>>你知道分弹头的直径是远远小于火箭的直径
而且都是锥行的, 根本放不了雷达, 发电设备和燃料.<<
F-22A nose houses APG-77 radar. And guess what? Its shape is approximately conical. And Guess what? The nose of F-22A at the widest section is no more than 1 meter in its diameter.
APG-77 radar has peak power output rating of 12KW. An AESA radar in the targeting warhead will only need to operate for no more than 10 minutes as the strike warheads will be flying towards surface targets at Mach 10 (or 3.4 KM/sec). I do not know the precise altitude (obviously top secret) over which post-boost vehicles (aka warheads) separate from the second stage (DF-21 is a 2 stage solid fuelled rocket). However, Given my original assumption that the targeting warhead will maintain altitude above 50K, the flight time of the remaining strike packages will be no more than 20 seconds after targeting warhead's AESA radar switches on. Even assuming that targeting warhead's AESA radar is on from the moment of post-boost separation and maximum burn time of an MRBM is only 10 minutes, we are looking at peak power requirement of no more than 10 minutes at 12KW. Existing fuel cell technologies powering cars, electronics and space shuttles have power output at 400KW and they fit in a car's boot along with engine.
Let's list the claims you have made thus far:
(1) IR/Thermal imaging won't work on a warhead - I agree it would be the case during unpowered re-entry at free fall speed. However that doesn't mean a targeting warhead can't be made to slow down and avoid extreme high temperature upon re-entry and in fact maintain its high altitude to avoid interception by conventional SAM. It has added advantage that only ABM missile will be able to get at it and I already pointed out that there simply aren't enough ABM capable (Standard 3 missiles in the US Navy's inventory) missiles right now or in the future that can be fitted on board a surface ship given the huge size required for a high speed/high altitude kill vehicle to counter a saturation attack from anti-ship ballistic missiles.
(2) Upon re-entry, warhead would be unable to receive or transmit due to radio black out - already pointed out that this problem has been gotten around and given the right geometry a hole can be created through ionise atmosphere to create a communication uplink. US Space Shuttle uses this technique every time.
(3) Radio Command Guidance doesn't work - already pointed out that SA2, being a radio command guided missile, has successfully brought down high speed high performance aircraft despite having only 1 tracking radar and relying solely upon radio command guidance. From the warhead's perspective, the surface ship is almost stationery whereas an aircraft would be moving at high velocity. In addition, the radar cross section of an aircraft is far smaller than a major surface combatant. If SA-2 can do it 40 years ago against a fast moving target, then a warhead can do it against a surface warship via radio command guidance.
(4) Radar on targeting warhead will be jammed by the more powerful radar on the surface ship - AESA radar has low probability of intercept given that thousands of elements will be individually transmitting at a unique frequency and each element also frequency-hop thousand times per second. This makes current known jamming techniques such as spot, sweep, barrage, base, and DRFM jamming ineffectual.
(5) Individual warhead simply does not have the dimension to carry the radar, the fuel and the generator: see my response above.
I am not saying that DF-21 has all of the capabilities I described above. I am making the point that the technologies already exist to make it happen. DF-21 may not be the right package to deliver the capabilities. However, from a technological standpoint, anti-ship ballistic missile is feasible even though the U.S. gave up the idea 30 years ago.