Ukrainians Want Their Nukes Back
Ukrainians Want Their Nukes Back
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
THANKS TO THOSE WHO SUPPORT OUR FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN????
Ternopil’ – We’ve asked every Ukrainian we’ve met over the past 1,400 days the same question: what security guarantees do you consider most reliable for your country?
From the front lines to the bombed cities, the answer has always been unequivocal: we want our nukes back.
We collected the last testimony moments before writing this article. Mrs. Miroslava and her husband, both survivors of the Russian attack on Ternopil a month ago that caused over 120 civilian casualties, unambiguously expressed their refusal to continue depending on third parties for Ukraine’s security:
«Call me Mira. I lived in Italy for a long time. Thirty years ago, we had around three thousand atomic bombs, and no one would have ever dreamed of invading us. No one gave them to us. We built them with our own labor, resources, and ingenuity. They convinced us to give them away for others’ safety. We were betrayed. No agreement based on that fraud will work».
It’s impossible to disagree with Mrs. Mira – and with the thousands of people who have responded in kind over the years.
Ukraine’s strategic defeat began not on February 24, 2022, but in 1994, with the signing of the Budapest Memorandum. A non-binding political declaration that persuaded Kyiv to give up approximately 3,000 nuclear warheads – the world’s third-largest arsenal – in exchange for promises that proved empty.
The imperialist war unleashed by Moscow has demonstrated even more brutal truths: promises are valid until they are broken, and nuclear deterrence remains the only deterrent the world truly fears.
Because it lacked enforcement mechanisms, automatic intervention obligations, or sanctions for violations, the Budapest Memorandum was not an international treaty under the 1969 Vienna Convention. The ‘security assurances’ provided in that context by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation were unilateral political declarations, not legally binding commitments. This is evident in the absence of concrete consequences following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Ukraine joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state. However, Article X of the treaty unequivocally establishes the right to withdraw if extraordinary events have compromised the signatory state’s supreme interests.
The Russian full-scale military invasion, territorial occupation, war crimes, existential threat to the Ukrainian state, and repeated nuclear intimidation fully satisfy this requirement in the most serious sense of the term.
Consequently, Ukraine is legally fully entitled to denounce the NPT. The political responsibility for exercising this right would fall entirely on those who destroyed the security conditions that justified disarmament.
For decades, the West sold Ukraine the narrative of an «open door» to NATO, without setting deadlines, binding roadmaps, or real protections. At the decisive moment, the Allies feared a nuclear aggressor more than the destruction of a sovereign state.
A devastating paradox has arisen: those who possess nuclear weapons can invade, while those who do not must submit. The military aid provided to Ukraine is not even remotely comparable to the deterrent it was forced to give up.
The narrative that Ukraine ‘inherited’ the Soviet arsenal is historically and technically false.
It was the industrial heartland and the jewel in the crown of Soviet engineering. It housed facilities for nuclear warhead production, assembly, and maintenance; produced key components for the USSR’s strategic missile industry; had access to first-rate raw materials and scientific expertise; and employed personnel directly involved in warhead development.
As Mrs. Mira recalls, those weapons were not a gift but the result of the work of Ukrainian industry during the Soviet era.
Renouncing them meant voluntarily destroying the national strategic capacity of one of the four founding countries of the USSR, to the benefit of a state born after its dissolution. Ukraine has always had its own legal identity, both as a constituent Soviet republic – with its own governing bodies – and as an independent state recognized after 1991. Today’s Russian Federation, however, is a post-Soviet state that unilaterally and deceitfullyassumed ownership of many of the former USSR’s international positions, despite being neither older nor more legitimate than its successor states.
The Lisbon Protocol and the Budapest Memorandum are legally linked by a single cause: security in exchange for nuclear renunciation. The Russian Federation was a party to both agreements in Lisbon and Budapest and subsequently became the aggressor. It is legally untenable to bind Ukraine to a nuclear-free future, as purportedly enshrined in point 11 of the 20 points of the so-called ‘peace plan’.
