http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3937&tx_ttnews[backPid]=196&no_cache=1
Pre-emptive operations or spoiling attacks have been part of the PLA’s doctrine since its beginning as the Red Army. Thus, in the event of problems in the South China Sea, or over Taiwan, the PLA could attack a third-party if the Chinese leadership thought it might intervene and upset its operations. Alternatively, it might initiate the attack early, even if not fully prepared to forestall intervention by taking over the areas earlier. This would occur if its strategic deterrence systems were seen to be under threat. China certainly feels threatened by any ballistic missile defense systems in North East Asia that threaten its ballistic missile land-based deterrence system. U.S. President Richard Nixon identified China as a “rogue nation” in 1969 to justify the deployment of the Sentinel BMD system and the proposed deployment and acquisition of BMDs by Taiwan and Japan in 1996 made sections of the in the Chinese government feel that these were parts of a United States containment strategy [8]. If China felt threatened it might launch its nuclear-armed missiles “on warning of threat,” believing that if it waited to “launch on warning” (of a launch) or wait until “launch under attack” its missiles would be intercepted before they could be used. China believes the latter scenarios destroy the basis of its strategic deterrence.
PRC (People's Republic of China) concept of active defense:
After 1949, majorities the military campaign the PLA conducted was not aiming at explain territories, but rather in what the Chinese called active defense. Active defense calls for a quick reaction before enemies are ready to strike, preferably on their own territory. Active defense has two elements. First is to minimize damage to China' own infrastructure, by conducting the war at enemy's backyard. Secondly is to create a psychological or political shock to the enemy, by upsetting the enemy's strategy and expectations, and acquiesce in a new status quo that is much more favorable to China. Many times those two elements of active defense come together to PRC leadership's push for war. When they felt the threats, imaginary or real, the PRC would order the PLA to strike first.
The Korean War Example:
The reason PRC sent 600,000 troops to aid the North Korean was party due to the threat of MacArthur would carry the war to North China, especially during the last months of 1952, when US troops were cross the Yalu River on number of occasions [4]. The PRC's contingency plan called for attack once the UN cross the line [Yalu], with fully calculated knowledge that many of the PVA will not return. But due to the 'intelligence failure' on the UN/US side, the PVA accomplished the tactical surprise it planed for [5]. This is the first example of the active defense carry out by the PLA, as stated in the active defense doctrine, China did not gain any territory.
1962 Sino-Indian War:
The second example active defense is the 1962 Chinese invasion of contested territory along the Sino-Indian border. PRC felt that India's forward policy was rooted in a perception of Chinese weakness, especially after the Sino-Soviet alliance collapse and the aftermath of economic collapse of the Great Leap Forward. Again PRC used her active defense doctrine. In addition to carry the war in enemy's territory, the other purpose of the operation appears to have been to direct a psychological shock; instead of holding on to the captured territory as a "bargaining chip," which might have seemed to be the more obvious strategy, the Chinese withdrew from it unilaterally. Some would state that military speaking, India were ready to counterattack and PLA is running out of supply, but the psychological shock had been completed. The shock that was created cancels any chance of a long draw out Sino-Indian war. If PRC ordered the PLA to hold the captured territories, the Indian certainty will not back down so easily.
The Sino-Indian war also acted as a signal to the United State, to stop the US-KMT operations in supporting of the Tibetan insurgency. For Beijing, she viewed the New Delhi's turned a blind eye to CIA activates with the refugees in India, and the forward policy happened in the same period of warning Indian-American relations and Tibetan raids against the Xinjing-Tibet highway. According the John W. Garver "To Beijing all this looked like a conspiracy to destabilized Chinese rule in Tibet." [6] The war was also a warning shot to United Stated to call off its intelligent operations in China.
From the above wars, it is easy to put China intentions invasion of Vietnam in 1979. As stated in the workings of active defense, in which territories were not the object, but rather to create a political shock that Soviet will not aid Vietnam militarily and change the status quo in favor of the PRC.
