瓦格纳的历史

转的，并不反映同意本文。中文是机器翻译。不负责质量。

 

Wagner, I hardly Knew Ye

SCOTT RITTER

2023年6月28日

 

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the Wagner Group, in Rostov, June 24, 2023

The dust has settled following last weekend’s abortive insurrection by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the owner of the private military company known as the Wagner Group, and some 8,000 fighters he employed, against Russian President Vladimir Putin. A clearer picture has since emerged about what exactly transpired during this coup, and why these events unfolded as they did. It also has allowed time to shine a light on Wagner Group, revealing it as something more than the invincible band of heroic Russian patriots celebrated by Russian society at large. Instead, a less complimentary image of Wagner emerges, one which portrays it as a business venture run by a corrupt narcissist who used Russian state funds to build a cult of personality that hypnotized an unwitting Russian populace into believing that Wagner was the sole source of salvation for Russia from the threat posed by the war with Ukraine.

As a military analyst with no small amount of experience in covering armed conflict, I don’t believe that I am susceptible to being star-struck in the presence of men who have earned, through experience, reputations as warriors of formidable stature. I was myself a US Marine, a member of a fraternity of sea-going warriors proud of both their martial history and military abilities, which are held to be second to none. I have served in harm’s way with special operators from America’s most elite military units and have worked closely with similarly skilled professionals from other nations. I think I have a good judge of what constitutes military competence and am not hesitant to give credit to where it is due.

As someone who follows events in the Middle East closely, I had been tracking the activities of the Wagner Group in Syria since their initial deployment in 2015. Their reputation as skilled fighters was earned in the blood of dozens of their comrades who lost their lives fighting terrorists affiliated with the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. As such, when in 2022 rumors started to circulate about the presence of Wagner Group fighters operating alongside the Russian Army in the region of the Donbas, I took notice. It was difficult to find credible sources of information, and the Wagner Group was reticent about anyone giving out information about its activities. But eventually I was able to piece together an understanding of the role played by Wagner in the Donbas, along with the impact Wagner had on the war. My analysis, both spoken and written, reflected the high regard I had for the Wagner Group as a combat formation, and the heroism and skill of the soldiers it employed.

Prior to my recent visit to Russia, my host informed me that the Wagner forces engaged in the fierce fighting around Bakhmut spoke highly of my analysis and could be counted among my biggest fans. Indeed, during my visit, I was introduced to several Wagner veterans, and a few serving Wagner employees, all of whom wanted to shake my hand, and many of whom presented me with gifts signifying the depth of their appreciation for my work. Whether it was a combat knife, a chrome-plated sledgehammer (an unofficial symbol of the Wagner Group), or various Wagner combat patches (including one embroidered with my name), I was taken aback by the level of genuine and heartfelt affection these Wagner men—noted for their toughness under fire—showed for me.

作为一名密切关注中东局势的人，自 2015 年瓦格纳集团首次部署以来，我一直在跟踪瓦格纳集团在叙利亚的活动。他们作为熟练战士的声誉是用数十名在战斗中丧生的战友的鲜血赢得的。 与伊斯兰国和基地组织有关联的恐怖分子。 因此，当 2022 年关于瓦格纳集团战士在顿巴斯地区与俄罗斯军队并肩作战的谣言开始流传时，我注意到了。 很难找到可靠的信息来源，瓦格纳集团对任何人透露有关其活动的信息都保持沉默。 但最终我能够拼凑出对瓦格纳在顿巴斯所扮演的角色以及瓦格纳对战争的影响的理解。 我的口头和书面分析反映了我对瓦格纳集团作为战斗部队的高度评价，以及它所雇用的士兵的英雄主义和技能。 在我最近访问俄罗斯之前，我的东道主告诉我，参与巴克穆特周围激烈战斗的瓦格纳部队对我的分析给予了高度评价，可以算作我最大的粉丝之一。 事实上，在我访问期间，我被介绍给了几位瓦格纳老员工和一些在职瓦格纳员工，他们都想与我握手，其中许多人向我赠送了礼物，表明他们对我的工作深表赞赏。 无论是一把战斗刀、一把镀铬大锤（瓦格纳集团的非官方标志），还是各种瓦格纳战斗徽章（包括绣有我名字的徽章），我都被瓦格纳的真诚和发自内心的感情所震惊。 那些以在枪林弹雨中坚韧着称的男人们为我展现了自己的魅力。

 

A personalized patch (left) and chrome-plated Wagner sledgehammer (right)

When the events of June 23-24 unfolded before me, I was taken aback. An organization that I held in the highest esteem was engaged in an act of self-destruction before my very eyes, engaged in conduct—an armed insurrection against a constitutionally-mandated government—that any military professional imbued with a respect for the chain of command and the nation he or she served would find reprehensible. Like many others, I was compelled to reexamine my understanding of the Wagner Group, the people it employed, and its history in the service of Russia.

Relatively little is known about the formation of the Wagner Group. What little information is available comes from Yevgeny Prigozhin himself and, as such, must be seen in the context of his tendency for self-promotion. Prigozhin long denied any involvement with Wagner Group, and indeed initiated legal action against journalists (including Bellingcat) who reported on his involvement. This changed in September 2022, when Prigozhin openly discussed his role with Wagner Group in a post published on his Telegram page.

Wagner’s origins date back to February 2014, following the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s constitutionally-elected President, Viktor Yanukovych, by Ukrainian nationalists backed by the United States and European Union. At that time, Crimea was part of Ukraine. Shortly after the Maidan revolution ousted Yanukovych, right-wing Ukrainian nationalists attempted to take control of Crimea, which had a majority ethnic-Russian population whose loyalties leaned decisively toward Moscow. The nationalists were confronted by so-called “self defense units” drawn from the local pro-Russian citizenry.

