https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA830-1.html
Key Findings
- Systemic U.S.-China conflict would likely extend across the globe and to all domains, including cyberspace and outer space. Such a conflict would take a chronic, systemic form that persists, possibly for years. The conflict would end only when one side or the other concedes the fight and acknowledges its subordination to the other.
- The U.S. and Chinese militaries could find themselves under immense strain in a systemic conflict owing to the competing demands to sustain the war effort, respond to a broad array of acute transnational threats, and help partner nations cope with their own security challenges.
- Low-intensity war could feature extensive fighting conducted primarily through partner nations and nonstate groups. The escalation risk would remain high because either side might tire of the inconclusive nature of such fighting and seek more aggressive actions to bring the war to a conclusion.
- To fight U.S. forces in a high-intensity war, the PLA might favor operations that rely on lower-cost, lower-risk weapons and on such methods as long-range precision strike, cyber operations, and support for irregular forces.
- Although such a war might begin with more modest war aims in mind, the temptation to escalate would be difficult to resist, owing to the underlying drive to dominate the other side. Fighting could feature extensive Chinese missile strikes throughout the Indo-Pacific region aimed at shattering U.S. military power.
Recommendations
- Planners should consider a broader range of contingencies for low- or high-intensity war with China, which could carry out combat options beyond such flashpoints as Taiwan.
- Planners should consider the prospect of U.S.-China conflict less as a single battle or clash over a specific flashpoint than as a series of sequentially related, geographically dispersed clashes between U.S.- and Chinese-aligned forces that span many domains. Such conflict could last for years and severely stress a U.S. military already addressing competing demands for security assistance from allies and partners and potentially tackling severe transnational threats as well.
- The United States should consider bolstering its ability to wage low-intensity war, which is a more likely scenario for U.S.-China conflict than a high-intensity war.
- Planners should ensure U.S. ability to defend and secure vital choke points in the Middle East and along the Indian Ocean.
- Planners should focus on alliance building and on weapons and platforms that help gain the information advantage and mitigate long-range strike capabilities.
