Starlink As A Weapon星链作为武器
原文链接：https://medium.com/@giorgioprovinciali/starlink-as-a-weapon-6f723d2e65c4?sk=976eeb2e34f4a37b4074cff61461ac87
Starlink As A Weapon
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
Pryluky — The restrictions agreed upon by Elon Musk and Ukraine’s new Defense Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, have had immediate effects, both in containing Russian medium-range strikes and at the front, where enemy communications have collapsed.
On Monday evening, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense issued an urgent statement explaining that within the next few hours, all Starlink devices on the territory would have to be registered at any local branch of the country’s Department of Administrative Services (CNAP) for private citizens, or via the Д?Я app (introduced by the Ministry of Technological Innovations when Fedorov himself was in charge) for companies.
While the electronic warfare containment measures were already stringent during the activation of Ukraine’s anti-aircraft defenses, after this announcement they led to a total ban with immediate effect. Although we registered our device very early Tuesday morning, our account was activated just before this article was published (we’re writing on Friday). Thus, the blockade was massive and preemptive, and the whitelist was applied later.
A brutal and operationally painful measure, but consistent with military logic, it had direct and devastating impacts on the front.
This highlights Russia’s effective dependence on Starlink. Although Elon Musk announced that he had blocked Russians from accessing its satellite network, thereby denying them strategic leverage, on the ground they continued to use it to connect their strike teams, coordinate artillery, manage evacuations, and dictate logistics schedules. Furthermore, as we have repeatedly highlighted, several Russian drones benefited from that valuable real-time feed to launch devastating attacks on Ukrainian cities in the rear.
For months, Moscow profited from smuggled Starlink terminals, foreign accounts, and the opaque use of the service in the territories of Ukraine it illegally occupies.
It connected commanders to their units and drone pilots to their instruments of death. Synchronizing these elements is crucial in modern warfare. Without coordination, teams advance blindly, reaction time and the risk of friendly fire increase, and retasking slows. The blackout was not only a failure of communication but also a failure of decision-making, resulting in immediate asymmetric impacts.
Having suffered the devastating experience of the information blackout that led to the compromise of Operation Kursk, Ukraine developed alternative networks and connection methods, while Russia hyper-centralized Starlink. The Ukrainians held up better because they were accustomed to fighting in degraded conditions, while the Russians collapsed. Being ‘disconnected’ in critical contexts creates a powerful psychological and operational effect, leading to indecision, slowdowns, and increased casualties.
Moscow had also begun using drones like the Gerbera (lightweight and long-range) as motherships to transport smaller, first-person-view drones to the Ukrainian rear areas, piloted by hooking up to the local mobile network with smuggled SIM cards.
Preventing those carrier drones from communicating via Starlink (during the attacks, 4G/LTE connectivity slowed or was completely disabled) was therefore essential.
2025 was the bloodiest year for civilians in Ukraine:
2,514 died, and 12,142 were injured.
The American withdrawal and the hypocrisy of an EU that claims to be “on Ukraine’s side” but indirectly funds Russian terror more than its own defense have led to a 31% increase over 2024 and a 70% increase over 2023.
The introduction of the Starlink whitelist also marks a crucial historical step. Elon Musk’s service has ceased to be a generic commercial service and has become a communications and political-operational control infrastructure. The network’s segmentation by identity, not just by geographic area or hardware ownership, has further disrupted the balance of that world, which was based on rules and laws that no longer exist today. From a neutral infrastructure to an instrument of power capable of producing immediate catastrophic effects, the Internet has, for the first time in history, played a decisive strategic role in a high-intensity conflict.
However, an observation arises. Russia is not among the countries covered by Starlink. So why did Elon Musk wait so long to deactivate the service? After all, Ukraine is among the countries covered by the service. However, when the Ukrainian government legitimately asked Elon Musk to provide service in Crimea, legally part of Ukraine, he refused, preventing the Ukrainians from using his satellite internet connection to carry out offensive operations. He maintained this stance during the Kursk operation, compromising its success. Likewise, it should be noted that indiscriminately blocking all signals over the Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by the Russian Federation will similarly prevent the Ukrainians from conducting deep-strikes to retake them.
Therefore, the introduction of the whitelist will make sense as long as the Ukrainian government decides which devices should be authorized within its territory and as long as the Starlink company upholds its publicly stated commitment not to provide service in Russia.
The ongoing blackouts severely damaged our house’s heating system in Western Ukraine while we were in the Donbas.
Without electricity, the pump couldn’t circulate the liquid while the fire was lit. As a result, the system caught fire, and the whole house was at risk of burning. Fortunately, it did not, but the whole system needs to be changed, and the house needs to be restored. Tubes are all bent, walls are blackened by haze, and the heating system doesn’t work, requiring an entirely new system.
We are doing our best since Alla’s parents live there, but there’s still a lot to work on here, too, as the people around us are in no better situation.
We’re renewing our fundraising campaign and thanking everyone who joins us in helping us restore what Russia is destroying. Even a small donation helps. We’ll keep you updated on developments.