作为一名密切关注中东局势的人，自 2015 年瓦格纳集团首次部署以来，我一直在跟踪瓦格纳集团在叙利亚的活动。他们作为熟练战士的声誉是用数十名在战斗中丧生的战友的鲜血赢得的。 与伊斯兰国和基地组织有关联的恐怖分子。 因此，当 2022 年关于瓦格纳集团战士在顿巴斯地区与俄罗斯军队并肩作战的谣言开始流传时，我注意到了。 很难找到可靠的信息来源，瓦格纳集团对任何人透露有关其活动的信息都保持沉默。 但最终我能够拼凑出对瓦格纳在顿巴斯所扮演的角色以及瓦格纳对战争的影响的理解。 我的口头和书面分析反映了我对瓦格纳集团作为战斗部队的高度评价，以及它所雇用的士兵的英雄主义和技能。 在我最近访问俄罗斯之前，我的东道主告诉我，参与巴克穆特周围激烈战斗的瓦格纳部队对我的分析给予了高度评价，可以算作我最大的粉丝之一。 事实上，在我访问期间，我被介绍给了几位瓦格纳老员工和一些在职瓦格纳员工，他们都想与我握手，其中许多人向我赠送了礼物，表明他们对我的工作深表赞赏。 无论是一把战斗刀、一把镀铬大锤（瓦格纳集团的非官方标志），还是各种瓦格纳战斗徽章（包括绣有我名字的徽章），我都被瓦格纳的真诚和发自内心的感情所震惊。 那些以在枪林弹雨中坚韧着称的男人们为我展现了自己的魅力。 个性化补丁（左）和镀铬瓦格纳大锤（右） 当6月23日至24日的事件展现在我面前时，我大吃一惊。 我最尊敬的一个组织在我眼前进行了一场自我毁灭的行为，其行为——对宪法授权的政府的武装叛乱——是任何军事专业人员都对指挥系统充满尊重的行为。 他或她所服务的国家将会受到谴责。 和其他许多人一样，我被迫重新审视自己对瓦格纳集团、其员工及其为俄罗斯服务的历史的理解。 人们对瓦格纳集团的形成知之甚少。 仅有的少量信息来自叶夫根尼·普里戈任本人，因此必须在他自我推销倾向的背景下看待。 普里戈任长期否认与瓦格纳集团有任何关系，并且确实对报道他的参与的记者（包括 Bellingcat）发起了法律诉讼。 这种情况在 2022 年 9 月发生了变化，当时普里戈任在其 Telegram 页面上发表的一篇文章中公开讨论了他与瓦格纳集团的角色。 瓦格纳的起源可以追溯到 2014 年 2 月，当时美国和欧盟支持的乌克兰民族主义者暴力推翻了乌克兰依宪法选举的总统维克托·亚努科维奇 (Viktor Yanukovych)。 当时，克里米亚是乌克兰的一部分。 独立广场革命推翻亚努科维奇后不久，右翼乌克兰民族主义者试图控制克里米亚，该地区的俄罗斯族人口占多数，他们的忠诚明显倾向于莫斯科。 民族主义者面临着由当地亲俄公民组成的所谓“自卫队”。

But there were other actors on the ground as well. Concerned that the Ukrainian government would call out the Ukrainian army to intervene, the Russian government mobilized a force of several hundred “little green men,” consisting of elite Russian special forces who, because of constitutional limitations regarding the deployment of regular Russian army forces on the soil of a foreign nation, were “sheep dipped” (a US term made popular during the CIA’s covert war in Laos in the 1960’s and 70’s, where active duty US Air Force officers would be transferred to the CIA’s “Air America” proprietary company for operations inside Laos.)

The man put in charge of these “sheep dipped” special operators was Dmitry Utkin, a recently-retired Lieutenant Colonel who had previously commanded a Russian special forces (Spetznaz) unit affiliated with Russian Military Intelligence (GRU). Utkin and his “little green men” played a leading role in the Russian takeover of Crimea on February 26, 2014, four days after Yanukovych fled Ukraine. Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, Utkin’s “little green men” were dispatched to Lugansk, where they were tasked with providing training and assistance to the pro-Russian fighters that had taken up arms against the Ukrainian nationalists who had seized power in Kiev.

但现场还有其他演员。 由于担心乌克兰政府会召集乌克兰军队进行干预，俄罗斯政府动员了数百名“小绿人”，其中包括俄罗斯精锐特种部队，由于宪法对俄罗斯正规军部署的限制，这些人由俄罗斯精锐特种部队组成。 在外国的土地上，被“羊浸”（这是一个美国术语，在 1960 年代和 70 年代中央情报局在老挝进行的秘密战争期间流行，当时美国现役空军军官将被转移到中央情报局的“美国航空”专有公司 适用于老挝境内的运营。） 负责这些“羊浸”特种作战人员的是德米特里·乌特金（Dmitry Utkin），他是一位最近退休的中校，此前曾指挥过隶属于俄罗斯军事情报局（GRU）的俄罗斯特种部队（Spetznaz）。 2014 年 2 月 26 日，即亚努科维奇逃离乌克兰四天后，乌特金和他的“小绿人”在俄罗斯接管克里米亚的过程中发挥了主导作用。 2014年3月克里米亚被俄罗斯吞并后，乌特金的“小绿人”被派往卢甘斯克，在那里他们的任务是为那些拿起武器反对夺取政权的乌克兰民族主义者的亲俄罗斯战士提供训练和援助 在基辅。

 

