辩证法是康德在被称为是哲学史上最具影响力的著作之一的《纯粹理性批判》[i],[ii]中讨论的最核心的一个内容，甚至可以认为该书的高潮就是围绕这辩证这个话题展开的。但是，非常奇怪地，与今天人们将辩证法与黑格尔哲学密切地联系在一起形成鲜明对比的是，今天很少有人将康德的哲学与辩证法联系在一起。甚至在谈论那本传世名著《纯粹理性批判》时，也常有人不对其中的辩证观进行探讨。当然，超验辩证这个词汇经常会出现在人们对康德哲学的介绍中，不过也经常只是照抄康德自己在该书所使用的一个词汇，通常不会对这个词汇与传统的辩证意义的关系进行解释。这种现象的存在与康德在该书中对于辩证意义的特殊处理是不无关联的。
康德认为传统的辩证意义对应的是一种错觉：
古时的哲学家们赋予了‘辩证’这个词汇各种不同的意思当他们将它用作一门科学或艺术的名字时，但是他们对这个术语的实际的运用表明他们其实将它作为一个关于错觉的逻辑的名字---就是这样，仅此而已。在这个意义上，辩证是一套为无知甚至有目的之诡计制造出真理之烟幕的刁钻技巧，它滑稽地模仿逻辑通常具有的方法上的缜密，并运用它的技术性的手段来美化每一种空洞的吹嘘。
（英译原文：
The ancient
philosophers gave the term ‘dialectic’ various different meanings when using it
as the name of a science or art, but their actual use of the term shows that
they meant it as a name for the logic of illusion—that and nothing else. Dialectic
in this sense is a tricky set of techniques for giving an air of truth to ignorance
and even to intentional tricks, which it does by aping the methodical
thoroughness that logic always prescribes, and using its technical
paraphernalia to prettify every empty pretension.
philosophers gave the term ‘dialectic’ various different meanings when using it
as the name of a science or art, but their actual use of the term shows that
they meant it as a name for the logic of illusion—that and nothing else. Dialectic
in this sense is a tricky set of techniques for giving an air of truth to ignorance
and even to intentional tricks, which it does by aping the methodical
thoroughness that logic always prescribes, and using its technical
paraphernalia to prettify every empty pretension.
）
而且认为哲学的一个主要任务便是除去辩证法中由错觉造成的影响：
既然总会有各种形而上学，就总会存在着纯理性的辩证，这是因为辩证对于理性来说是很自然的。所以哲学的第一要务便是，通过堵住错误的源头，来一劳永逸地除去辩证中的不良影响。
（英译原文：
For there always
has been, and always will be, some kind of metaphysics, so there will always be
a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. So the
first and most important task of philosophy is to deprive dialectic of its bad
influence, once and for all, by blocking off the source of the errors.
has been, and always will be, some kind of metaphysics, so there will always be
a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. So the
first and most important task of philosophy is to deprive dialectic of its bad
influence, once and for all, by blocking off the source of the errors.
）
他指出，造成辩证的错觉的原因是人们将原本不属于经验范畴的逻辑运用于与经验相关的知识领域中去，主要表现在两个方面：一方面是将原本应该仅仅是判断法则的一般性逻辑误用为实际产生客观结论的内容依据（他称之为辩证[iii]）；而另一方面则是将不属于经验范畴的超验分析用于经验的领域中。这第二种表现是他在该书中主要讨论的对象，他称之为超验辩证，而相应的错觉被称为超验错觉（transcendental illusion）。
他在将传统的辩证概念与理性的错觉联系在一起之后，他又将辩证一词用于他《纯粹理性批判》一书中提出的克服理性错觉的方法：
这样步骤是配不上哲学之高贵的，因而我们不需要‘辩证’或任何其它的词汇来为这样一种坏东西命名。所以我宁可用‘辩证’这个名词来表示对于前述的辩证错觉的批判；这样一种批判不属于逻辑的一部分，这就是‘辩证’在本书中的意义。
（英译原文：
Such a procedure
is quite unworthy of the dignity of philosophy, ·and we don’t need ‘dialectic’
or any other word to name something so bad·. So I prefer to use the noun ‘dialectic’
to stand for a critique of dialectical illusion; such a critique does count as
part of logic, and that’s how ‘dialectic’ is to be understood in the present
work.