Basing its future security guarantees on the most serious strategic error of the past is profoundly incorrect and dangerous.
The NPT is not irrevocable, and Article X takes precedence over political memoranda and implementing protocols. There are no subordination clauses or external veto rights.
In the Ukrainian case, the Treaty’s legal threshold has been exceeded in its most serious form. The nuclear rearmament project could and should have been launched immediately, and today it would constitute the best guarantee of security for the country.
This is why soldiers at the front and civilians in the cities demand it.
Nuclear deterrence is not prohibited by international law: it is regulated. As long as it does not violate jus in bello and its indiscriminate use is not threatened, it is fully compatible with the international legal order.
Ukraine had – and still has – the right and the technical and engineering capabilities to reconstitute its legitimate nuclear arsenal.
Which is the only truly credible security guarantee it needs.
Experience teaches that even legally binding agreements depend on the will to respect them. Starting with NATO’s Article 5, which is often used as an example, misinterpreting its meaning because it does not mandate direct military intervention at all. Neither legally nor operationally. As several analysts have already observed, including
here on Medium, in the event of a classic Russian false flag attack, the Americans would not even intervene to defend Ukraine. The Willing have already made it clear that any European deterrent forces would only be effective in peacetime.
Given this, writing down in black and white that Ukraine confirms its non-nuclear status, agrees to limit its armed forces, and chooses to rely on external security guarantees means going back to square one after losing men, resources, and territory.
THANKS TO ALL WHO BACK US IN THESE HARD TIMES ????
感謝那些支持我們籌款活動的人????
致所有相信我们工作并想支持它的人
在过去三年里，作为自由撰稿人，我们一直在乌克兰战争的所有前线进行报道，自从大规模……
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乌克兰人希望拿回他们的核武器
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
乌克兰前线报道
特尔诺波尔——在过去的1400天里，我们问过每一位遇到的乌克兰人同样的问题：您认为对您的国家最可靠的安全保障是什么？
从前线到被轰炸的城市，答案始终明确：我们希望拿回我们的核武器。
我们在撰写本文之前收集了最新的民意证词。米罗斯拉夫妇都是一个月前俄罗斯袭击特尔诺波尔的幸存者，那次袭击造成了超过120名平民伤亡，他们明确表达了拒绝继续依赖第三方来保障乌克兰安全的立场：
“叫我米拉。我在意大利生活了很长时间。三十年前，我们拥有大约三千枚核弹，任何人敢想要入侵我们。那些武器不是别人给我们的。是我们靠自己的劳动、资源和智慧建造的。他们说服我们放弃，以换取他人的安全。我们被背叛了。任何基于这种欺诈的协议都不会有效。”