Vladimir Putin (center) with Dmitry Utkin (far right) and other Wagner commanders, 2016

As the fighting expanded, so, too, did the role of the “little green men,” and by April it became clear that the Russian government would need to create a more formal organization which would serve as the conduit for military assistance to the pro-Russian militias fighting in the Donbas. On May 1, 2014, a new entity, known as the “Wagner Group” (named after the call sign—“Wagner”—used by Utkin) was created and given a contract with the Ministry of Defense to serve in this role. While Utkin served as the military commander of this new organization, “Wagner Group” itself was managed by a group of civilian businessmen headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who by that time had established himself as a successful restaurateur whose clients included Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Wagner was heavily involved in the fighting that raged in the Donbas from May 2014 through February 2015, when a ceasefire came into effect after the signing of the Minsk 2 accords. With the fighting in Ukraine winding down, Prigozhin and Utkin sought to exploit Utkin’s own past experience as a mercenary in Syria. The ability to deploy a professional military unit capable of operating on foreign soil where regular Russian forces were prohibited was attractive to the Russian Ministry of Defense, who contracted with Wagner to provide military assistance to the embattled Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad. Wagner’s success in Syria led to additional “support contracts” being executed for operations in several African countries. In addition to being paid by the Russia government, Wagner Group was able to arrange its own economic relationships with its African clients, which led to several profitable ventures designed to enrich its owners, including Prigozhin.

 

Wagner Group soldiers in Syria

On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military to commence what was being called a “Special Military Operation” (SMO) against Ukraine. The Russian military began deploying onto the soil of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (which were both recognized by Russia as independent states days prior to the SMO being kicked off), where they fought alongside local militias. Wagner Group continued to operate on the territory of the Donbas in a reduced capacity from 2015 until the SMO’s initiation.

After the collapse of the April 1, 2022, peace negotiation between Russia and Ukraine scheduled to take place in Istanbul, Turkey, the Russian military was instructed to begin large-scale offensive operations intended to liberate the territory of the Donbas still occupied by Ukraine. On May 1, 2023, a new contract was signed between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Wagner Group for some 86 billion rubles, or $940 million, to expand the scope and scale of its Ukrainian operation from advisory and assistance to that of a combat unit of roughly division-size capable of largescale fighting against regular Ukrainian forces. To sweeten the deal, the Russian Ministry of Defense signed a separate 80-billion-ruble deal (some $900 million) for the provision of food to the Russian Army using Prigozhin’s catering company.

随着战斗的扩大，“小绿人”的作用也随之扩大，到了四月，很明显俄罗斯政府需要建立一个更正式的组织，作为向亲俄武装分子提供军事援助的渠道。 -在顿巴斯作战的俄罗斯民兵。 2014 年 5 月 1 日，一个名为“瓦格纳集团”（以乌特金使用的呼号“瓦格纳”命名）的新实体成立，并与国防部签订了合同，担任这一角色。 当乌特金担任这个新组织的军事指挥官时，“瓦格纳集团”本身是由一群以叶夫根尼·普里戈任为首的平民商人管理的，当时叶夫根尼·普里戈任已成为一名成功的餐馆老板，其客户包括俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京。 瓦格纳积极参与了 2014 年 5 月至 2015 年 2 月期间顿巴斯爆发的战斗，明斯克 2 号协议签署后停火生效。 随着乌克兰战斗的结束，普里戈任和乌特金试图利用乌特金过去在叙利亚当雇佣兵的经历。 部署一支能够在俄罗斯常规部队被禁止的外国领土上开展行动的专业军事部队的能力对俄罗斯国防部很有吸引力，俄罗斯国防部与瓦格纳签订了合同，向陷入困境的叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德政府提供军事援助。 瓦格纳在叙利亚的成功导致在几个非洲国家的行动中签署了额外的“支持合同”。 除了获得俄罗斯政府的报酬外，瓦格纳集团还能够与非洲客户建立自己的经济关系，这导致了几家旨在丰富其所有者（包括普里戈任）的盈利企业。 瓦格纳集团士兵在叙利亚 2022 年 2 月 24 日，弗拉基米尔·普京命令俄罗斯军方对乌克兰展开所谓的“特别军事行动”(SMO)。 俄罗斯军队开始在卢甘斯克和顿涅茨克人民共和国（在 SMO 启动前几天被俄罗斯承认为独立国家）部署，并与当地民兵并肩作战。 自 2015 年起，直至 SMO 启动，瓦格纳集团继续在顿巴斯地区开展业务，但产能有所减少。 原定于2022年4月1日在土耳其伊斯坦布尔举行的俄罗斯和乌克兰和平谈判破裂后，俄罗斯军方奉命开始大规模进攻行动，旨在解放仍被乌克兰占领的顿巴斯地区。 2023 年 5 月 1 日，俄罗斯国防部与瓦格纳集团签署了一份价值约 860 亿卢布（约合 9.4 亿美元）的新合同，将其在乌克兰的行动范围和规模从咨询和援助扩大到作战行动 大约师级规模的部队，能够与乌克兰正规军进行大规模战斗。 为了使协议更加顺利，俄罗斯国防部单独签署了一项价值 800 亿卢布（约合 9 亿美元）的协议，通过普里戈任的餐饮公司向俄罗斯军队提供食品。

 

Yevgeny Prigozhin serves food to Vladimir Putin

War, it seems, had become very profitable business for Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Wagner played a major role in many of the battles waged in the spring and summer of 2022 which, collectively, became known as the Battle of the Donbas. Wagner was initially organized as a battalion-sized unit of several hundred highly-trained military veterans. As the fighting dragged on, the Wagner forces began to expand in size and capabilities, soon acquiring their own armor and artillery forces, as well as dedicated fighter aircraft. By the time the Lugansk city of Sievierodonetsk fell to Russian forces, on June 25, 2022, the Wagner Group was a division-sized unit which had developed a reputation for expertise in urban warfare, taking the lead in clearing Ukrainian troops who were dug in among the ruins of that city. By the fall of the neighboring city of Lysychansk, on July 3, 2022, the Wagner Group had become synonymous with operational excellence.

