern version could therefore be between 450 and 600 interceptors. This estimate includes strategic reserves and convertible training stocks but excludes those already allocated to the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and continental defense. According to the cited operational standards, in a high-intensity conflict, half of the US strategic reserve could be consumed in a few weeks. Even if exports were eliminated and existing contracts violated, the industrial bottleneck would not yield better results.
America’s reluctance to deliver additional PAC-3 MSEs is therefore understandable.
As things stand, the US does not have enough modern interceptors to defend itself, prepare for a conflict in the Pacific, and support Ukraine at the same time.
Diversification toward the SAMP/T is therefore not ideological but a mathematical necessity.
Added to this is a European political and industrial duty: a paradigm shift.The United States is not supplying Ukraine with a sufficient number of Patriot systems and interceptors, for questionable but coherent reasons. At the same time, it is not funding Russia’s ability to strike it.
The European Union, on the other hand, claims to be “on Ukraine’s side,” but in reality continues to channel more financial resources to its aggressor.
If the EU truly intends to support the continent’s defense, it must begin treating it as an integrated industrial system: autonomous production, diversified systems, resilient supply chains, and the immediate cessation of any mechanism that finances the Russian war machine. This is no more and no less than what Mario Draghi indicated four years ago.
Until this happens, the problem will not be a shortage of Patriots but the EU’s structural incoherence.
The ongoing blackouts severely damaged our house’s heating system in Western Ukraine while we were in the Donbas.
Without electricity, the pump couldn’t circulate the liquid while the fire was lit. As a result, the system caught fire, and the whole house was at risk of burning. Fortunately, it did not, but the whole system needs to be changed, and the house needs to be restored. Tubes are all bent, walls are blackened by haze, and the heating system doesn’t work, requiring an entirely new system.
We are doing our best since Alla’s parents live there, but there’s still a lot to work on here, too, as the people around us are in no better situation.
We’re renewing our fundraising campaign and thanking everyone who joins us in helping us restore what Russia is destroying. Even a small donation helps. We’ll keep you updated on developments.
Thank you all, friends
乌克兰的反弹道防御至关重要，但过度倚重爱国者并非欧洲的正确选择