米拉女士的观点让人无法反驳——她的观点与多年来数千人的回答相同。
（图：我在特尔诺波尔撰写本文之前拍下了这张照片。这片居民区遭到俄罗斯联邦的袭击，导致超过40名平民遇难，120多人受伤——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
乌克兰的战略失败并不是在2022年2月24日开始的，而是始于1994年布达佩斯备忘录的签署。这一不具约束力的政治声明迫使基辅放弃了大约3000枚核弹头——世界第三大核武库——以换取证明空洞的承诺。
莫斯科发起的帝国主义战争暴露了更加残酷的真相：承诺在被打破前是有效的，而核威慑仍然是世界真正畏惧的唯一威慑手段。
因为缺乏强制执行机制、自动干预义务或对违约行为的制裁，布达佩斯备忘录并不是1969年维也纳公约下的国际条约。美国、英国和俄罗斯联邦在这一背景下提供的“安全保证”是单方面的政治声明，而不是具有法律约束力的承诺。这一点在俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后没有具体后果的情况下尤为明显。
乌克兰作为无核国家加入了核不扩散条约（NPT）。然而，该条约的第十条明确规定，如果重大事件妨碍签署国的根本利益，该国则有权退出。
俄罗斯全面的军事入侵、领土占领、战争罪行、对乌克兰国家的生存威胁以及反复的核恐吓在最严肃的意义上都充分满足了这一要求。
因此，乌克兰在法律上完全有权宣布退出核不扩散条约。行使这一权利的政治责任将完全在于那些破坏了为裁军提供保障的安全条件的人。
（图：我在特尔诺波尔撰写本文前拍下了这张照片，身后的居民点的基础设施被俄罗斯联邦摧毁——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
几十年来，西方向乌克兰出售了“北约开放大门”的叙事，但并没有设定截止日期、强制路线图或真正的保护措施。在关键时刻，盟国对核侵略者的恐惧超过了对一个主权国家被毁灭担忧。
由此产生了一个毁灭性的悖论：拥有核武器的人可以入侵（他国），而没有核武器的国家则必须屈服。提供给乌克兰的军事援助甚至无法与它被迫放弃的威慑力量相提并论。
（图：我在乌克兰战略核武器地点报道时为Alla拍下了这张照片——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
关于乌克兰“继承”苏联核武库的说法在历史和技术上都是错误的。
乌克兰曾是苏联工业的心脏，地位如王冠上的明珠。它拥有核弹头的生产、组装和维护设施；为苏联的战略导弹工业生产关键组件；拥有一流的原材料和科学家；并雇佣直接参与弹头开发的人员。
正如米拉女士所回忆的，那些武器并不是赠礼，而是苏联时代乌克兰工业的自主产出。
放弃它们意味着自愿摧毁乌克兰作为苏联四个创始国之一的国家战略能力，以利于一个在苏联解体后诞生的国家。乌克兰一直拥有自己的法律身份，无论是作为一个拥有自己治理机构的苏联加盟共和国，还是作为一个在1991年之后被承认的独立国家。然后，今天的俄罗斯联邦是一个后苏联国家，它单方面且欺骗性地宣称了许多前苏联的国际地位，尽管它的历史既不悠久也不合法。
（图：Alla在乌克兰一个战略核武器地点报道——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
里斯本议定书和布达佩斯备忘录在法律上由一个共同原因联系在一起：以核放弃换取安全。俄罗斯联邦是这两个协议的签署方，随后成为了侵略者。将乌克兰约束于一个无核未来在法律上是站不住脚的，正如据称被写入所谓“和平计划”20条中的第11点所宣称的。
将未来安全保障建立在过去最严重的战略错误上是极其错误和危险的。
核不扩散条约（NPT）不是不可撤销，第十条优于政治备忘录和实施协议。条约中没有从属条款或外部否决权。
乌克兰的情况已经被超越了该条约最严重的形式上的法律门槛。核武器重新武装项目可以并且应该立即启动，今天它将构成该国安全的最佳保障。
这也是前线的士兵和城市中的平民为何要求这一点。
核威慑并不被国际法禁止，而是受到监管的。只要不违反国际人道法（jus in bello）并且其无限制使用不受到威胁，它就与国际法律秩序完全兼容。
乌克兰曾经拥有——并且仍然拥有——重建其合法核武库的权利以及技术和工程能力。
这正是乌克兰所需要的唯一真正可信的安全保障。
（图：阿拉手里拿着苏联时代发起核打击所需的钥匙——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
经验教训表明，即使是具有法律约束力的协议，也依赖于各方遵守它们的意愿。拿北约第五条作为例子，其含义常被误解，因为该条款根本不要求进行直接军事干预，无论是法律上还是操作上。如多位分析人士，包括在Medium上的Dylan Combellick在内，所指出的，在经典的俄罗斯假旗攻击发生时，美国人甚至不会出手保护乌克兰。志愿者联盟已经明确表示，任何欧洲威慑力量仅在和平时期才有效。
鉴于此，黑纸白字地写下乌克兰确认其无核地位，同意限制其武装力量，并选择依赖外部安全保障，意味着在失去人手、资源和领土之后又重新回到起点。
（图：我与米拉的丈夫米哈伊尔合影——版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
感谢所有在这段艰难时期支持我们的人????
致所有相信我们工作并想支持它的人
在过去三年里，作为自由撰稿人，我们一直在乌克兰战争的所有前线进行报道，自从大规模……
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