The fighting in Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk, however successful it was for the Russians and Wagner, had proven to be extremely costly from the standpoint of casualties. It became apparent to both the military command structure of Wagner, built around a cadre of experienced military veterans known as the “commanders council,” and Wagner’s corporate owners, headed by Prigozhin, that Wagner would suffer both in terms of military efficiency and profitability if it had to recruit and train seasoned veterans to replace those who had fallen in battle. During the house-to-house fighting that defined the Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk battles, Wagner’s small unit commanders had developed tactics which combined firepower (indirect artillery and direct fire support from tanks) with aggressive infantry assaults which could overwhelm Ukrainian defenders.

Rather than waste experienced fighters in this style of fighting, Prigozhin began recruiting new fighters from Russian prisons, promising them expungement of their criminal record in exchange for a six-month contract to fight on the frontlines. The Wagner commanders would train these inmate recruits over the course of a 21-day program that focused on the rudimentary combat skills needed to execute the Wagner urban warfare tactics, before organizing them into “shock” units which would be fed into the fighting. These units, while ultimately effective, suffered up to 60% casualties. Between 30-50,000 convicts were eventually recruited by Wagner, of whom 10-15,000 are believed to have been killed in the subsequent fighting for the cities of Soledar and Bakhmut.

对于叶夫根尼·普里戈任来说，战争似乎已经成为非常有利可图的生意。 瓦格纳在 2022 年春季和夏季发生的许多战役中发挥了重要作用，这些战役统称为顿巴斯战役。 瓦格纳最初是一个营规模的单位，由数百名训练有素的退伍军人组成。 随着战斗的持续，瓦格纳军队开始扩大规模和能力，很快就获得了自己的装甲部队和炮兵部队，以及专用战斗机。 2022 年 6 月 25 日，当卢甘斯克市西维耶顿涅茨克落入俄罗斯军队之手时，瓦格纳集团已是一支师级部队，在城市战方面享有盛誉，率先清除了被挖进的乌克兰军队。 在那座城市的废墟之中。 2022 年 7 月 3 日，邻近城市利西昌斯克陷落时，瓦格纳集团已成为卓越运营的代名词。 西维耶顿涅茨克和利西昌斯克的战斗无论对俄罗斯人和瓦格纳来说多么成功，从伤亡的角度来看都被证明是极其昂贵的。 对于瓦格纳的军事指挥结构（围绕着被称为“指挥官委员会”的经验丰富的退伍军人骨干队伍）和以普里戈任为首的瓦格纳的企业所有者来说，瓦格纳的军事效率和盈利能力都将受到影响，如果 它必须招募和训练经验丰富的退伍军人来替代那些在战斗中阵亡的人。 在西维耶顿涅茨克战役和利西昌斯克战役的挨家挨户战斗中，瓦格纳的小部队指挥官制定了将火力（间接炮兵和坦克的直接火力支援）与侵略性步兵攻击相结合的战术，这可以压倒乌克兰守军。 普里戈任并没有在这种战斗中浪费经验丰富的战士，而是开始从俄罗斯监狱招募新战士，承诺消除他们的犯罪记录，以换取为期六个月的前线战斗合同。 瓦格纳指挥官将在为期 21 天的计划中对这些囚犯新兵进行训练，重点是执行瓦格纳城市战战术所需的基本战斗技能，然后将他们组织成“突击”部队投入战斗。 这些部队虽然最终发挥了作用，但伤亡高达 60%。 瓦格纳最终招募了 30 至 50,000 名囚犯，据信其中 10 至 15,000 人在随后争夺索莱达尔和巴赫穆特市的战斗中被杀。

Dead Wagner Convict “shock troops”

The battles for the twin cities of Soledar and Bakhmut began on August 1, 2022. Wagner Group and its inmate “shock” units played a central role in the intense combat that followed. By this time, the world was starting to take notice of the fighters of this private military company. Labeled as mercenaries by the Western media and governments, and patriotic heroes by the pro-Russian citizens of the Donbas whose homes, villages, towns, and cities were being liberated, Wagner began emerging from the shadows. Whereas previously the Russian government and media were reticent to even acknowledge its existence, by the end of September 2022 Prigozhin, who had famously sued journalists who (accurately) reported that he was the owner of Wagner Group, wrote a posting on his Telegram channel admitting that he was, indeed, the owner.

While many observers took Prigozhin’s unexpected step into the spotlight as a sign of Wagner’s increasing public profile, the reality behind Prigozhin’s decision was simple business. From September 25-27, 2022, the citizens of the Donbas undertook a referendum on whether they wanted to be incorporated as part of the Russian Federation. By the end of the first day, it was clear that the result would be an overwhelming “yes.”

Prigozhin went public with his role as the owner of Wagner Group on September 26, 2022. This was the first salvo of what would become a massive public relations campaign designed to create the impression that Wagner was an essential part of the Russian war effort, whose fighters were singularly capable of defeating the Ukrainians. Prigozhin’s public relations campaign was further enhanced by the fact that the Russian public had been shocked by the retreat of the Russian army during the Ukrainian Kharkov Offensive, which began on September 6, 2022. While the regular army was in retreat, the forces of Wagner continued to advance along the Soledar-Bakhmut front, providing the Russian people with the only example of battlefield success during these dark times.

