你的“我最佩服和最不佩服的三个半”（http://game.ali213.net/viewthread.php?tid=2692116&page=1#pid25951613）我也去看了。其他的二战名将不好说，也就继续说说巴顿。
ZT你的句子：
“巴顿的问题在于他是专才，不是全才。”“1944年秋梅斯战役屡次攻坚不下，伤亡太大。这其中有后勤跟不上的原因，这不能怪巴顿。但巴顿命令20军军长沃克(就是后来朝鲜战争前期的第八集团军司令)不惜代价强攻，则是一个战术错误，反映了他过强的优势意识。”
我认为将军是不需要全才的，统帅才需要全才。将军最重要的职责就是把仗打好，而统帅则需要统筹兼顾，精于计划和协调各方各面的利益。从这个角度来说，巴顿和艾森豪威尔是将军和统帅的楷模。
巴顿的杰出在于他战场上的嗅觉和判断力。你提到的44年秋梅斯战役，如果按照巴顿最初的想法--坚持运动中歼灭德军的有生力量，就不会有强攻Metz的发生。而且如果艾森豪威尔把给蒙哥马利的补给给巴顿的话，欧洲战场或许提早几个月结束。以下摘自维基：
Patton's experience suggested that a major US and Allied advantage was in mobility. This was the result of a greater number of US trucks, higher reliability of US tanks, better radio communications, all contributing to superior ability to operate at a high tempo. Slow attacks were wasteful and resulted in high losses; they also permitted the Germans to prepare multiple defensive positions rather than withdraw from one defense to another after inflicting heavy casualties on US and Allied forces. He refused to operate that way.
The time needed to resupply was just enough to allow the Germans to further fortify the fortress of Metz. In October and November, the Third Army was mired in a near-stalemate with the Germans, with heavy casualties on both sides. By November 23, however, Metz had finally fallen to the Americans, the first time the city had been taken since the Franco-Prussian War.
顾侠以后有机会可看看Patton 360，里面很多细节很值得一看。
另外，你提到的当时德国投降后苏联红军的实际困境，巴顿当时清楚的看到了：
摘自维基：
“After the surrender of May 8, 1945 eliminated the threat of Nazi Germany, Patton was quick to assert the Soviet Union would cease to be an ally of the United States. He was concerned that some 25,000 American POWs had been liberated from POW camps by the Soviets, but were never returned to the US. In fact, he urged his superiors to evict the Soviets from central and eastern Europe. Patton thought that the Red Army was weak, under-supplied, and vulnerable, and the United States should act on these weaknesses before the Soviets could consolidate their position. In this regard, he told then-Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson that the "point system" being used to demobilize Third Army troops was destroying it and creating a vacuum that the Soviets would exploit. "Mr. Secretary, for God’s sake, when you go home, stop this point system; stop breaking up these armies," pleaded the general. "Let’s keep our boots polished, bayonets sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to these people, the Soviets. This is the only language they understand." Asked by Patterson — who would become Secretary of War a few months later — what he would do, Patton replied: "I would have you tell the Red Army where their border is, and give them a limited time to get back across. Warn them that if they fail to do so, we will push them back across it."”
假如当时美军把苏军打退回苏联境内（但正如你所说，进军苏联本土就完全是另一码事了），可能二战后的世界就是另外一副景象了。美国及其欧洲的盟友对苏联就是压倒性的优势，可能没有冷战，也不会发生韩战了。。。
ZT你的句子：
“巴顿的问题在于他是专才，不是全才。”“1944年秋梅斯战役屡次攻坚不下，伤亡太大。这其中有后勤跟不上的原因，这不能怪巴顿。但巴顿命令20军军长沃克(就是后来朝鲜战争前期的第八集团军司令)不惜代价强攻，则是一个战术错误，反映了他过强的优势意识。”
我认为将军是不需要全才的，统帅才需要全才。将军最重要的职责就是把仗打好，而统帅则需要统筹兼顾，精于计划和协调各方各面的利益。从这个角度来说，巴顿和艾森豪威尔是将军和统帅的楷模。
巴顿的杰出在于他战场上的嗅觉和判断力。你提到的44年秋梅斯战役，如果按照巴顿最初的想法--坚持运动中歼灭德军的有生力量，就不会有强攻Metz的发生。而且如果艾森豪威尔把给蒙哥马利的补给给巴顿的话，欧洲战场或许提早几个月结束。以下摘自维基：
Patton's experience suggested that a major US and Allied advantage was in mobility. This was the result of a greater number of US trucks, higher reliability of US tanks, better radio communications, all contributing to superior ability to operate at a high tempo. Slow attacks were wasteful and resulted in high losses; they also permitted the Germans to prepare multiple defensive positions rather than withdraw from one defense to another after inflicting heavy casualties on US and Allied forces. He refused to operate that way.
The time needed to resupply was just enough to allow the Germans to further fortify the fortress of Metz. In October and November, the Third Army was mired in a near-stalemate with the Germans, with heavy casualties on both sides. By November 23, however, Metz had finally fallen to the Americans, the first time the city had been taken since the Franco-Prussian War.
顾侠以后有机会可看看Patton 360，里面很多细节很值得一看。
另外，你提到的当时德国投降后苏联红军的实际困境，巴顿当时清楚的看到了：
摘自维基：
“After the surrender of May 8, 1945 eliminated the threat of Nazi Germany, Patton was quick to assert the Soviet Union would cease to be an ally of the United States. He was concerned that some 25,000 American POWs had been liberated from POW camps by the Soviets, but were never returned to the US. In fact, he urged his superiors to evict the Soviets from central and eastern Europe. Patton thought that the Red Army was weak, under-supplied, and vulnerable, and the United States should act on these weaknesses before the Soviets could consolidate their position. In this regard, he told then-Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson that the "point system" being used to demobilize Third Army troops was destroying it and creating a vacuum that the Soviets would exploit. "Mr. Secretary, for God’s sake, when you go home, stop this point system; stop breaking up these armies," pleaded the general. "Let’s keep our boots polished, bayonets sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to these people, the Soviets. This is the only language they understand." Asked by Patterson — who would become Secretary of War a few months later — what he would do, Patton replied: "I would have you tell the Red Army where their border is, and give them a limited time to get back across. Warn them that if they fail to do so, we will push them back across it."”
假如当时美军把苏军打退回苏联境内（但正如你所说，进军苏联本土就完全是另一码事了），可能二战后的世界就是另外一副景象了。美国及其欧洲的盟友对苏联就是压倒性的优势，可能没有冷战，也不会发生韩战了。。。
选择“Disable on www.wenxuecity.com”
选择“don't run on pages on this domain”