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道
切尔尼戈夫——与基辅的结构性弱点相比，俄罗斯联邦最近对乌克兰能源基础设施的毁灭性袭击更揭示了其伙伴的政治、工业与战略脆弱性及随之而来的虚伪。
周日，Defense Express 的分析人士估算，为了每月拦截平均 61 枚俄罗斯弹道导弹——这些导弹需要由爱国者（Patriot）或 SAMP/T 系统拦截——乌克兰在第一种情况（使用爱国者拦截器拦截）下需配备 122 到 244 枚PAC-3 MSE 拦截弹（至少相当于美国标准的一半，美国标准要求对每一枚弹道威胁配备 2–4 个爱国者发射架）。他们指出，乌克兰防空部队通常每枚威胁只部署一个发射架，难以承受更多配置。
他们的计算基于乌克兰拥有 10 套爱国者系统的估计，每套配 6 个发射器（而标准配置为 8 个），与美军常用的部署相似。
基于此，他们得出结论：乌克兰最低需求为每月至少60 枚 PAC-3 MSE 拦截弹。
这一速度对洛克希德·马丁来说不可持续，尽管其宣布产量将增加三倍，但在2025年只生产了620枚（每月51.6枚），且必须为所有爱国者系统使用国供货，美国为最高优先级。以每枚拦截弹497万美元的单价计算，最低必要支出约为每月3亿美元。
正如此前在本栏内已广泛讨论的那样，由于费用、认证和出口关税等原因，这一数字往往会翻倍。
还需澄清的是，即便按最坏情形估算也偏乐观：鉴于伙伴国未兑现承诺与系统部分损坏，乌克兰实际可用系统可能更少，保守估计为八个爱国者电池（并非均为六发发射器配置）和两套 SAMP/T 系统。
此外，并非所有交付乌克兰的爱国者系统都为PAC-3 MSE配置。通过美国交付的以色列退役系统实际上是技术上较落后的PAC-2版本，且不保证可升级。
即便把最坏情形放大也显而易见：俄罗斯的火力已超过西方向乌克兰提供现代拦截弹的能力。
（图：以色列的一套爱国者系统 ——图片来源：JACK GUEZ/AFP/Getty Images）
具有讽刺意味的是，这情况正是对一个国土面积是意大利 56 倍但 GDP 与意大利相当的国家实施 12 年制裁之后的结果。迄今对莫斯科实施的限制并未触及其核心业务；事实上，目前仍在讨论第 20 轮较小制裁方案的欧洲国家，仍是俄罗斯 LNG 与天然气的主要买家。非政府组织 Urgewald 基于 Kpler 数据的最新分析凸显了这一伪善：自 2022 年至 2025 年底，欧盟向俄罗斯支付了超 2160 亿欧元，同时对乌克兰防务投入约 1670 亿欧元。尽管全球货运量略有下降，但 2025 年欧盟在俄罗斯主要对欧出口通道亚马尔项目相关发运量中的比重上升到76.1%，高于前一年的 75.4%，而前一年已创纪录。
当欧洲港口仍作为俄罗斯最大 LNG 终端的物流枢纽之时，朝鲜港口仍不断有运载武器（包括 KN-23 及类似弹道导弹）的船只驶向俄罗斯：据“NK Pro”周五发布的一项研究，自 2023 年以来已有约 250 艘此类船只离港。这个数字很可能已超过迄今乌克兰收到的 PAC-3 MSE 拦截弹数量。
莫斯科还囤积了大量用于S-300和S-400防空系统的导弹，这些导弹经过改装可用于打击地面目标，利用了西方“伙伴”强加给基辅的作战限制性条款——这些条款与国际法相悖——从而阻止基辅利用这些发射器实施远程深度打击，进而增加了每枚拦截弹的负担。
这一政治悖论在技术与作战层面造成了故意的不对称优势，而中国的支持进一步加剧了这一点：其提供了关键技术、零部件与援助，维持并扩大了俄罗斯的导弹生产能力。
（图：朝俄边境铁路交通的卫星影像 — 图片来源：Airbus 卫星图像/SIA SuperX）
在下一篇文章中，我将从严格技术层面探讨爱国者与 SAMP/T 并非对立，而是同一概念架构的并行实现。
但在今天，在任何工程论证之前，有一个逻辑结论必须指出：继续坚持依赖美国提供PAC-3 MSE将无果而终。
虽然五角大楼未公开战争储备和预置库存的作战储备量，但通过将洛克希德·马丁的产量数据与美国国防预算交叉比对，我们估算自2001年以来各型号PAC-3的产量为2,200–2,500枚，其中自2015年以来生产的PAC-3 MSE为1,200–1,400枚；其中40%–50%已被出口或合同预分配。
因此，美国可动用的最新型拦截弹库存估计在 450–600 枚之间。该估计包含战略储备与可转换训练库存，但不包括已分配至印太地区、中东与大陆防御的部分。按照所引用的作战标准，在高强度冲突中，美国一半的战略储备可能在数周内消耗殆尽。即便取消出口并违约现有合同，产业瓶颈也无法带来更好结果。
因此，美国不愿意再交付额外的PAC-3 MSE是可以理解的。
依现状，美国没有足够的现代拦截弹自卫、为太平洋可能的冲突做准备并支援乌克兰几者兼顾。
因此，向SAMP/T多元化并非意识形态问题，而是数学上的必然。
除此之外，还有欧洲在政治和工业层面的责任：范式转变。
美国没有向乌克兰提供足够数量的爱国者系统和拦截弹，动机虽成问题但逻辑自洽；同时，美国也不资助俄罗斯的打击能力。
而欧盟则自称“站在乌克兰一边”，但实际上却继续向其侵略者输送更多资金。
若欧盟真心想维护欧洲防务，就必须开始把它当作一个整体的工业体系来对待：自主生产、系统多元化、供应链弹性，以及立即终止任何为俄罗斯战争机器提供资金的机制。这正是四年前马里奥·德拉吉所指示的方向，既不过分也不不足。
在此之前，问题不在于爱国者的短缺，而在于欧盟的结构性不连贯。
（图：我在乌克兰切尔尼戈夫，于提交此文前的瞬间 ——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
***
持续的停电严重损坏了我们在乌克兰西部的家中的供暖系统，而我们当时就在顿巴斯。
没有电，点着的炉火无法通过水泵循环热水。结果，系统起火，整个房子面临着烧毁的风险。幸而未被烧毁，但整个系统需要更换，房子也需要修复。管道都是歪的，墙壁被烟雾熏黑，供暖系统无法正常工作，需要彻底更换。
我们正在尽最大努力，因为Alla的父母住在那里，但这里还有许多工作要做，周围的人处境也好不到哪儿去。
我们正在重启筹款活动，感谢每一位支持我们修复被俄罗斯摧毁一切的朋友。即使是小额捐款也有帮助。我们会及时更新进展。
感谢大家，朋友们。
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