For Prigozhin, it became essential that he separate Wagner from the Russian Army in the eyes of the Russian people. The reason why was simple—with the Donbas now part of the Russian Federation, Wagner Group was in technical violation of Russian laws which prohibited the operation of private military contractors on Russian soil. Already there was talk about the need to change the contractual status of Wagner’s relationship with the Russian Ministry of Defense as soon as Wagner’s contract expired on May 1, 2023.

But Prigozhin had a money-making system in place, especially when it came to the use of convicts. Prigozhin could pay them less than a regular Wagner recruit, and the cost of their training was miniscule compared to that given more specialized fighters. The money saved by this process was estimated to be in the tens of millions of dollars, all of which flowed back into the pockets of Prigozhin and his fellow owners and investors. Desperate to keep this enterprise intact, Prigozhin went on the offensive, publicly condemning senior Russian generals and officials, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

In November Wagner unveiled a shiny new center in Saint Petersburg designed to propel the company into the psyche of the Russian public as a major player in Russian national security affairs. All the while, the fighters of Wagner pressed forward their attacks on Soledar and Bakhmut, driven by Prigozhin’s desire to be seen as the only effective fighting force fighting the Ukrainians. And, increasingly, the fighters leading the charge were units composed on former Russian inmates.

But Prigozhin was running into a problem. He was forced to stop recruiting from prisons for the simple fact that he lacked a contract vehicle to pay the inmates after May 1,2023, meaning the last inmate recruit was processed by Wagner by December 1, 2022. Prisoners were still allowed to volunteer as frontline fighters, but they would have to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense going forward. Since the prisoner contracts were linked to specific periods of service that had to be fulfilled before their records could be expunged, Wagner could not commit inmates to anything less than a full-six-month term of enlistment. Wagner could still recruit non-inmate persons, since there would be no legal headaches created if Wagner did not renew its contract with the Ministry of Defense.

索莱达尔和巴克穆特双城之战于 2022 年 8 月 1 日打响。瓦格纳集团及其囚犯“突击”部队在随后的激烈战斗中发挥了核心作用。 这时，世界开始关注这家私人军事公司的战士。 瓦格纳被西方媒体和政府称为雇佣兵，被顿巴斯的亲俄公民称为爱国英雄，他们的家园、村庄、城镇和城市正在获得解放，瓦格纳开始从阴影中走出来。 此前，俄罗斯政府和媒体甚至不愿承认其存在，但到了 2022 年 9 月，普里戈任在他的 Telegram 频道上发帖承认，他因起诉（准确地）报道他是瓦格纳集团所有者的记者而闻名。 他确实是所有者。 尽管许多观察家将普里戈任出人意料地走入聚光灯下视为瓦格纳公众形象日益提高的标志，但普里戈任决定背后的现实很简单。 2022年9月25日至27日，顿巴斯公民就是否愿意并入俄罗斯联邦进行了全民公投。 第一天结束时，很明显，结果将是压倒性的“是”。 普里戈任于 2022 年 9 月 26 日公开了自己作为瓦格纳集团所有者的身份。这是一场大规模公关活动的第一波，旨在给人留下瓦格纳是俄罗斯战争努力的重要组成部分的印象。 战士们有能力击败乌克兰人。 2022 年 9 月 6 日开始的乌克兰哈尔科夫攻势中，俄罗斯军队的撤退让俄罗斯公众感到震惊，这进一步强化了普里戈任的公关活动。在正规军撤退的同时，瓦格纳的部队 继续沿着索莱达尔-巴赫穆特前线前进，为俄罗斯人民提供了在这些黑暗时期战场上取得成功的唯一例子。 对于普里戈任来说，在俄罗斯人民眼中将瓦格纳与俄罗斯军队分开变得至关重要。 原因很简单——顿巴斯现已成为俄罗斯联邦的一部分，瓦格纳集团在技术上违反了俄罗斯禁止私人军事承包商在俄罗斯领土上运营的法律。 瓦格纳的合同于 2023 年 5 月 1 日到期后，已经有人讨论需要改变瓦格纳与俄罗斯国防部的合同状态。 但普里戈任有一套赚钱系统，特别是在使用囚犯方面。 普里戈任给他们的工资比瓦格纳的普通新兵要少，而且与更专业的战士相比，他们的训练成本微乎其微。 这一过程节省的资金估计达数千万美元，所有这些资金都又回到了普里戈任及其其他所有者和投资者的口袋里。 普里戈任不顾一切地想要保持这一事业的完整性，于是发起进攻，公开谴责俄罗斯高级将领和官员，其中包括国防部长谢尔盖·绍伊古。 11 月，瓦格纳在圣彼得堡揭幕了一个闪亮的新中心，旨在推动该公司成为俄罗斯公众心目中俄罗斯国家安全事务的主要参与者。 与此同时，瓦格纳的战士们一直在向索莱达尔和巴赫穆特发起进攻，普里戈任希望被视为与乌克兰人作战的唯一有效的战斗力量。 而且，带头冲锋的战士越来越多地由前俄罗斯囚犯组成。 但普里戈任遇到了问题。 他被迫停止从监狱招募囚犯，原因很简单，即他在 2023 年 5 月 1 日之后缺乏合同工具来向囚犯支付工资，这意味着最后一批囚犯招募已由瓦格纳于 2022 年 12 月 1 日完成。 前线战斗机，但他们今后必须与国防部签订合同。 由于囚犯合同与特定的服役期限相关，必须在其记录被删除之前履行这些期限，瓦格纳不能让囚犯接受少于六个月的入伍期限。 瓦格纳仍然可以招募非囚犯，因为如果瓦格纳不与国防部续签合同，就不会产生法律问题。

 

Promotional photo for the 2023 film, Best in Hell

While Prigozhin’s PR campaign was a tremendous success (Wagner even released a feature-length film, Best in Hell, in February 2023 that brought the horrors of urban warfare—and the individual heroism of the Wagner fighters—to the screen), he was failing to win over the Minster of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense, Valery Gerasimov. Prigozhin turned what should have been a professional disagreement about legalities into a personal matter filled with allegations of corruption and incompetence. Prigozhin also began accusing the Russian Ministry of Defense of deliberately holding back on the provision of ammunition to Wagner forces, a phenomenon he described as “shell hunger,” which resulted in Wagner forces suffering disproportionally high casualties.