Thank you all, friends
星链作为武器
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道
普鲁留基——埃隆·马斯克与乌克兰新任国防部长米哈伊洛·费多罗夫达成的限制措施已产生即时效果，既遏制了俄方中程打击，也使前线敌方通信陷入瘫痪。
（图：显示离线状态的 Starlink 控制面板的截屏。这是由于对乌克兰乃至希望包括俄罗斯在内的地区施加的限制所致——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
周一晚上，乌克兰国防部发出紧急声明，说明在未来数小时内，境内所有 Starlink 设备须由私人用户在各地行政服务中心（CNAP）办理登记，企业则通过费多罗夫任内推出的 Д?Я 应用程序注册。
尽管在乌克兰启动防空防御时电子战遏制措施已相当严格，但此公告之后立即升级为全面禁用并立即生效。尽管我们在周二凌晨很早就为设备登记，但我们的账户直到本文发布前才被激活（本文撰写于周五）。由此可见，封锁是大规模且具有先发性，白名单随后才被启用。
这一残酷且在操作上代价高昂的措施，符合军事逻辑，却对前线产生了直接且毁灭性的影响。
（图：我们的 Starlink 控制面板截屏显示账户被禁用——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
这凸显了俄方对 Starlink 的实质性依赖。尽管马斯克宣称已阻止俄罗斯人访问其卫星网络，以剥夺其战略优势，但在地面上他们仍继续利用该网络连接打击小组、协调火力、组织撤离与安排后勤。此外，正如我们反复指出的，多型俄方无人机也借助该实时信息，向乌克兰后方城市发起毁灭性袭击。
数月来，莫斯科从走私的 Starlink 终端、境外账号以及在其非法占领区内对该服务的不透明使用中获益匪浅。
它将指挥官与部队、无人机操作者与其“杀伤”设备连接起来。在现代战争中，同步这些要素至关重要。若缺乏协调，部队盲目前进、反应时间延长、误伤风险上升、任务调整变慢。断联不仅是通信失败，更是决策失败，进而带来即时的不对称后果。
（图：我们的 Starlink 控制面板截屏显示访问受限——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
在遭受导致库尔斯克行动受损的信息中断惨痛教训后，乌克兰发展了替代网络和连通方式，而俄罗斯则将Starlink 的使用高度集中化。乌克兰人更擅长在受损条件下作战，因此支撑性更强；俄罗斯则在断联后崩溃。在关键情境下被“断联”会产生强大的心理和作战影响，导致犹豫、拖延和更多伤亡。
莫斯科还开始使用类似格尔贝拉（轻型、远程）这样的无人机作为母舰，携带更小的第一视角（FPV）无人机深入乌克兰后方，并通过走私的SIM 卡接入当地移动网络进行操控。
因此，在攻击期间切断这些运载无人机通过 Starlink的通信（4G/LTE 连接被削弱或完全失效）就显得尤为必要。
（图表来源：TopLeadEU）
2025 年是对乌克兰平民最血腥的一年：
2,514 人死亡，12,142 人受伤。
美国撤退与自诩“站在乌克兰一边”却间接资助俄方恐怖活动的欧盟 –“资助”额较 2024 年上升 31%，较 2023 年上升 70%，多于自身防务支出。
（图：“Atesh”组织的俄罗斯游击队员证实了Starlink的中断——图片来源：Telegram上的Atesh）
引入Starlink 白名单也标志着一个关键的历史性转折。马斯克的服务已不再是单纯的商业服务，而成为一种通信与政治-作战控制基础设施。网络按身份而非仅按地理区域或硬件所有权进行分段，进一步打破了过去基于规则与法律建立的平衡，这些规则如今已不复存在。互联网从中立基础设施转为一种能产生即时灾难性效应的权力工具，互联网首次在历史上，在高强度冲突中发挥决定性战略作用。
（图：我们的 Starlink 控制面板截屏显示服务恢复——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
不过，有一点值得注意。俄罗斯并不在 Starlink 服务覆盖的国家名单中。那么为何马斯克迟迟不关闭该服务？毕竟，乌克兰在服务覆盖范围内。然而，当乌克兰政府合法地要求埃隆·马斯克在法律上属于乌克兰的克里米亚提供服务时，他拒绝了，阻止乌克兰人利用其卫星互联网开展攻势行动。他在库尔斯克行动期间也持此立场，影响了行动的成功。同样需要指出的是，若不加区别地封堵乌克兰境内被俄方非法占领区上空的所有信号，也同样会阻止乌克兰对这些地区实施深度打击以夺回控制权。
因此，白名单的引入在两个条件下才有意义：其一是乌克兰政府能决定其领土内应获授权的设备；其二是Starlink公司履行其公开承诺，不向俄罗斯提供服务。
（图：我站在为保卫这座城市而牺牲的乌克兰英雄纪念碑前：乌克兰普鲁留基——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
***
持续的停电严重损坏了我们在乌克兰西部的家中的供暖系统，而我们当时就在顿巴斯。
没有电，点着的炉火无法通过水泵循环热水。结果，系统起火，整个房子面临着烧毁的风险。幸而未被烧毁，但整个系统需要更换，房子也需要修复。管道都是歪的，墙壁被烟雾熏黑，供暖系统无法正常工作，需要彻底更换。
我们正在尽最大努力，因为Alla的父母住在那里，但这里还有许多工作要做，周围的人处境也好不到哪儿去。
我们正在重启筹款活动，感谢每一位支持我们修复被俄罗斯摧毁一切的朋友。即使是小额捐款也有帮助。我们会及时更新进展。
感谢大家，朋友们。
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