is quite unworthy of the dignity of philosophy, ·and we don’t need ‘dialectic’
or any other word to name something so bad·. So I prefer to use the noun ‘dialectic’
to stand for a critique of dialectical illusion; such a critique does count as
part of logic, and that’s how ‘dialectic’ is to be understood in the present
work.
）
上面这段话的真实意思恐怕要比它的字面意思复杂许多。康德这里要说的实际意思是他在《纯粹理性批判》这本书中将用‘辩证’一词来表示他所提出的方法，它是专门用来揭示传统的辩证错觉的根源从而帮助人们来对它加以克服的。这里容易造成读者误解的是，康德在该书中出现将产生错觉的原因与克服错觉的方法都与辩证一词联系在一起，这应该是因为他的那套方法是专门用来克服他所认为的与传统的辩证意义相关的理性错觉的。在《纯粹理性批判》一书的第二部分中，他更多地用超验错觉一词来表示理性错觉及其产生原因时，而超验辩证一词主要用于他所提出的新的辩证法，也就是他所认为的正确的辩证法。
康德对于辩证错觉的分析的基本要点在于将人的思维分为经验性思维与非经验性思维，也就是所谓的超验的思维。关于经验与错觉的关系康德在《纯粹理性批判》一书的讨论是比较含糊的。一方面他说：
……感觉是不会错的 --- 不是因为它们正确地进行判断而是因为它们根本不做判断！
……
对于感觉的直接反映从不会引入错误，因为它从不会对任何事情做判断，因而在完全遵守着理解定律的任何知识项目也不会有任何错误---除非受到外来的影响，自然力是不会偏离自己的规律的。
（英译原文：
……the senses
don’t err—not because they always judge correctly but because they don’t judge
at all!
don’t err—not because they always judge correctly but because they don’t judge
at all!
……
A representation of the senses never involves error, because it
never makes any judgment whatsoever; and there is no error, either, in any item
of knowledge that completely accords with the laws of understanding—a natural
force can’t deviate from its own laws unless it is
never makes any judgment whatsoever; and there is no error, either, in any item
of knowledge that completely accords with the laws of understanding—a natural
force can’t deviate from its own laws unless it is
influenced from outside itself. . . .
）
但另一方面他又专门对上述的论点做了一个注解：
当感性服从于理解而为理解提供材料时，它是真实的知识的来源。但是当同样的感性影响理解应如何作业并决定理解所做出的判断时，它是错误的基础。
（英译原文：
When sensibility is subordinated to understanding, as providing
the understanding with something to work on, it is the source of real items of
knowledge. But when that same sensibility influences how the understanding
works and dictates the judgments that it makes,
the understanding with something to work on, it is the source of real items of
knowledge. But when that same sensibility influences how the understanding
works and dictates the judgments that it makes,
it’s the basis of error.
