首先，这篇论文有一个“公认的”前题，那就是在美“第一代华人”的英语发音比在美“第一代日本人”的英语发音要“优美”些。如果你不认同此前题，不要往下走了， 得先就此前题论战一番。
好了，没停在上面，都是“前题”的公认者，论文如下。
如果没有哈佛与哈佛的“教育事业”，在美的第一代华人的英语发音会比实际发生的要差。因为，发声语音的起点会不同。
历史公认（又一个公认，*_*），没有美国的参与，热情的参与，第二次世界大战会拖的更长，也许更长一二十年。长到在中国的许多中国人要学习日语，作为后果，一旦来美华人与来美日本人一样用日语为“母语”学习英语，那个相比较的发音“优美些”就不复存在了。
而美国摆脱“孤立主义”的厌世情绪，毅然参与第二次世界大战，后果于日本海军的军舰与战机对夏威夷的恶意偷袭。有了被日本海军的偷袭，美国才毅然参战。而让日本海军偷袭成为可能的第一责任人，是海军领兵的山本五十六大将。
山本五十六是怎样成为如此高能的战将的呢？哈佛的教育。在1919年至1921年，也就是恶意偷袭前的20年，山本五十六在哈佛以“特殊学生”的身份上了两个学期的课（有说法只上了不到一个学期）。正是这个在哈佛的“高校教育”，让山本五十六成为了“完整的”山本五十六。可以说，“没有哈佛也就没有完整的山本五十六”。没有了“完整的山本五十六”，也就不会有“成功的”偷袭珍珠港，也就消除了“美国摆脱‘孤立主义’的厌世情绪”的条件。日本在中国的占领会更长，中国人“说日本话”的机会大增，后来进入美国的华人说日本话的可能在大增的基础上伴随大增，也就没有了“英语发音要‘优美’些”的可能。
哈佛大学对第一代华人英语发音的重大贡献，通过教育山本五十六。
论文毕。
后注：下一个论文预告----“哈佛教育山本与孔子‘有教无类’伟大思想的原创与山寨顺序分析”。
后注2：嗯， 哈佛人也评论过，虽然严谨程度差大幅度了。见下：
这是文章链接：Yamamoto at Harvard, and a Harvard Community Garden | Harvard Magazine
（“Harvard Magazine”的文章，没著名。）
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who led the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, was a special student at Harvard from 1919 to 1921. Seymour Morris Jr. ’68, M.B.A. ’72, of New York City, advances a theory that lessons Yamamoto learned at the University emboldened him to launch the attack, and that if the United States military had known their enemy as well as he knew them, they might not have been caught flatfooted, betting that he would first attack the Philippines.
In American History Revised: 200 Startling Facts That Never Made It Into the Textbooks (Broadway Books), Morris argues that if Washington had done some serious background checking into Yamamoto’s student days, they would have uncovered useful clues to his psychological makeup. “Classmates would have remembered Yamamoto well: a hard worker but not a grind, exceptionally curious and imaginative,” Morris writes. “When they introduced him to the game of poker, he became a fanatical poker player who would stay up all night, winning hand after hand. And what did he do with his poker winnings--lead the good life? No, not at all: he hitchhiked around the country during the summer, exploring America.” Years later, as a naval attaché at the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C., and still a compulsive poker player, Yamamoto gambled with members of the United States military. “Spurred on by his victories,” Morris writes, “he developed contempt for the mental agility of his American naval opponents at the poker table.”
Yamamoto strongly opposed Japan’s entry into the war; he feared American might. But when ordered, he would do his best. As commander of the Combined Fleet, he calculated that to beat the United States, it was necessary to strike first. “Yamamoto wasn’t a great poker player for nothing,” writes Morris. He resolved, as in poker, to “blow the best player out of the game, good and early....The shame of the Joint Chiefs was their lack of imagination in trying to figure out their opponent. They thought of him as a traditional Japanese who would do everything ‘by the book’ (just as they did). They failed to consider that maybe, just maybe, Isoroku Yamamoto was more American than they were.”