Prigozhin began to behave erratically. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Wagner contract was not going to be renewed, meaning that Wagner forces would have to be incorporated into the very Russian Ministry of Defense Prigozhin was publicly denigrating, a move widely rejected by the rank and file of Wagner as well as its leadership. It also was becoming clear that Prigozhin’s lucrative food contract with the Ministry of Defense was likewise not going to be renewed, an action most probably related to Prigozhin’s attacks on the Defense Ministry’s two most senior officials, Shoigu and Gerasimov.

It was around this time that Prigozhin first discussed the issue of what would become of Wagner’s 50,000-strong force if the Russian Ministry of Defense continued to insist on their formal incorporation. In an interview in February 2023 with Semyon Pegov (“War Gonzo”), a pro-Russian combat correspondent and blogger, the topic of a potential Wagner attack on Moscow was raised in the context of why the Ministry of Defense was restricting ammunition. While Prigozhin noted that the idea did not originate with him, he indicated that it was interesting—not something one wants to hear from who owns a large, combat-hardened, well-equipped private army.

It was also in February 2023 that, according to US intelligence, Prigozhin and the Ukrainian intelligence service began communicating directly. Perhaps picking up on Prigozhin’s frustration and paranoia, the Ukrainian intelligence service notified the Wagner owner of a plot involving former Wagner personnel to orchestrate a coup in Moldova. Prigozhin and Wagner had, by this time, been conducting secret talks with Ukrainian intelligence. Concerned that Russian intelligence had gotten wind of these discussions, Ukraine raised the possibility of Prigozhin’s arrest and subsequent labeling as a traitor.  

The impact of Prigozhin losing nearly $2 billion in contacts, combined with an increasing level of paranoia on his part that he was caught up in a life-or-death struggle with Shoigu and Gerasimov, led the Wagner owner to double down on his vitriolic attacks on Russia’s military leadership, and thereby create the impression that he and Wagner alone could guarantee military victory for Russia over Ukraine. These attacks reached their culmination in the final fights for Bakhmut, which concluded on May 20, 2023, when Prigozhin announced that his fighters had captured the city. Prigozhin spoke of the “meatgrinder” aspect of this battle, and how Wagner—at great sacrifice—“broke the back” of the Ukrainian army, killing between 55-70,000 Ukrainian soldiers for a loss of between 20-30,000 of its fighters.

As Russia celebrated the accomplishments of Wagner in Bakhmut—elevating even further the near-mythological status Wagner and its fighters enjoyed in the eyes of an adoring Russian public—Prigozhin had more pressing matters to deal with. His contract with the Ministry of Defense had expired. He had been given a two-month extension—through July 1, 2023—given the fact that Wagner was heavily engaged in the fighting in Bakhmut. After that time, however, the Wagner forces operating in the Donbas would have to enter a contractual relationship with the Ministry of Defense or else be disbanded. Prigozhin withdrew his fighters from Bakhmut to camps in eastern Lugansk, where he lobbied his combat-hardened commanders to reject the terms of the Ministry of Defense, and instead join him to create a common front of opposition to the leadership of the Russian military.