）
）
考虑到康德在那本书中第一次提出了的现象（phenomenon）与物自体（Noumenon）的区别，他其实有必要在上面这部分的讨论中对于他在这里所说的感性的真实性的意义做更多的说明：是因为我们无法了解物自体（Noumenon）到底是什么因而是感性一定是彻底的真实呢，还是仅仅强调感性本身不具有人们因判断而引入的错误呢？从上面提到的那个注解的内容看来，康德所说的感性的真实性应该仅仅是强调感性不进行判断，而不是要强调因为我们无法了解物自体（Noumenon）因而感觉到的都是对的；否则的话就不存在注解中所说的感性误导理解而产生错误之说了。换句话说，康德所说的感性的真实性指的应该是感性的内容本身而不是感性与客观对象之间的吻合。
康德在《纯粹理性批判》中主要讨论的是纯粹理性（pure reason）所引起的超验错觉，或者说是提供他对于纯粹理性引起的超验错觉的超验辩证的讨论，而所谓的纯粹理性就是不具备经验内容的理性。康德认为当人们运用纯粹理性时一定会产生超验错觉：
当理性被超验地运用时，其产生的结果不是真理而是错觉；这意味着它不应是超验分析的处理对象，而是超验辩证的处理对象。
（英译原文：
When reason is used in a transcendental way the result is not •truth
but •illusion; which implies that it has to be handled not in the ·transcendental·
•analytic, but rather in the transcendental •dialectic.
but •illusion; which implies that it has to be handled not in the ·transcendental·
•analytic, but rather in the transcendental •dialectic.
）
他认为之所以会这样的基本原因在于理性的本性决定了任何经验都不是理性对象：
它（理性）的对象是概念与判断。因此，即便纯粹理性想要关心客观对象，它直接涉及到的也不会是客观对象或关于对象的直觉，而是理解以及理解所做出的判断，它们才是直接与感观及其直觉打交道以建立起关于客观对象的事实的。理解的（内在）统一性是可能的经验的统一……是经验成为可能不是理性的工作；这就剥夺了理性将任何综合性的统一加在经验上的任何机会……
……
正如理解可以被认为是运用法则来统一表观的功能，理性可以被认为是运用原理来统一理解所依据的法则的功能。因此，理性从不直接应用于经验或任何客观物体。它所作用的是理解：它的角色是通过概念来将理解的复杂的知识网络先验地统一起来。
（英译原文：
What it deals with are •concepts and •judgments. Thus, even if
pure reason does·somehow· concern itself with objects, what it is immediately related
to are not •objects and the intuition of them, but rather •the understanding
and its judgments, which do deal at first hand with the senses and their
intuition for the purpose of establishing facts about their object. The unity of
understanding is the unity of a possible experience
pure reason does·somehow· concern itself with objects, what it is immediately related
to are not •objects and the intuition of them, but rather •the understanding
and its judgments, which do deal at first hand with the senses and their
intuition for the purpose of establishing facts about their object. The unity of
understanding is the unity of a possible experience
…… reason doesn’t have the job of making experience possible; and
that deprives it of any chance of imposing on experience any such synthetic
unity…...
that deprives it of any chance of imposing on experience any such synthetic
unity…...
…
Just as understanding can be seen as the faculty that uses rules to unify
appearances, reason can be seen as the faculty that uses principles to unify
the understanding’s rules. Thus, reason never applies directly to experience or
to any object. What it applies to is the understanding: its role is to give an a priori unity by means of concepts to the understanding’s complex web of items of knowledge.
Just as understanding can be seen as the faculty that uses rules to unify
appearances, reason can be seen as the faculty that uses principles to unify
the understanding’s rules. Thus, reason never applies directly to experience or
to any object. What it applies to is the understanding: its role is to give an a priori unity by means of concepts to the understanding’s complex web of items of knowledge.
）
他对超验错觉与因对经验的错误理解或对逻辑的错误运用而造成的所谓经验错觉或逻辑错觉加以了区别。他指出那另外的两种错觉是可以通过对错误的原因（即对经验的理解或逻辑的运用）的纠正而被消除，但是他声称超验错觉即便被发现了都难以克服，就像人们无法让月亮刚升起是看上去比较大一样地无法克服。他认为这样的错觉的产生是因为将根本不属于经验的原理用于原本属于经验的领域，形象地说，是因为我们的理性所依据的一些主观的基本公理法则具有客观原理的外表。对此他进一步指出解释道：
也就是说，那些其实表示东西具有‘在认知的活动中，做X’的形式的法则却表现为‘真实世界是Y’。这不是简单地实际为主观的看上去象客观的；他们实际上为指导或命令却看上去象提供信息的命题。
（英译原文：
That is, rules that really mean things of the form ‘When engaged
in cognitive activities, do X’ have the appearance of being of the form ‘The real
world is Y’. It’s not just that they are really subjective yet appear to be
objective; but also they are really advice or commands, yet they appear to be
informative propositions·.
in cognitive activities, do X’ have the appearance of being of the form ‘The real
world is Y’. It’s not just that they are really subjective yet appear to be
objective; but also they are really advice or commands, yet they appear to be
informative propositions·.
