Ukraine’s Role In The (New) European Intelligence
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
Kyiv – In addition to accelerating the production of its own anti-ballistic defense system by integrating it into the relevant supply chain, as analyzedyesterday in these pages, Ukraine’s rapid accession to the EU would strengthen European intelligence not only quantitatively but also fundamentally change its nature. Ukraine would introduce into the EU system a warfare rationale based on urgency, operational integration, and risk-taking, a rationale currently largely absent from the EU’s architecture.
Europe is dependent on the United States not because of technical incompetence but because of its political architecture. It collects enormous quantities of HUMINT, especially in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. It is technically advanced in SIGINT thanks to contributions from countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and it excels in OSINT, sometimes even outperforming the United States. The problem, however, lies not in collecting that data but in the sovereignty of the decision-making cycle. Often referred to as «European intelligence,» the EU INTCEN is not an operational structure: it does not use its own data but collects that provided by individual countries. It has no decision-making power and no direct channel to a unified military structure. It is an analytical hub, not a strategic intelligence service. Valuable information flows into the EU INTCEN, but it stops there because it lacks a connection to an apparatus capable of commanding drones, satellites, and military or cyber attacks.
Within the EU, world-class services such as the French DGSE, the German BND (excellent in SIGINT), the Italian AISE (also excellent in HUMINT), the Spanish CNI (leading in the Mediterranean and African regions), and other technologically advanced Northern European SIGINT entities cooperate, reporting to national governments, not to the EU. European intelligence exists but is not sovereign; it operates in a slow, horizontal, negotiated chain that often requires the consensus of all 27 governments and is not connected to a single military apparatus. The American system operates rapidly in a vertical decision-making chain and is closely integrated into the Defense Department. Ukraine received numerous European warnings about Russian troop buildup, unit rotations, and enemy logistical patterns. But for strategic targeting and intelligence-related strikes, it had no choice but to rely on the United States. When Washington turned off the tap, Europe had no alternative pipeline ready, and Ukraine found itself «blinded.» During the American information blackout in Kursk, Tokyo and Paris provided it with vital intelligence: the only fighters in the air were Mirage-2000s, whose radars provided valuable information supplemented by data from a network of French satellites that operate independently and integrate with NATO only when necessary. Tokyo also has autonomous satellite ISR, naval and space SIGINT, and a short decision chain. It was a strategic humiliation for Europe because a non-European actor had filled a European void. France did not replace American intelligence, but it prevented total blackout by providing independent analysis of Russian movements, SIGINT, and GEOINT through national assets (satellites and ISR cooperation) and by maintaining direct channels with Kyiv even when relations with Washington were cool. This was possible because France is the only European power with a truly sovereign vision of strategic autonomy: its decision-making chain is short (DGSE – Presidency – Armed Forces), and intelligence is conceived as an instrument of power. It is no coincidence that it is the only European country with a complete nuclear deterrent and willing to assume the political risk associated with the use of intelligence.
With a possible return of Great Britain, the EU could also count on MI6, among the best HUMINT agencies in the world, with strong penetration into Russia and the Middle East and top-level analytical capabilities. Ukraine’s rapid accession to the EU, however, would not only represent a geopolitical expansion but also a qualitative acceleration of the European intelligence system. For the first time, the EU would integrate a player that operates daily in a high-intensity war environment, with capabilities developed under real pressure, not in exercises or stable contexts.
Since 2022, Ukrainian intelligence has undergone a forced but rapid evolution, shifting from a reformed post-Soviet model to an adaptive warfare ecosystem. Its two pillars are: the SBU – a hybrid domestic counterintelligence service already structured for warfare, with deep penetration of Russian networks, neutralization of agents and saboteurs, close integration with territorial forces, and infrastructure protection – and the HUR, which has evolved into offensive military intelligence with tactical HUMINT directly linked to strikes, covert operations, and unconventional operations across borders. The recent appointment of the former HUR chief as head of the President’s Office is indicative of this, resulting in a radically different communications approach at the strategic level. Kyiv has learned to use intelligence as a survival function and a condition for the state’s existence. This has led to extremely short decision-making times, institutional tolerance for risk, and a culture of immediate error correction. By contrast, the EU operates within a preventive and consensual paradigm, not an existential one. Kyiv has developed models in which the loss of a node does not interrupt the flow of information, targeting does not depend on a single central hub, and information is quickly accessible to operational units. For the EU, this would be a crucial added value. Ukraine would fill the Union’s structural gaps, forcing it to function as a strategic player, not a coordinator.
A significant portion of the US press, however, tends to portray Ukrainian deep strikes as the near direct product of American intelligence. This interpretation is analytically incomplete and, in some respects, technically flawed. The reason lies in the nature of the systems employed and the type of intelligence required to make them effective. In the HUMINT domain, Ukraine enjoys structural advantages that no other ally can replicate: a historical and social presence in Russian and occupied territories; pre-existing networks (civilian, technical, industrial, military); linguistic and operational continuity; and rapid cross-validation capabilities. Coordinated primarily by HUR and SBU, these networks have enabled Kyiv to map air bases, identify operational routines, monitor asset concentration and dispersal times, and validate targets before engagement.
