为什么美国应该退出乌克兰？Gemini 3 AI的回答：

The argument that the U.S. must "give up" (or significantly reduce support for) Ukraine to secure the Western Pacific is primarily rooted in the "Realist" school of international relations and the "Strategy of Denial."

This perspective, championed by current Pentagon official Elbridge Colby and other defense strategists, argues that the United States no longer possesses the military or industrial capacity to act as a global hegemon. Therefore, they argue the U.S. must ruthlessly prioritize the Pacific theater.

Here is the detailed breakdown of the logic behind this argument:

1. The "Empty Bins" Problem (Hard Constraints)

The most tangible argument is based on physics and logistics: the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is currently unable to support two major conflicts simultaneously.

• Munitions Stockpiles: While Ukraine is largely a land war (artillery/tanks) and a Taiwan scenario would be an air/sea war (missiles/submarines), there is a critical overlap in explosives and solid rocket motors. The chemicals and production lines used to make Javelins and GMLRS rockets for Ukraine are often the same ones needed to make Harpoon and LRASM anti-ship missiles for Taiwan.

• Replenishment Rates: The U.S. has burned through years' worth of stockpiles in Ukraine. Officials argue that if China invades Taiwan within the "window of vulnerability" (roughly 2024–2027), the U.S. will simply not have enough precision-guided munitions to repel the invasion because the industrial base takes years to ramp up production.

• High-End Assets: Critical "low-density, high-demand" assets—specifically Patriot air defense systems—are finite. Every Patriot battery deployed to Kyiv is one less battery available to protect Guam or U.S. aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

2. The Hierarchy of Threats (Strategic Prioritization)

This argument posits that not all enemies are equal, and treating them as such is a strategic error.

• China is the "Peer": China is viewed as the only nation with the economic and military power to displace the U.S. as the global leader and dominate the world's most economically dynamic region (Asia).

• Russia is a "Rogue": In this view, Russia is a declining power with an economy smaller than Italy's. While dangerous to its neighbors, it lacks the capacity to dominate the globe.

• The Logic: You do not exhaust your primary resources fighting a secondary threat (Russia) when the primary threat (China) is preparing for war. Realists argue the U.S. must conserve its strength for the "Main Event."

3. The "Bandwidth" Bottleneck

Resources are not just missiles; they are also time, intelligence, and political capital.

• Leadership Attention: A Pentagon and White House consumed by managing a war in Europe (coordinating NATO, managing escalation risks with Putin) has less bandwidth to build complex alliances in the Indo-Pacific (like AUKUS or the Quad).

• Crisis Management: If a crisis erupts in the Taiwan Strait while the U.S. is deeply entangled in Ukraine, the U.S. decision-making apparatus could be overwhelmed, leading to slower or poorer responses to China.

4. The Division of Labor (Geography and Wealth)

Proponents argue that the geopolitical math forces a division of labor:

• Europe is Rich: NATO Europe has a combined GDP vastly larger than Russia's. The argument follows that Germany, France, the UK, and Poland have the money and manpower to contain Russia without American leadership, provided they summon the political will.

• Asia is Fragile: In contrast, the disparity in Asia is stark. Japan and Taiwan cannot balance China alone. They require the full weight of the U.S. military to deter Chinese aggression.

• Conclusion: Therefore, the U.S. should offload European security to Europeans and shift the bulk of its forces to the Pacific.

Summary of the "Zero-Sum" View

The core of this argument is that deterrence is fragile. If China perceives that the U.S. is distracted, low on ammunition, or politically exhausted by Ukraine, Beijing might calculate that it has a "once-in-a-century" opportunity to take Taiwan.

To strategists like Colby, "giving up" Ukraine is not about disliking Ukraine; it is a cold calculation that the U.S. cannot afford to lose the Pacific, and trying to save both might result in losing both.