）
相应地，他声称他《纯粹理性批判》一书中提出的超验辩证法就是针对这种难以预防的错觉的：
所以超验辩证法将用于揭示超验判断的错觉，同时也帮助我们避免被它欺骗。
（英译原文：
So the transcendental dialectic will content itself with exposing
the illusion of transcendent judgments, while also keeping us from being
deceived by it.
the illusion of transcendent judgments, while also keeping us from being
deceived by it.
）
康德在该书中提出了纯粹理性导致超验错觉的三种基本类型：纯粹理性谬误推理（The paralogisms of
pure reason），纯粹理性的二律背反（The antinomy of pure reason），以及纯粹理性之理想（The ideal of pure
reason），并指出它们分别对应于心理学，宇宙学，以及神学。其中，他对柏拉图的理念进行的批判性的讨论，认为柏拉图的理念的主要意义是作为思维的理想原型，然后又提出他自己的与柏拉图不同的理想概念并将之称为Ideal以区别于被柏拉图用作理念以及被用作一般的理想性概念的Idea。
pure reason），纯粹理性的二律背反（The antinomy of pure reason），以及纯粹理性之理想（The ideal of pure
reason），并指出它们分别对应于心理学，宇宙学，以及神学。其中，他对柏拉图的理念进行的批判性的讨论，认为柏拉图的理念的主要意义是作为思维的理想原型，然后又提出他自己的与柏拉图不同的理想概念并将之称为Ideal以区别于被柏拉图用作理念以及被用作一般的理想性概念的Idea。
尽管传统意义上的辩证法或更确切地说是被称为柏拉图的辩证法有其非常积极的意义，但是由于柏拉图本人并没有将其解释清楚，更由于人们在与之相关的实践中的错误，使得传统的辩证法具有了不好的名声，因而得到了亚里士多德与康德的否定。但是，亚里士多德并没有指出辩证法出现问题的原因，而康德则识图通过对人的经验与非经验思维的分析来指出导致辩证法出问题的原因。在他看来，人类的思维特性本身决定了人类思维带有辩证的倾向而这样的辩证思维又具有错觉性。虽然康德在《纯粹理性批判》一书中的很多分析的细节及结论尤其是对于辩证的分析如黑格尔批评的那样是很有缺陷的，他对于人类思维模式的首创性分析，以及相应的对于人类思维因对经验的依赖而具有的局限性（如Noumenon）的提出，以及指出人类会因为本能性的思维倾向而产生错觉的可能性还是具有一定的积极意义的。
他对柏拉图那未解释清楚的理念与辩证法的理解仍然是很片面的。以辩证法为例，尽管对辩证法的讨论是他的《纯粹理性分析》一书的核心内容，他对辩证法的观点却是消极的。他所强调的只是辩证思维之不可避免及其所带有的错觉性，而没有看到辩证思维的积极意义。或者按照他的话说，他的辩证法的积极意义仅在于揭示并克服人们天然的辩证倾向中的错觉。其后的黑格尔则看到了辩证法的积极意义。
[i] Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 1929,
London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. URL:
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-kemp-smith.pdf
London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. URL:
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-kemp-smith.pdf
[ii]《纯粹理性批判》，康德，蓝公武译，北京：商务印书馆出版 1997，链接：http://bjzc.org/lib/54/shkx/ts054072.pdf
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