Pre-emptive operations or spoiling attacks have been part of the PLA’s doctrine since its beginning as the Red Army. Thus, in the event of problems in the South China Sea, or over Taiwan, the PLA could attack a third-party if the Chinese leadership thought it might intervene and upset its operations. Alternatively, it might initiate the attack early, even if not fully prepared to forestall intervention by taking over the areas earlier. This would occur if its strategic deterrence systems were seen to be under threat. China certainly feels threatened by any ballistic missile defense systems in North East Asia that threaten its ballistic missile land-based deterrence system. U.S. President Richard Nixon identified China as a “rogue nation” in 1969 to justify the deployment of the Sentinel BMD system and the proposed deployment and acquisition of BMDs by Taiwan and Japan in 1996 made sections of the in the Chinese government feel that these were parts of a United States containment strategy [8]. If China felt threatened it might launch its nuclear-armed missiles “on warning of threat,” believing that if it waited to “launch on warning” (of a launch) or wait until “launch under attack” its missiles would be intercepted before they could be used. China believes the latter scenarios destroy the basis of its strategic deterrence.
PRC (People's Republic of China) concept of active defense:
After 1949, majorities the military campaign the PLA conducted was not aiming at explain territories, but rather in what the Chinese called active defense. Active defense calls for a quick reaction before enemies are ready to strike, preferably on their own territory. Active defense has two elements. First is to minimize damage to China' own infrastructure, by conducting the war at enemy's backyard. Secondly is to create a psychological or political shock to the enemy, by upsetting the enemy's strategy and expectations, and acquiesce in a new status quo that is much more favorable to China. Many times those two elements of active defense come together to PRC leadership's push for war. When they felt the threats, imaginary or real, the PRC would order the PLA to strike first.
The Korean War Example:
The reason PRC sent 600,000 troops to aid the North Korean was party due to the threat of MacArthur would carry the war to North China, especially during the last months of 1952, when US troops were cross the Yalu River on number of occasions [4]. The PRC's contingency plan called for attack once the UN cross the line [Yalu], with fully calculated knowledge that many of the PVA will not return. But due to the 'intelligence failure' on the UN/US side, the PVA accomplished the tactical surprise it planed for [5]. This is the first example of the active defense carry out by the PLA, as stated in the active defense doctrine, China did not gain any territory.
1962 Sino-Indian War:
The second example active defense is the 1962 Chinese invasion of contested territory along the Sino-Indian border. PRC felt that India's forward policy was rooted in a perception of Chinese weakness, especially after the Sino-Soviet alliance collapse and the aftermath of economic collapse of the Great Leap Forward. Again PRC used her active defense doctrine. In addition to carry the war in enemy's territory, the other purpose of the operation appears to have been to direct a psychological shock; instead of holding on to the captured territory as a "bargaining chip," which might have seemed to be the more obvious strategy, the Chinese withdrew from it unilaterally. Some would state that military speaking, India were ready to counterattack and PLA is running out of supply, but the psychological shock had been completed. The shock that was created cancels any chance of a long draw out Sino-Indian war. If PRC ordered the PLA to hold the captured territories, the Indian certainty will not back down so easily.
The Sino-Indian war also acted as a signal to the United State, to stop the US-KMT operations in supporting of the Tibetan insurgency. For Beijing, she viewed the New Delhi's turned a blind eye to CIA activates with the refugees in India, and the forward policy happened in the same period of warning Indian-American relations and Tibetan raids against the Xinjing-Tibet highway. According the John W. Garver "To Beijing all this looked like a conspiracy to destabilized Chinese rule in Tibet." [6] The war was also a warning shot to United Stated to call off its intelligent operations in China.
From the above wars, it is easy to put China intentions invasion of Vietnam in 1979. As stated in the workings of active defense, in which territories were not the object, but rather to create a political shock that Soviet will not aid Vietnam militarily and change the status quo in favor of the PRC.
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