https://www.ft.com/content/f8e474aa-a2a9-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849
America is making life difficult for China over North Korea
More sanctions will not, by themselves, curb Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions
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https://www.ft.com/content/f8e474aa-a2a9-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849
September 28, 2017 by Fu Ying North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, conducted on September 3 in defiance of the international consensus on non-proliferation, drew unanimous condemnation. Efforts to contain its nuclear ambitions have again yielded no clear result. Equally frustrating, from a Chinese perspective, is that western media have pointed fingers at China. The international community, China included, certainly has a part to play in upholding non-proliferation. But how the US responds to North Korean provocation matters more than anything else for the regime of Kim Jong Un. Yet the US has shown no willingness to make serious efforts to tackle the real issue (which is to ensure de-nuclearisation by responding to North Korea’s security concerns). Some historical context is useful here. The “agreed framework” signed by the US and North Korea in 1993 required the North Koreans to replace their graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with “light-water” ones, which are proliferation resistant. However, differences between the parties on the implementation of the agreement later led to North Korea announcing that it would resume its nuclear programme. At the end of 2002, China initiated the six-party talks with the US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia. It was no easy job for China to manoeuvre between North Korea and the US, trying to talk the former into giving up its nuclear programme and the latter into addressing North Korea’s security concerns. But so successful were these talks that work began on closing and sealing up the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. Throughout the Obama administration, the US followed a policy of “strategic patience”, which was in fact a cover for inaction Unfortunately, every time progress was made it was promptly derailed. For example, the US decided to impose financial sanctions on North Korea for money laundering just as the six parties were prepared to implement the joint statement agreed in September 2005. North Korea responded with its first nuclear test. Throughout the Obama administration, the US followed a policy of “strategic patience”, which was in fact a cover for inaction. Peace talks came to a halt and sanctions became the only tool for the US, whose real aim was widely believed to be regime change in North Korea. We have since seen a vicious cycle in which North Korea has conducted a further four nuclear tests and countless missile tests. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China administered sanctions under the UN resolutions, but its calls for peace talks went unanswered. All the while, joint military exercises by South Korea and the US grew larger and more sophisticated. As a result, tension continues to rise. The Trump administration has called on China to do more. China has responded by offering stronger support for tougher UN sanctions. It has banned imports of North Korean coal, iron, iron ore and seafood and suspended new joint ventures with North Korea. It has also called for a “double freeze”, in which North Korea would stop its nuclear programme in exchange for the US halting joint military exercises with South Korea. However, the US is single-mindedly pursuing an intensification of the sanctions regime. Yet it is already clear that sanctions alone could not curb North Korea’s nuclear programme. Despite ever tougher sanctions and deepening isolation, North Korea’s gross domestic product in 2016 grew better than at any time in the past 17 years, while agricultural output also improved. In the meantime, unconstrained by any peace talks, North Korea is moving further down the nuclear path, while its relations with China have deteriorated.
https://www.ft.com/content/f8e474aa-a2a9-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849
September 28, 2017 by Fu Ying North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, conducted on September 3 in defiance of the international consensus on non-proliferation, drew unanimous condemnation. Efforts to contain its nuclear ambitions have again yielded no clear result. Equally frustrating, from a Chinese perspective, is that western media have pointed fingers at China. The international community, China included, certainly has a part to play in upholding non-proliferation. But how the US responds to North Korean provocation matters more than anything else for the regime of Kim Jong Un. Yet the US has shown no willingness to make serious efforts to tackle the real issue (which is to ensure de-nuclearisation by responding to North Korea’s security concerns). Some historical context is useful here. The “agreed framework” signed by the US and North Korea in 1993 required the North Koreans to replace their graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with “light-water” ones, which are proliferation resistant. However, differences between the parties on the implementation of the agreement later led to North Korea announcing that it would resume its nuclear programme. At the end of 2002, China initiated the six-party talks with the US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia. It was no easy job for China to manoeuvre between North Korea and the US, trying to talk the former into giving up its nuclear programme and the latter into addressing North Korea’s security concerns. But so successful were these talks that work began on closing and sealing up the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. Throughout the Obama administration, the US followed a policy of “strategic patience”, which was in fact a cover for inaction Unfortunately, every time progress was made it was promptly derailed. For example, the US decided to impose financial sanctions on North Korea for money laundering just as the six parties were prepared to implement the joint statement agreed in September 2005. North Korea responded with its first nuclear test. Throughout the Obama administration, the US followed a policy of “strategic patience”, which was in fact a cover for inaction. Peace talks came to a halt and sanctions became the only tool for the US, whose real aim was widely believed to be regime change in North Korea. We have since seen a vicious cycle in which North Korea has conducted a further four nuclear tests and countless missile tests. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China administered sanctions under the UN resolutions, but its calls for peace talks went unanswered. All the while, joint military exercises by South Korea and the US grew larger and more sophisticated. As a result, tension continues to rise. The Trump administration has called on China to do more. China has responded by offering stronger support for tougher UN sanctions. It has banned imports of North Korean coal, iron, iron ore and seafood and suspended new joint ventures with North Korea. It has also called for a “double freeze”, in which North Korea would stop its nuclear programme in exchange for the US halting joint military exercises with South Korea. However, the US is single-mindedly pursuing an intensification of the sanctions regime. Yet it is already clear that sanctions alone could not curb North Korea’s nuclear programme. Despite ever tougher sanctions and deepening isolation, North Korea’s gross domestic product in 2016 grew better than at any time in the past 17 years, while agricultural output also improved. In the meantime, unconstrained by any peace talks, North Korea is moving further down the nuclear path, while its relations with China have deteriorated.
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https://www.ft.com/content/f8e474aa-a2a9-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849
Yet the US still expects China to influence North Korean policy and behaviour, while ignoring advice and proposals tabled by China and other parties. America has made things even more difficult for China by installing the Thaad anti-missile defence system in South Korea. This has an “X-band radar” capable of monitoring vast swaths of Chinese territory. Rather than providing protection for the South Korean people, the system threatens strategic stability in north-east Asia. The US has so far shown no intention of changing course. Meanwhile, fears about what happens next are growing in South Korea and Japan. In the interests of a peaceful resolution, China must try even harder to get the US and North Korea to take each other’s concerns seriously. Yet if we are really to solve the problem, then both parties need to make concessions. If we allow things to slide, who knows what awaits us?
https://www.ft.com/content/f8e474aa-a2a9-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849
Yet the US still expects China to influence North Korean policy and behaviour, while ignoring advice and proposals tabled by China and other parties. America has made things even more difficult for China by installing the Thaad anti-missile defence system in South Korea. This has an “X-band radar” capable of monitoring vast swaths of Chinese territory. Rather than providing protection for the South Korean people, the system threatens strategic stability in north-east Asia. The US has so far shown no intention of changing course. Meanwhile, fears about what happens next are growing in South Korea and Japan. In the interests of a peaceful resolution, China must try even harder to get the US and North Korea to take each other’s concerns seriously. Yet if we are really to solve the problem, then both parties need to make concessions. If we allow things to slide, who knows what awaits us?
The author is chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress
