关于台湾和太平洋第一岛链，这份文件这么说：

“A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of

strategic competition. There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of

Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan

provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and

Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping

passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the

U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving

military overmatch, is a priority. We will also maintain our longstanding

declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any

unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

 

We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island

Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone.

Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for

collective defense. America’s diplomatic efforts should focus on pressing our First

Island Chain allies and partners to allow the U.S. military greater access to their

ports and other facilities, to spend more on their own defense, and most

importantly to invest in capabilities aimed at deterring aggression. This will

interlink maritime security issues along the First Island Chain while reinforcing

U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance

of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible.”