Ukrainian HUMINT does not replace American HUMINT: however, it often renders it superfluous for operational targeting.
The main misunderstanding in the American narrative centers on the SIGINT/ISR profile. American cruise missiles (such as the Tomahawk) require complex mission planning because they rely on TERCOM/DSMAC maps, signal libraries, ISR updates, and satellite and naval deconfliction. Ukrainian cruise missiles are not integrated into the US-led global ecosystem and therefore continue to function fully without American intelligence. This is because they are based on a radically different concept: GPS/INS navigation, pre-programmed waypoints, limited dynamic corrections, and static or semi-static targets. They use what Kyiv has at its disposal without the need for deep intelligence. The coordinated attackagainst Russian strategic and tactical air bases is a prime example, relying solely on elements endogenous to the Ukrainian system. The US press tends to overestimate the American role for three reasons: a systemic bias resulting from the difficulty in accepting the autonomous capabilities of an ally perceived as «assisted»; conceptual confusion regarding technical elements such as those described, which leads to confusing strategic sharing with operational dependence; and its role in reinforcing the idea of US control over escalation by emphasizing its domestic military and industrial role.
From a European perspective, it is therefore important to understand that Ukraine in the EU would not be a beneficiary of security but a provider of critical capabilities.
Without the absorption of this know-how, European intelligence will remain technically advanced but politically defused. With Ukraine, the Union would have the opportunity – perhaps its last – to bridge the gap between knowledge and action.
The continuous blackouts severely damaged the heating system of our house in Western Ukraine while we were here in Donbas.
Without electricity, the pump couldn’t circulate the liquid while the fire was lit. As a result, the system caught fire, and the whole house was at risk of burning. Fortunately, it did not, but the whole system needs to be changed, and the house needs to be restored. Tubes are all bent, walls are blackened by haze, and the heating system doesn’t work, requiring an entirely new system.
We are doing our best since Alla’s parents live there, but there’s still a lot to work on here, too, as the people around us are in no better situation.
We’re renewing our fundraising campaign and thanking everyone who joins to help us restore what Russia is destroying. Even a small donation helps. We’ll keep you updated on developments.
Thank you all, friends
乌克兰在（新）欧洲情报格局中的作用
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道
基辅 — 正如昨日本栏所分析的，除通过将自有反弹道防御系统纳入相关供应链以加快其生产外，乌克兰迅速加入欧盟不仅会在数量上增强欧洲情报力量，还将从根本上改变其性质。乌克兰会向欧盟体系引入一种基于紧迫性、作战一体化与敢于冒险为核心的战争逻辑——这是当前欧盟架构中大多缺失的要素。