虽然普里戈任的公关活动取得了巨大成功（瓦格纳甚至于 2023 年 2 月发行了一部长片《地狱之巅》，将城市战争的恐怖以及瓦格纳战士的个人英雄主义搬上了银幕），但他却失败了 拉拢国防部长谢尔盖·绍伊古和俄罗斯武装部队总参谋长兼国防部第一副部长瓦列里·格拉西莫夫。 普里戈任将本应是关于合法性的专业分歧变成了充满腐败和无能指控的个人问题。 普里戈任还开始指责俄罗斯国防部故意阻止向瓦格纳部队提供弹药，他将这种现象描述为“炮弹饥饿”，导致瓦格纳部队遭受了不成比例的高伤亡。 普里戈任的行为开始变得不稳定。 越来越明显的是，瓦格纳的合同不会续签，这意味着瓦格纳的部队将不得不并入普里戈任公开诋毁的俄罗斯国防部，这一举动也遭到了瓦格纳普通士兵的普遍拒绝。 作为其领导。 很明显，普里戈任与国防部签订的利润丰厚的食品合同同样不会续签，这一行动很可能与普里戈任攻击国防部两名最高官员绍伊古和格拉西莫夫有关。 大约在这个时候，普里戈任首次讨论了如果俄罗斯国防部继续坚持将瓦格纳的五万军队正式合并的话，他们将会变成什么样子的问题。 2023 年 2 月，在接受亲俄战地记者兼博主谢苗·佩戈夫（“战争奇闻趣事”）采访时，在国防部限制弹药的背景下，提出了瓦格纳可能对莫斯科发动袭击的话题。 虽然普里戈任指出这个想法不是他提出的，但他表示这很有趣——这不是一个拥有一支庞大、久经沙场、装备精良的私人军队的人想听到的。 据美国情报机构称，也是在2023年2月，普里戈任和乌克兰情报部门开始直接沟通。 也许是察觉到了普里戈任的沮丧和偏执，乌克兰情报部门向瓦格纳老板通报了一项涉及前瓦格纳人员的阴谋，目的是在摩尔多瓦策划一场政变。 此时普里戈任和瓦格纳已经与乌克兰情报部门进行秘密会谈。 由于担心俄罗斯情报部门获悉这些讨论，乌克兰提出了普里戈任被捕并随后被贴上叛徒标签的可能性。 普里戈任失去了近 20 亿美元的联系人，加上他越来越偏执地认为自己陷入了与绍伊古和格拉西莫夫的生死搏斗，导致瓦格纳老板加倍尖酸刻薄的攻击。 俄罗斯的军事领导力，从而给人留下这样的印象：仅靠他和瓦格纳就可以保证俄罗斯在军事上战胜乌克兰。 这些袭击在巴赫穆特的最后战斗中达到了顶峰，战斗于 2023 年 5 月 20 日结束，当时普里戈任宣布他的战士已经占领了这座城市。 普里戈任谈到了这场战斗的“绞肉机”方面，以及瓦格纳如何以巨大的牺牲“折断了”乌克兰军队的后盾，杀死了 55-70,000 名乌克兰士兵，损失了 20-30,000 名战士。 当俄罗斯庆祝瓦格纳在巴赫穆特的成就时——进一步提升了瓦格纳及其战士在崇拜的俄罗斯公众眼中近乎神话的地位——普里戈任有更紧迫的事情需要处理。 他与国防部的合同已经到期。 鉴于瓦格纳大量参与了巴赫穆特的战斗，他被延长了两个月——直到 2023 年 7 月 1 日。 然而，在那之后，在顿巴斯作战的瓦格纳部队必须与国防部建立合同关系，否则将被解散。 普里戈任将他的战士从巴赫穆特撤回卢甘斯克东部的营地，在那里他游说久经沙场的指挥官拒绝国防部的条款，转而与他一起建立反对俄罗斯军队领导层的共同阵线。

 

Yevgeny Prigozhin at the frontlines, Donbas, February 2023

Prigozhin’s opposition to Shoigu and Gerasimov, and his plotting to supplant them, did not escape the attention of either the Russian government or Russia’s enemies in Ukraine, the US, and Great Britain. Vladimir Putin, in a speech delivered to Russian security officials on June 27, indicated that Russian officials were in constant contact with the commanders of Wagner to warn them not to help Prigozhin use Wagner for his own personal ambition. Days before Prigozhin sent Wagner forces to Rostov and Moscow, the CIA briefed US Congress and President Biden on the existence of Prigozhin’s plot. The British MI-6 did the same, briefing the British Prime Minister as well as Ukrainian President Zelensky.

According to Ukrainian sources, the British also lobbied the Ukrainians to pause offensive operations during the window of time Prigozhin was expected to move on Moscow in the hopes that a civil war would break out that would cause Russia to withdraw combat troops from the frontline, providing the Ukrainian army with increased opportunities for success. MI-6 also used its connectivity with the Ukrainian intelligence services, in coordination with MI-6-controlled Russian oligarchs operating out of London, to reinforce Prigozhin’s belief that he had the support of the Russian military, politicians, and business elite, all of whom Prigozhin was led to believe would rally to his side once Wagner began marching on Moscow.

The failure of Prigozhin’s gambit has already become cemented in history. However, there remains an element of Russian society which, having been swayed by Prigozhin’s intensive PR campaign, continue to believe that Prigozhin’s complaints against Shoigu and Gerasimov were legitimate and, as such, so too was his march of Moscow. The facts speak otherwise. At the time of Prigozhin’s precipitous move on Moscow, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov were overseeing a Russian military campaign that was eviscerating Ukraine’s NATO-trained army, inflicting casualties at a 10-to-1 ration. During the first three weeks of the current Ukrainian counteroffensive, more than 13,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed, along with hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles—many of which were just recently supplied to Ukraine—destroyed. The Russian military was well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led. Morale was high. Any notion that Shoigu and Gerasimov were professionally incompetent was belied by the facts.

Prigozhin has bragged about the superiority of the Wagner forces when compared to those of the Russian Army. But the real reason the Wagner forces halted their march on Moscow and returned to their barracks was the fact that they had encountered the Russian military outside Serpukhov, south of Moscow. There, some 2,500 Russian special forces backed by Russian air power were waiting. At the same time, some 10,000 Chechen “Akhmat” special forces had closed in on Rostov-on-Don, where Prigozhin had taken up headquarters, and were preparing to assault the city with the intent to destroy the Wagner forces deployed there, along with their leader. Wagner’s combat experience could not make up for the fact that they were not prepared to carry out sustained ground combat against Russian ground and air forces.

Prigozhin was not only confronted with the reality of his imminent demise and of the men who had accompanied him, but, contrary to the expectations created by the British and Ukrainian intelligence services before the Wagner mutiny, the fact that not a single military unit or officer, not a single politician, and not a single businessman—no one—rallied to Prigozhin’s cause; Russia had sided with its President, Vladimir Putin. While Prigozhin’s extensive PR campaign had succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of Russian people, it had failed to convince people that they should betray their president.

In the interest of avoiding Russian-on-Russian bloodshed, Prigozhin accepted a compromise, brokered by Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, that had he, Dmitry Utkin (the only senior Wagner commander to join him) and the 8,000 Wagner fighters who participated in the failed coup return to their camps in eastern Lugansk. There they would disarm, turning over their heavy weapons to the Russian military, before being sent off into exile in Belarus. For those Wagner fighters—some 17,000—who refused to participate in Prigozhin’s act of treachery, they, along with their commanders, were given the option to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense or go home. Prigozhin’s contracts were cancelled, and Wagner disbanded. Moreover, there would be no changes in the Russian Ministry of Defense—Shoigu and Gerasimov would remain in their respective positions.