欧洲对美国的依赖并非源于技术无能，而是政治架构所致。欧洲在人工情报（HUMINT）方面收集大量情报，尤其是在巴尔干、南高加索和东欧地区；在电子信号情报（SIGINT）方面也具备技术优势，这得益于法国、德国、意大利和西班牙等国的贡献；在开源情报（OSINT）方面表现出色，有时甚至超过美国。然而问题不在于数据的采集，而在于决策周期的主权。被称为“欧洲情报”的欧盟情报与反恐中心（EU INTCEN）并非一套作战性机构：它不直接运用自身采集的数据，而是汇编各成员国提供的情报。它无决策权、无通向统一军事机构的直接通道；它是一个分析枢纽，而非战略情报机构。大量有价值的信息流入EU INTCEN，但多半止步于此，因为它缺乏与能够指挥无人机、卫星以及军事或网络打击的装置相连的通路。
在欧盟内部，世界级情报机构如法国的对外安全总局（DGSE）、以电子侦察见长的德国联邦情报局（BND）、在人力情报上同样出色的意大利对外情报局（AISE）、在地中海和非洲地区领先的西班牙国家情报中心（CNI），以及其他北欧的技术先进的SIGINT机构。这些机构相互合作，但它们向各自国家政府负责，而非向欧盟负责。欧洲确实存在情报能力，但并不具备主权性；其运作为缓慢、横向、协商式的链条，通常需要27国政府的一致同意，且未与单一军事机构相连。美国体系则以垂直决策链快速运作，并与国防部紧密整合。乌克兰曾多次收到欧洲关于俄军集结、部队轮换及敌方后勤规律的预警。但在战略性选点与情报相关打击上，乌克兰别无选择只得依靠美国。
当华盛顿关闭信息源时，欧洲并无备用管线，乌克兰随之陷入“失明”。在库尔斯克发生美国情报封锁期间，东京与巴黎向其提供了关键情报：当时空中唯一出动的战斗机为幻影?2000（Mirage?2000），其雷达提供了重要情报，并由一组独立运行的法国卫星网络补充数据——这些卫星仅在必要时与北约对接。日本同样拥有独立的卫星侦察与监视（ISR）、海上与太空SIGINT以及简短的决策链。对于欧洲而言，这是一次战略性的羞辱：一个非欧洲行为体填补了欧洲的空白。法国并未完全取代美国情报，但通过国家资产（卫星与ISR合作）提供对俄军动向、SIGINT与地理情报（GEOINT）的独立分析，并在与华盛顿关系冷却时保持与基辅的直接通道，从而避免了全面的信息真空。这之所以可能，是因为法国是唯一具备真正主权性战略自主愿景的欧洲大国：其决策链短（DGSE－总统府－武装力量），并将情报视为权力工具。法国也是唯一拥有完整核威慑力量并愿意承担与情报使用相关政治风险的欧洲国家，这并非偶然。
若英国重回欧盟，欧盟还可能重新获得MI6——全球最优秀的HUMINT机构之一，具备对俄及中东的深度渗透能力，及顶级的分析能力。更重要的是，乌克兰迅速加入欧盟不仅是地缘政治的扩张，更将在质的层面加速欧洲情报体系。欧盟将首次纳入一名每天在高强度战争环境中运作、在真实压力下而非在演习或稳定环境中锻造能力的参与者。
自2022年以来，乌克兰情报经历了一次被迫但迅速的演变，从改良后的后苏联模式转向适应性战争生态系统。其两大支柱为：SBU（安全局）——一种已为战争重构的混合型国内反间谍与安全机构，深度渗透俄方网络、铲除特工与破坏分子、与地方部队紧密整合并负责基础设施保护；以及HUR（军事情报局）——已发展为进攻性军事情报机构，具备将战术HUMINT直接与打击、隐蔽行动及跨境非常规行动相联结的能力。最近任命前HUR首脑出任总统办公厅主任即表明了这一点，进而在战略层面带来了截然不同的沟通方式。基辅已经学会将情报作为一种生存功能和国家存在的前提。这导致了极短的决策时间、制度性容忍风险以及即时纠错的文化。相较之下，欧盟运作在一种以预防与共识为主的范式，而非存在主义范式。基辅已发展出一种模式：节点丧失不会中断信息流，打击不依赖单一中心枢纽，情报能迅速为作战单元所用。对欧盟而言，这是极为关键的附加价值。乌克兰将填补欧盟的结构性空白，迫使其以战略行为体而非单纯协调者的身份运作。
然而，美国媒体有相当一部分倾向于将乌克兰的深度打击直接归因于美国情报。这一解读在分析上并不完整，且在某些层面存在技术偏差。原因在于所用系统的性质以及使其有效所需情报的类型。在HUMINT领域，乌克兰具有其他盟友难以复制的结构性优势：在俄罗斯及被占领土的历史性与社会性存在；既有网络（民用、技术、工业、军事）；语言与作战延续性；以及迅速的交叉验证能力。由HUR与SBU主导协调的这些网络，使基辅得以绘制空军基地图、识别作战常规、监测兵力集结与分散时间点，并在实施打击前对目标进行验证。
乌克兰的人源情报并不取代美国的人源情报；但在作战选点上，它常使美方情报变得非必需。
美国叙事中的主要误解集中在SIGINT/ISR特性上。美国的巡航导弹（如“战斧”）需复杂的任务策划，依赖地形匹配（TERCOM）/目标匹配（DSMAC）地图、信号库、ISR更新及卫星和海军去冲突。乌克兰的巡航导弹并未集成入美国主导的全球生态系统，因此在没有美情报的情形下仍能完全运作。这是因为两者基于截然不同的理念：乌方多采用GPS/惯导（INS）导航、预设航点、有限的动态修正，及针对静态或半静态目标的方案。它们使用基辅现有资源，而不依赖深度情报。对俄方战略与战术空军基地的协同打击便是一典型，仅依赖乌克兰体系内生要素即可完成。美国媒体高估美方作用有三方面原因：一是体制性偏见，难以接受一个被视为“受援助”的盟友具备自主能力；二是对上述技术要素的概念性混淆，将战略共享与作战依赖混淆；三是出于强化美方对升级态势控制的叙述需要，夸大其国内军事与工业角色。
从欧洲视角看，重要的是明白：若乌克兰加入欧盟，它并非安全的受益者，而是关键能力的提供者。
若不吸收这类专有技能和经验，欧洲情报将继续在技术上先进但在政治上失能。有了乌克兰，欧盟将获得一次——或许是最后一次——弥合“认知”与“行动”之间差距的机会。
（图：在撰写本文前，我从靠近基辅与布查的沃尔泽尔市现场报道——照片中的标语写着“我们会成功”——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
持续的停电严重损坏了我们在乌克兰西部的家中的供暖系统，而我们当时就在顿巴斯。
没有电，点着的炉火无法通过水泵循环热水。结果，系统起火，整个房子面临着烧毁的风险。幸而未被烧毁，但整个系统需要更换，房子也需要修复。管道都是歪的，墙壁被烟雾熏黑，供暖系统无法正常工作，需要彻底更换。
我们正在尽最大努力，因为Alla的父母住在那里，但这里还有许多工作要做，周围的人处境也好不到哪儿去。
我们正在重启筹款活动，感谢每一位支持我们修复被俄罗斯摧毁一切的朋友。即使是小额捐款也有帮助。我们会及时更新进展。
感谢大家，朋友们。
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