Even had Prigozhin not betrayed Russia, the Wagner Group would have ceased to exist as Prigozhin’s private army. However, the Wagner Group’s honor would have remained intact. Prigozhin’s treachery guaranteed that Wagner will be forever tainted by the greed and naked ambition of its owner, a man who sought to exploit the goodwill of the Russian public that the fighters of Wagner had earned with their blood and sacrifice on battlefields in the Donbas, Syria, and Africa, all in a misguided effort to usurp a constitutionally-mandated government the people had themselves put in power.

Farewell, Wagner—I hardly knew ye.

普里戈任对绍伊古和格拉西莫夫的反对以及他取代他们的密谋，并没有逃过俄罗斯政府或俄罗斯在乌克兰、美国和英国的敌人的关注。 弗拉基米尔·普京6月27日在向俄罗斯安全官员发表讲话时表示，俄罗斯官员一直与瓦格纳的指挥官保持联系，警告他们不要帮助普里戈任利用瓦格纳来实现自己的个人野心。 在普里戈任派遣瓦格纳部队前往罗斯托夫和莫斯科的前几天，中央情报局向美国国会和拜登总统通报了普里戈任阴谋的存在。 英国军情六处也做了同样的事情，向英国首相和乌克兰总统泽连斯基通报了情况。 据乌克兰消息人士称，英国还游说乌克兰人在预计普里戈任向莫斯科进军的时间窗口内暂停进攻行动，希望爆发内战，导致俄罗斯从前线撤出作战部队，前提是 乌克兰军队的成功机会增加。 军情六处还利用其与乌克兰情报部门的联系，与军情六处控制的在伦敦外活动的俄罗斯寡头协调，强化普里戈任的信念，即他得到了俄罗斯军方、政界人士和商界精英的支持。 普里戈任相信，一旦瓦格纳开始向莫斯科进军，他就会团结在他一边。 普里戈任策略的失败已经成为历史。 然而，俄罗斯社会仍有一部分人受到普里戈任密集公关活动的影响，仍然相信普里戈任对绍伊古和格拉西莫夫的抱怨是合法的，因此他的莫斯科进军也是合法的。 事实并非如此。 当普里戈任仓促进攻莫斯科时，谢尔盖·绍伊古和瓦列里·格拉西莫夫正在监督一场俄罗斯军事行动，该行动正在摧毁乌克兰受北约训练的军队，造成10比1的伤亡。 在当前乌克兰反攻的前三周内，已有超过 13,000 名乌克兰士兵阵亡，数百辆坦克和装甲车（其中许多是最近才供应给乌克兰）被摧毁。 俄罗斯军队装备精良、训练有素、领导有方。 士气高昂。 任何认为绍伊古和格拉西莫夫在专业上无能的观点都被事实推翻了。 普里戈任吹嘘瓦格纳部队与俄罗斯陆军相比的优越性。 但瓦格纳部队停止向莫斯科进军并返回军营的真正原因是他们在莫斯科以南的谢尔普霍夫郊外遭遇了俄军。 大约 2,500 名由俄罗斯空军支持的俄罗斯特种部队正在那里等待。 与此同时，约1万名车臣“艾赫马特”特种部队已经逼近普里戈任指挥部所在的顿河畔罗斯托夫，并准备袭击这座城市，意图摧毁部署在那里的瓦格纳部队以及 他们的领袖。 瓦格纳的作战经验无法弥补他们不准备对俄罗斯地面和空军进行持续地面作战的事实。 普里戈任不仅面临着他和陪伴他的人即将死亡的现实，而且与瓦格纳叛变之前英国和乌克兰情报部门的期望相反，事实上没有任何一个军事单位或军官 没有一个政客、一个商人——没有一个人——支持普里戈任的事业； 俄罗斯站在其总统弗拉基米尔·普京一边。 尽管普里戈任广泛的公关活动成功地赢得了俄罗斯人民的支持，但它未能说服人们应该背叛总统。 为了避免俄罗斯对俄罗斯的流血事件，普里戈任接受了白俄罗斯总统亚历山大·卢卡申科斡旋的妥协方案，他、德米特里·乌特金（瓦格纳唯一的高级指挥官加入了他的行列）以及参与失败的8000名瓦格纳战士 政变返回卢甘斯克东部的营地。 他们将在那里解除武装，将重型武器移交给俄罗斯军方，然后被流放到白俄罗斯。 对于那些拒绝参与普里戈任背叛行为的瓦格纳战士（约 17,000 人），他们和他们的指挥官可以选择与国防部签署合同或回家。 普里戈任的合同被取消，瓦格纳解散。 此外，俄罗斯国防部不会发生任何变化——绍伊古和格拉西莫夫将继续担任各自的职务。

即使普里戈任没有背叛俄罗斯，瓦格纳集团作为普里戈任的私人军队也将不复存在。 然而，瓦格纳集团的荣誉仍然完好无损。 普里戈任的背叛保证了瓦格纳将永远被其主人的贪婪和赤裸裸的野心所玷污，这个人试图利用瓦格纳的战士在叙利亚顿巴斯战场上用鲜血和牺牲赢得的俄罗斯公众的善意 和非洲，所有这些都是为了篡夺人民自己掌权的宪法授权政府。 再见，瓦格纳——我几乎不认识你。

Wagner assault troops raise their flag after capturing Bakhmut, May 2023